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Savings and debt as well as the financial intermediation in between are at the heart of every 
economic system. When an economic system is under stress, disrupted or accused of 
malfunctioning, it is essential to investigate the core mechanisms and established patterns of this 
system. The financial crisis of 2008 and the following recession represent this type of disruption 
that provides cause to examine the fundamentals of our economic system. Thus, this dissertation 
challenges common wisdom and established theories on private-sector saving and debt as well as 
the role of financial intermediation in view of the financial crisis and the following recession in 
recent years.  
Economic agents who save provide funds to economic agents who take on debt and invest. 
Saving and debt are thus inevitably interlinked. The household sector thereby typically has a 
surplus of savings over investments and provides these funds to the overall economy, whereas the 
corporate sector is believed to invest more than it saves and consequently borrows from the 
household sector. These patterns are standard for the institutional sectors in a market-based 
economy. There would likely not be any significant private investment without the pooling of 
savers’ funds by financial intermediaries. When more funds are pooled in terms of the share of 
the population that participates in financial intermediation and in terms of the volume of funds 
that are intermediated (e.g., private credit or bank deposits relative to GDP), financial 
intermediaries are more effective in conducting their inherent task. The role of these three parties 
– savers, borrowers and financial intermediaries – has been and will continue to be at the core of 
debates surrounding the financial crisis. In the following three chapters of this dissertation, I 
examine these three parties from different perspectives.  
All chapters are based on empirical research. I thereby build the regression estimations based on 
unique cross-country panel datasets that were partially assembled by me, based on the 
aggregation of micro-level data (chapter 2) and datasets that represent a combination of different 
existing macro-level datasets (chapters 3 and 4). Common wisdom regarding the three parties and 
theories establishing the underlying rationale are challenged in this dissertation. I thereby study 
time horizons that are directly linked to the financial crisis (chapters 2 and 3) and long-term 
developments occurring over the course of five decades (chapter 4). Chapter 2 investigates the 
saving behavior of the corporate sector prior to the financial crisis and over a longer-term 
horizon, as the corporate sector was accused of excessive saving. Herein, I challenge the widely 
established saving glut hypothesis with a focus on corporate savings. Similar to the allegedly 
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unusual behavior of the corporate sector, the behavior of the household sector was also atypical 
before the crisis. Households in many Western economies reduced their saving rates prior to the 
financial crisis and amassed large amounts of debt. Household sectors consequently became net 
borrowers. The effect of this debt and the deleveraging following the financial crisis on the 
aggregate demand channel and unemployment are investigated in chapter 3. Chapter 4 is also 
motivated by the debates that arose during the course of the financial crisis; this chapter examines 
how financial intermediation evolved during the last five decades and how this financial 
development affects income inequality. 
The contribution of this dissertation to the existing literature is manifold. By incorporating 
aggregated firm-level data in a macro-level analysis of corporate savings, chapter 2 shows that 
the System of National Accounts ought to be amended by an alternative measure of gross 
savings. Furthermore, examining the link between household sector debt and unemployment, 
chapter 3 confirms existing empirical research on the United States and Australia for Europe and 
particularly Spain and provides a basis for the analysis of the increase in unemployment 
following the financial crisis. Chapter 4 tests established theories and rejects older empirical 
research on the link between financial development and income inequality and can thus assist 
policy makers in understanding this nexus and addressing potential inequality issues. The 
timeliness of this dissertation and the relevance of the topics investigated are demonstrated, for 
example, by recent coverage of the chapters in The Economist. A special report on the world 
economy (“For richer, for poorer”, The Economist (Oct. 13, 2012)) focuses on inequality issues. 
Another article discusses academic research regarding the magnitude of [the traditional definition 
of] corporate savings (“Dead Money”, The Economist (Nov. 3, 2012)). Furthermore, 
unemployment in Spain is at the center of European business news (e.g., “The euro zone isn’t 
working”, The Economist (Oct. 31, 2012)). Thus, this dissertation addresses highly topical 
macroeconomic issues that are relevant for the public, policymakers and academia. The following 
three paragraphs provide a brief motivation and summary of chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
Chapter 2 
When one analyzes the financial crisis, one reason for the initial burst of the American housing 
and subprime bubble can be found in the low interest rate in the years preceding the crisis. This 
low interest rate was caused by, among other factors, a “global saving glut”. Ben Bernanke 
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postulated this global saving glut (cf. Bernanke (2005)) and thought of it as increasing saving 
rates around the world. Subsequently, it was primarily the corporate sector that was blamed for 
having excessively saved. In chapter 2, I investigate this global saving glut with regard to the 
corporate sector. I find evidence to confirm this hypothesis when using standard national account 
figures and when corporate savings consist of retained profits. However, listed companies in 
many advanced economies changed their payout behavior in the 1990s and 2000s from dividends 
to share repurchases, which are another medium for distributing profits to shareholders. In this 
chapter, I aggregate share repurchases from listed companies in 30 OECD countries and correct 
the official corporate sector saving rate for aggregated share repurchases. This method leads to 
the rejection of the saving glut hypothesis for the corporate sector and shows that the corporate 
sector on aggregate did not significantly change its saving behavior relative to GDP in the “global 
saving glut” period. The study of the drivers of the corporate saving rate reveals that the most 
important determinants of the aggregate corporate saving rate are the lagged saving rate and 
profits. The first contribution of this chapter to the literature is that private-sector saving is 
normally studied as a whole or with a focus on household saving, but the corporate sector, which 
is typically neglected, is at the center of this research. Second, share repurchases have been 
investigated in detail in the finance literature, but to the best of my knowledge, there have been 
no attempts to aggregate share repurchases for a large number of countries and to study the macro 
effects of this changing payout behavior. Third, this research clarifies that the corporate sector 
cannot be charged with having excessively high gross savings in its original sense because the 
sector did not change its saving behavior significantly relative to the reference period of the 
global saving glut.      
Chapter 3 
As stated, the household sector is typically the net lender of capital to the entire economy. 
However, households in the United States and many European countries loaded their balance 
sheets with excessive amounts of debt prior to the financial crisis. Realizing that these debt loads 
cannot be sustained in the context of the financial crisis, the household sector began a 
deleveraging process. The theoretical foundation for this deleveraging is exemplified in the work 
of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). Deleveraging began earlier in the United States than in 
Europe, and the effects of this deleveraging on consumption or via the aggregate demand channel 
on employment have been subject to studies by Dynan (2012) and Mian and Sufi (2012). Chapter 
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3, which is adapted from Jauch and Watzka (2012), closely follows the approach of Mian and 
Sufi (2012) and investigates the effects of household debt at the country level in Europe and at a 
regional level in Spain. At the European country level, we confirm that increases in household 
debt are linked to an increasing contribution of household sector consumption expenditures to 
GDP growth, and decreases in household debt are associated with a lower contribution of 
household sector consumption expenditures to GDP growth. Furthermore, economies with a high 
level of household debt or high increases in household debt exhibit a steeper decline in 
employment or increases in unemployment in the economic downturn. To prove that there is a 
direct link from household debt via the aggregate demand channel to unemployment, we 
investigate Spanish provinces. On a regional level, we can separate local from national demand 
shocks. Because household debt is heterogeneous across provinces, provinces that experience a 
higher debt level relative to GDP should observe a steeper decline in consumption. This 
consumption is linked to local demand and thus local non-tradable sector unemployment. 
Differentiating between non-tradable and tradable sectors consequently enables us to confirm the 
negative effects of household deleveraging; in our estimation, this deleveraging caused one-third 
of the increase in Spanish unemployment from November 2007 to November 2010. This chapter 
contributes to the recent field of empirical deleveraging studies by first investigating Europe and 
then considering Spain, which is one of the economies that experienced especially high increases 
in unemployment. Our European and Spanish findings confirm the results for the United States 
and Australia. Thus, chapter 3 provides a fact base for policymakers with regard to the reasons 
for the increase in unemployment and for macro-prudential regulators who are concerned with 
potential negative implications of household sector debt.  
Chapter 4 
Although chapter 3 discusses the potential negative effects of household debt, household debt 
may also have beneficial effects. In fact, access to finance is viewed as especially positive 
because it enables individuals to borrow, to pursue investments in human capital or to found 
businesses. Hence, greater debt and easy access to credit can be viewed as financial development 
that improves career and business opportunities for all individuals and thus fosters income 
equality in a society. This reasoning is key in the theories proposed by Banerjee and Newman 
(1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Chapter 4, which is 
adapted from Jauch and Watzka (2011), examines this effect of financial development on income 
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inequality and tests the aforementioned theories. Existing empirical research that investigates the 
financial development income inequality nexus has confirmed the theories that greater financial 
development reduces income inequality. We use a broader dataset in terms of countries and a 
broader time horizon to estimate the relationship with more appropriate estimation techniques 
and a consistent measure of inequality. Using the same OLS approach that was used in previous 
research confirms Kuznets curve with respect to the effect of economic development on income 
inequality and the lowering effect of financial development on income inequality. However, 
when we control for time and country-specific effects, among other factors, and use appropriate 
standard errors, the results lead us to reject the Kuznets curve. Furthermore, we find that 
increased financial development is followed by a more unequal distribution of income. These 
findings are robust to different econometric specifications, different measures of financial 
development and different subsamples of the dataset. Although financial development may lead 
to more equal opportunities, it does not lead to a more equal outcome regarding income. The 
contribution of this chapter to the literature is that, to the best of our knowledge, we use the 
largest and most comparable cross-country dataset on income inequality to study the effects of 
financial development. This approach enables us to correct for data issues and a lack of coverage 
in previous research. The findings are important with regard to policy measures that aim to 
reduce income inequality because we show that more finance does not necessarily need to be a 
supportive factor, but it rather enables talented individuals to extract higher incomes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Global Saving Glut Revisited –  
Corporate Savings and the Role of Share 
Repurchases 
 
Abstract 
Given that at the time that the “global saving glut” was announced, the global saving rate showed 
one of its lowest values in the past three decades, this study seeks to investigate corporate saving 
patterns, which are alleged to be significant contributors to the saving glut. I build a unique 
dataset with aggregated share repurchases organized on the country level to examine how the 
corporate saving rate would actually behave if the System of National Accounts was adjusted for 
changing firm payout behaviors, i.e., the increasing distribution of funds to shareholders by 
substituting dividends for share repurchases. Using this newly calculated saving rate, I reject the 
corporate saving glut hypothesis for the G7 countries. To deepen the understanding of aggregated 
corporate saving patterns, I use a large, unique cross-country panel dataset. This shows that 
among the examined factors, the lagged saving rate and profitability have the highest impact on 
the corporate saving rate.  
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2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Many different explanations of the recent financial crisis have been suggested. One proposed 
cause of this crisis is the global saving glut that contributed to low interest rates, particularly in 
the United States, and thereby encouraged risky investments that partially turned out to be bad 
ones. The foundations of this argument about the global saving glut were established in March 
2005 by Ben Bernanke in his speech addressing “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current 
Account Deficit” (cf. Bernanke (2005)), which introduced the notion of a global saving glut. 
Bernanke was correct if the global gross saving rate excluding the United States was considered 
on a worldwide basis and compared with the gross saving rate of the United States. The United 
States was by far the largest importer of capital in the world, whereas the remainder of the world 
possessed a savings surplus and exported capital. These large inflows of capital into the United 
States helped maintain interest rates at historically low levels. The wide range of literature that 
addresses the global imbalances generated by the existence of various exporting or surplus 
countries, such as China, Japan and Germany, and one large importer, the United States, relates 
to this discussion. A discussion of different explanations for the global imbalances is for example 
given by Eichengreen (2006). The saving glut is frequently interpreted in terms of saving 
differences between the United States and the rest of the world, primarily Asia (cf. Chinn 
(2005)); in Bernanke’s view, these differences are closely linked to global imbalances with 
respect to current accounts. However, one can also consider the saving glut from a pure savings 
perspective and ask how much capital is provided by the institutional sectors and countries in the 
world to maintain fixed capital investments (i.e., to compensate for depreciation) and to increase 
the global stock of capital through new investments.  
I examine this gross saving rate on a truly global basis and find a different picture than the saving 
glut theory would imply. The saving rate
1
 on a global basis had been trending downward for the 
past three decades. In particular, this rate peaked in the late 1970s and declined in long cycles. 
The peak of the saving rate cycle in the 1970s is higher than the peak of the saving rate cycle in 
the 1980s; similarly, the peak saving rate is higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s, and the peak 
saving rate in the 1990s is greater than the peak saving rate in the 2000s. Therefore, the saving 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this article “saving rate” and “savings” always refer to gross savings. The concept of gross savings 
includes the consumption of fixed capital (depreciation). This consumption represents the difference between 
gross savings and net savings. The difference between gross savings and net lending primarily represents gross 
fixed capital formation (investment) (cf. Lequiller and Blades (2006), p.193).  
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glut prior to the recent financial crisis is certainly not due to an increase in the global saving rate 
above its long-term average, as the global saving rate decreased by approximately 1.2 percentage 
points of GDP between the 1970s and the 2000s. Excluding the United States, the global saving 
rate reached its peaks of 1977 and 1989 again in 2006. The trend line for this rate indicates an 
increase of just 0.01 percentage points per year. At the time of Bernanke’s speech, this rate was 
just above its average of the preceding decades and its trend had been stable for the preceding 30 
years (cf. figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1  
Global gross saving rate including and excluding the United States 
 
 
 
Data source: World Bank – World Development Finance. 
Decomposing the saving rate in terms of the institutional sectors of the world economy, namely, 
households, corporations and governments, as for example done by the McKinsey Global 
Institute (2010), reveals the increasing importance of the corporate sector with respect to the 
global supply of capital. Government sector savings are of minor importance on a global basis. In 
recent decades, household saving rates declined in the developed world, with the steepest 
decreases in Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, and increased in emerging 
markets, such as China and India. In contrast to the developments in the household sector, the 
corporate sector increased its share of total savings and its relative saving rate in both developed 
and emerging economies. This sector accounts for approximately 2/3 of the supply of capital in 
the developed world today. Various entities responded to Bernanke’s speech by arguing that 
corporations were leading the global saving glut (cf. The Economist (2005) or Loeys et. al 
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(2005)) and the increasing importance of corporate saving was leading to the conventional 
wisdom of excessive corporate savings. This point of excess corporate savings was made clear in 
analyses by André et al. (2007) and the International Monetary Fund (2006), which indicated that 
corporate savings were increasing; in fact, corporate savings surpassed corporate fixed capital 
investment in large OECD countries during several years of the early 2000s. Thus, the corporate 
sector became a net lender to the economy with high net financial surpluses. It was commonly 
assumed that the increase in corporate savings was merely a short-term phenomenon that would 
quickly fade (cf. Loeys et al. (2005); International Monetary Fund (2006)).  
One consideration that has not been thoroughly accounted for and has traditionally been regarded 
as a secondary concern is the impact of share repurchases on corporate savings. A reason for not 
including share repurchases in analyses of saving data is that share repurchases are part of 
corporate saving according to the official definitions of the System of National Accounts (SNA).
2
 
The magnitude of aggregated share repurchases around the world has not been a focus of 
economic research despite the fact that theoretical and empirical explanations for share 
repurchases have become available. One contribution of this paper is to close this gap by 
aggregating share repurchases on a country level and calculating a new saving rate that reflects 
these aspects of corporate saving.  
Drivers of corporate gross saving can be determined from the supply and the demand side. The 
primary supply-side driver for corporate saving is corporate profits; a certain fraction of these 
profits are distributed to a firm’s shareholders, and the remainder is retained within the 
corporation, i.e., corporate saving. The primary demand-side driver for corporate saving is the 
need for internal capital. Because capital markets are not perfect, firms must utilize internal funds 
for a certain fraction of their investments. This requirement creates a demand for corporate 
saving. In addition to corporate saving for current investments, other considerations also increase 
the demand for corporate saving. Corporate savings can be used to increase corporate cash 
holdings, reduce debt, or repurchase shares from shareholders. Cash holdings can be used for 
future investment, as insurance against future lending restrictions from capital markets, and as a 
buffer that allows a firm to pay out a constant amount of dividends to its shareholders during 
                                                          
2
 Share repurchases are incorporated into the financial accounts in the SNA as a source of changes in shareholders’ 
equity. However, these changes are net figures that also include delistings and IPOs (cf. United Nations’ (2000) 
Handbook of National Accounting, p. 61ff.).   
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times of unstable profits. Debt reductions reduce a firm’s interest expenses and increase its ability 
to take on future debts when needed (cf. Achavarya et al. (2005)). Share repurchases are the 
fourth demand-side motivation for engaging in corporate saving, as defined by the SNA, although 
share repurchases are a substitute to dividends, and the funds that are used for these repurchases 
do not remain within the corporation.  
Each of these reasons has been studied on its own in theoretical and empirical research; however, 
share repurchases are a rather new topic that has not yet been extensively investigated and the 
aforementioned studies focus on a firm-level. In this chapter, I present different theories about 
corporate savings and then combine the rationales of these theories to estimate the magnitude of 
corporate savings on an aggregate level. I calculate an adjusted corporate saving rate by 
subtracting share repurchases and compare this adjusted rate with the official corporate saving 
rate. I test and reject the hypothesis of a corporate saving glut by aggregating share repurchases 
on a national level for the G7 countries. This study contributes to literature on saving behavior by 
investigating an institutional sector that is frequently neglected. In particular, the study presented 
in this chapter contributes to the extant literature by incorporating share repurchases on a national 
level for a large set of countries, which has to the best of my knowledge not been done before.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of related literature. In 
section 2.3, the hypothesis of a corporate saving glut is tested. Section 2.4 explains the 
hypotheses and theories underlying the empirical approach and presents the empirical analysis 
with respect to the aggregate corporate saving rate. Section 2.5 repeats the assessments of 
corporate savings on the firm level and section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no significant research addressing the saving behavior of 
the corporate sector across a large set of countries. Consequently, in this analysis, I integrate 
different streams of literature that relate to this analysis. First, studies addressing macro saving 
behavior serve as a starting point for this analysis. Second, finance literature that assesses firm 
behavior is used to identify the motivation and theoretical background underlying the derivation 
of a regression equation for corporate saving.  
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Research on saving rates usually investigates household saving or total private sector saving, 
which combines household and corporate saving. In this context, corporate saving includes both 
financial and non-financial corporate saving. A main paper on private saving is written by Loayza 
et al. (2000), who claim to have built the world’s largest macroeconomic dataset regarding 
saving.
3
 The authors analyze determinants of private saving rates based on a dataset containing 
up to 150 countries for a maximum time period of 30 years. They identify the lagged saving rate 
as the most important determinant of the saving rate. Although this study and Loayza et al. 
(1998) provide a very detailed investigation of private saving, corporate saving alone and the 
relationship between household and corporate saving are not thoroughly investigated. Callen and 
Thimann (1997) study determinants of household saving in OECD countries. One reason for 
choosing the household instead of other institutional sectors is that “most fundamental household 
saving, per se, is important because this is the component of saving—rather than public or 
corporate saving—that economic theory tells us [the] most about.” (Callen and Thimann 1997, p. 
4). However, the limitations of economic theory with respect to corporate saving do not justify 
neglecting the study of corporate saving behavior on a macro level, particularly given that the 
corporate sector accounts for the majority of the aggregated savings in the world. The common 
argument that economists offer for not examining the corporate saving rate in isolation is that 
households own corporations and integrate corporate saving decisions into their own saving 
decisions. According to this view, which is also known as piercing the corporate veil, the private 
saving rate is ceteris paribus constant, and increases in corporate saving are offset by equivalent 
decreases in household saving.  
Empirical analyses are inconclusive with respect to the extent of this phenomenon. Poterba 
(1987) concludes that households only partially pierce the corporate veil, a conclusion that is 
supported by Auerbach and Hassett (1991). One argument explaining this result is that the 
propensity to consume out of income that is received in the form of dividend payments differs 
from the propensity to consume out of a change in wealth if profits are not paid out. These 
changes in wealth might also be only temporary. Furthermore, as Poterba (1987) notes, the 
ownership structure of shares is highly skewed within the United States. If rich people have a 
lower propensity to consume than the poor people and the largest fraction of dividends accrues to 
the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution, a change in corporate saving is not mirrored by a 
                                                          
3
 The World Saving Database is available at the World Bank website (http://go.worldbank.org/CBSLXPRUN0). 
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change in household saving. This is particularly true if the wealth distribution is more skewed 
than the income distribution. Moreover, figure A2.1 in the Appendix shows the time trend of 
corporate and household savings for selected countries. If households pierced the corporate veil, 
changes in one sector should be offset by changes in the other sector. Among the examined 
countries, this expectation only holds true for Japan.  
Corporate net lending, which reflects corporate savings less corporate investments, is a topic that 
has been examined in greater detail than corporate saving (cf. International Monetary Fund 
(2006), Loeys et al. (2005) and André et al. (2007)), as corporations in OECD countries exhibited 
positive net lending in many years of the previous decade. André et al. (2007) provides a good 
descriptive overview of the development of corporate net lending and changes in corporate gross 
saving from 2001 to 2005. These authors conclude that most of the increase in net lending is 
unlikely to be persistent and that the underlying causes of this increase vary by country. In Japan, 
for instance, the observed increase in net lending was motivated by a desire to reduce excessive 
debt burdens, whereas in the United Kingdom, this increase was triggered by the increasing 
importance and profitability of the financial sector and in Germany, this increase was indicative 
of the increased competitiveness of industrial companies.  
Few studies addressing the aggregated corporate saving rates of single countries exist. One of 
these studies is the investigation of Aron and Muellbauer (2000), who examine corporate saving 
in South Africa from 1966 to 1997 and note that corporate saving is “underresearched”. They 
estimate a coefficient of 0.5 for the lagged saving rate and conclude that it takes one year to 
correct for half of the difference between a particular saving rate and the normal saving rate. 
Bayoumi et al. (2010) address Chinese corporate saving, investigating the allegedly excessive 
savings of Chinese firms. Based on a comparison of listed Chinese firms with firms from 51 other 
countries from 2002 to 2007, Bayoumi et al. (2010) reject the hypothesis that listed Chinese firms 
demonstrate a higher saving rate than the global average. Moreover, they explain that high saving 
rates in China reflect extensive corporate investment; in fact, this investment caused China to be 
the only country in their sample that displayed negative net savings
4
 over the entire period that 
these researchers examined. However, the companies that were investigated reflect only one third 
of all enterprise profits in China. The saving rate may thus be comparable on a listed firm level, 
                                                          
4
 Bayoumi et al. (2010, p.5) calculate the net saving rate as gross savings/asset - investment/assets. In the SNA 
terminology, net savings refers to gross savings less depreciation.  
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but the aggregated corporate gross saving rate in China is still among the highest in the world. 
Kuijs (2006) takes a different perspective on the Chinese corporate saving rate and argues that it 
is among the highest in the world. However, the years used for comparison are 2004 and 2005 for 
China and these two years are indeed characterized by high corporate saving rates compared to 
previous and following years. Furthermore, the data for the countries of comparison, such as 
Japan, Korea and the United States, are from 2002, which are lower than in 2004 or 2005. Kuijs 
(2006) explains the high saving rates with the high investment rates that are mainly financed 
internally. A potential contradiction between Bayoumi et al. (2010) and Kuijs (2006) can be 
explained by the difference between the firm- and country-level analysis. On a firm-level the 
saving rates are in line with other countries, because the ratios are built over assets. On an 
aggregate level, the rate over GDP is higher than in other countries because the share of capital 
intensive industries in the economy is higher for China.    
The second block of literature I introduce presents a micro or finance-based view of corporate 
savings and firm behavior. André et al. (2007) mention the importance of payout behavior for 
gross saving, as gross saving is calculated as profits less dividends. The need to integrate share 
repurchases into considerations of corporate saving is based on the increasing relevance of these 
behaviors across all of the OECD countries.
5
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) highlight the 
importance of share repurchases in the United States, where share repurchases surpassed 
dividends as a method of distributing cash to shareholders for the first time in 1999. They find 
evidence for their hypotheses that share repurchases are a substitute for dividends. This 
substitution effect is my motivation for treating share repurchases and dividends in a similar 
manner by subtracting these repurchases from gross savings. The European Central Bank (2007) 
confirms the growing importance of share repurchases in the euro area and claims that excess 
profits prior to the financial crisis were the main driver of this habit. Von Eije and Megginson 
(2008) investigate patterns of share repurchases in Europe and argue that most of the 
observations for the United States can also be found with some time lag in Europe. Based on 
these findings, I incorporate share repurchases into my analysis of corporate savings.  
There are many reasons for the increasing importance of share repurchases. The rationale behind 
share repurchasing programs and a critique of these reasons is not a focus of this chapter. 
                                                          
5
 Cf. table A2.1 in the Appendix for an overview of the magnitude of share repurchases in OECD countries. 
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However, I nonetheless wish to list the following primary reasons that drive the increasing 
popularity of these repurchasing programs. First, executives of listed companies typically receive 
shares of the company as an aspect of their compensation. Therefore, companies repurchase their 
own shares from the market to ensure that shares are available for distribution to these 
executives. Moreover, because the value of the shares executives receive as remuneration is 
linked to the share price performance, these executives have an incentive to conduct price nursing 
via share repurchase programs. Furthermore, in certain countries, capital gains are taxed 
differently than dividends. Therefore, increasing shareholder wealth through repurchases instead 
of dividends may provide tax advantages for shareholders. Share repurchases also gained 
importance during a period of high corporate profits because share repurchase programs provide 
a method for paying out these profits without changing dividends and raising shareholders’ 
expectations regarding future dividends too much.   
The macroeconomic measure of corporate gross savings is reflected by the financial term of 
“retained earnings”, i.e., profits after taxes and interest less payouts. One influential reference 
that addresses corporate savings is the work of Lintner (1956), who writes about the distribution 
of profits among dividends, retained earnings and taxes. Lintner argues that companies smooth 
their dividend payments and that dividends therefore depend on both current profits and past 
dividends. There are many uses of retained earnings. As discussed above, retained earnings may 
be used for share repurchases. Furthermore, companies utilize retained earnings to finance 
investments, repay debt, or increase their cash holdings. While the former represents a payout to 
shareholders, the latter three purposes for retained earnings have different determinants. As 
Myers and Majluf (1984) reveal, internal funds are required to conduct investment; moreover, 
their well-known pecking order states that firms prefer internal funds to external funds for 
financing investments. Among the many existing empirical studies supporting this pecking order 
theory, I want to highlight the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001). Various researchers, 
including Bates et al. (2006), Almeida et al. (2004) and Opler et al. (1999), study reasons for cash 
holdings and use firm-level data to assess different time periods in the United States. Through 
examinations of different theories and motives, such as the transaction, precautionary, tax and 
agency motives, they find that cash holdings increase with idiosyncratic risk, cash flows, growth 
opportunities and financing frictions. The work of Acharya et al. (2005) is closely linked to the 
studies about cash holdings. However, these researchers exhibit a narrower focus on the 
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relationship between cash holdings and the repayment of debt; they find that this relationship 
depends on the hedging needs that are created by financial constraints.  
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, single- and cross-country analyses of the 
corporate sector are scarce. Moreover, the few studies that are available typically examine the 
entirety of the corporate sector, including both financial and non-financial corporations. In this 
study, I investigate the non-financial corporate sector alone as financial corporations differ in 
their behavior from the real economy. Second, share repurchases have attracted increasing 
interest in recent years. However, to the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made to 
aggregate share repurchases on a country level for a large set of countries and to combine this 
examination with the macro analysis of saving patterns. Third, the adjusted saving rate provides 
new insights regarding the saving glut hypothesis. 
 
2.3 THE CORPORATE SAVING GLUT – THE CASE OF THE G7 COUNTRIES 
In the time span that Bernanke referred to in his speech about the global saving glut (1996 – 
2004), all of the G7 countries exhibited either increased or constant corporate saving rates. 
However, this conclusion changes dramatically if the saving rate is adjusted for additional 
corporate payouts via share repurchases.
6
 After this adjustment, the aggregate saving rate of the 
G7 countries remains unchanged during the time span of interest, and only Japan and Canada 
exhibit a permanent increase in corporate saving rates. A formal test of the saving glut hypothesis 
confirms that there was indeed a corporate saving glut in the largest economies of the world for 
the years from 1996 to 2004 if the United Nations System of National Accounts (UN SNA) 
definition for the corporate saving rate is used. However, this hypothesis must be rejected if a 
more appropriate measure of aggregated corporate savings that includes an adjusted rate for share 
repurchases is employed (cf. tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 A detailed description of share repurchases and the adjustment of the saving rate is given in section 2.4.2. 
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Table 2.1 
Average non-financial corporate saving rates in the G7 countries, as a percentage of GDP 
Type of corporate 
saving rate 
 
Total period 
 (1987-2007) 
Before saving 
glut  
(1987-1995) 
Saving glut  
(1996-2004) 
 Change between 
the prior period 
and the saving 
glut period 
UN SNA definition  10.03 9.46 10.34  +9.3% (0.88 p.p.) 
Adjusted  9.35 9.24 9.61  +4.0% (0.37 p.p.) 
 
By the UN SNA definition of corporate saving, during the period of the saving glut, corporations 
increased their saving relative to GDP by 9%, or almost a full percentage point. However, after 
accounting for share repurchases and employing a saving rate that is adjusted for more modern 
firm payout behaviors, this change diminishes to a modest increase of 4% or less than 0.4 
percentage points.  
A formal test of the hypothesis                                                           
against                                                          supports this perspective (cf. 
table 2.2). Based on the tests that are presented in table 2.2 and the average saving rates shown in 
table 2.1, I confirm the hypothesis that the corporate sector did not cause the global saving glut. 
Table 2.2 
Tests of the saving glut hypothesis (H0: No saving glut) 
 
p-values of median tests 
Type of corporate saving 
rate 
G7 countries  
aggregated 
G7 countries  
pooled 
G7 countries  
aggregated (until 2007) 
G7 countries  
pooled (until 2007) 
Original (UN SNA) saving rate 0.001 0.212 0.009 0.036 
Adjusted saving rate 0.157 0.373 0.318 0.545 
# of observations 18 126 21 147 
years - before saving glut (#) 1987-1995 (9) 1987-1995 (63) 1987-1995 (9) 1987-1995 (63) 
years - saving glut (#) 1996-2004 (9) 1996-2004 (63) 1996-2004 (9) 1996-2004 (63) 
years - after saving glut (#) --- --- 2005-2007 (3) 2005-2007 (21) 
# represents the number of observations. 
As the saving rate during the saving glut years is not normally distributed, I use a nonparametric 
k-sample test on the equality of medians. Using the UN SNA definition, this test strongly rejects 
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the null hypothesis that both distributions are drawn from a population with the same median 
value for the aggregated saving rate of the G7 countries, thus confirming the saving glut 
hypothesis. However, if this test is used to assess the adjusted saving rate, I obtain a p-value of 
15.7% and cannot reject the null hypothesis. Pooling the saving rates of all countries provides a 
larger number of observations. For the 126 country-year observations the saving glut hypothesis 
can also not be rejected. Again, correcting for share repurchases gives a p-value of 37.3% and 
strengthens this paper’s hypothesis that the corporate sector did not contribute to a saving glut. 
The inclusion of all of the years until the start of the crisis increases the sample size to 147 
observations and accounts for the particularly high saving rates that were observed prior to the 
crisis. It is particularly apparent for the sample that includes these pre-crisis years that an 
examination of standard national account figures produces different conclusions than the results 
that are generated from more reasonable economic assumptions underlying the adjusted saving 
rate. The hypothesis that all of the saving rates are drawn from a sample with the same median 
cannot be rejected for the adjusted corporate saving rate. Thus, if corporate saving measures are 
examined in a detailed manner that incorporates an adjustment for all corporate payouts, tests 
with four different samples confirm my rejection of the commonly held perspective that a 
corporate saving glut occurred prior to the recent financial crisis. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
adjusted and unadjusted saving rates for all G7 countries from 1980 until 2008, providing a 
visualization of the differences between these two measures of corporate savings for the by then 
largest economies in the world. 
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Figure 2.2 
Non-financial corporate sector saving rates in G7 countries 
The dotted line indicates the saving rate of non-financial corporations, as measured by the SNA. The solid line 
indicates the adjusted saving rate, which is calculated as the official saving rate less share repurchases.  
Figure 2.2(a): Canada, Japan, the United States and the G7 as a whole
 
Figure 2.2(b): European G7 countries
1)
 Data prior to 1991 are based on West Germany.  
Data source: UN SNA, Bureau of Economic Analyses (BEA), World Saving Data Base, Worldscope. 
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By the SNA definitions assumptions, the United States exhibited the same corporate saving rate 
in 2008 and 1980, but the adjusted saving rate reveals to us that the yearly decrease in this saving 
rate was as high as -.13 percentage points of GDP over the course of almost 30 years. The high 
saving rate in Japan can be explained by an extended phase of reducing the debt burdens that 
were built up during the Japanese asset bubble in the late 1980s and by the high share of 
depreciation caused by a high capital stock. Canada’s increase in corporate saving is linked to a 
surge in commodities and the increasing share of the corporate sector in Canada’s GDP. 
European corporate saving rates remained in a narrow band during the 1990s and early 2000s but 
widened after 2005 based on diverging developments in the European G7 nations with respect to 
economic profitability. The corporate saving rates of France and Italy were especially low in the 
early 1980s. This phenomenon reflects the high rate of inflation that existed in these countries 
during the years in question; these inflation rates discouraged corporate saving because 
corporations experienced significant gains from lowering their real debt burden.
7
 
It may be argued that the integration of statistics from more countries, particularly China, could 
change the results that are presented above. However, the G7 countries accounted for more than 
60% of global GDP in each of the examined years and are therefore a valid proxy for the world 
economy. Furthermore, Chinese figures are subject to frequent changes, and the Chinese 
economy was not yet of such a big importance during the time frame that Bernanke referenced, as 
its share in the world economy was below 5% in 2004. Moreover, Bayoumi et al. (2010) reveal 
that listed Chinese corporations do not exhibit a higher saving rate than companies elsewhere. 
Chinese aggregated corporate saving rates are for example comparable to the United Kingdom 
from 1995 to 2003, falling below the United Kingdom’s rates from 1996 to 1998 and surpassing 
it in 2000 and 2001. 2004 is the only year, in which China’s saving rate clearly exceeded its 
counterpart in Europe.  
These findings alter the understanding of the roles of different sectors prior to the financial crisis 
and have significant implications. First, during the alleged saving glut, the corporate sector did 
not provide significantly more capital relative to GDP to the global investment market than it did 
during the preceding time period. Second, many firms, especially corporations in the United 
States, have been heavily decreasing their supply of capital instead of keeping the rate constant. 
                                                          
7
 André et al. (2007) calculate inflation adjusted gross saving rates. I refrain from this adjustment but include the 
inflation rate as an explanatory variable in the econometric analysis of this study. 
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Third, the declining saving rate of American households, which was below 3% of GDP from 
2005 to 2007, is moderated and less steep if it is adjusted to account for changes in wealth that 
result from corporate share repurchase programs. If households in the top income decile have a 
higher propensity to save than the other 90% of households, and because the top 10% also hold 
the largest fraction of common stock,
8
 a large part of the share repurchases can be attributed to 
household saving from a wealth perspective. This, however, does not alter the problem of too low 
household savings from a distributional perspective, because the majority of households does not 
benefit from the share repurchases and the resulting increase in wealth. Fourth, the System of 
National Accounts needs to be complemented by other metrics of corporate saving that reflect 
changing firm payout behavior. This topic has been extensively studied on a micro level but was 
neglected on an aggregated level when looking at savings.   
In a next step, I address part of the research needs resulting from the findings presented above by 
investigating the determinants of the aggregate corporate saving rate and the changes in these 
determinants in the context of an adjusted saving rate.  
2.4 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATE CORPORATE SAVING RATE 
2.4.1 Hypotheses and theory 
The empirical analysis is based on a selection of theoretical models. There are various theories 
that explain demand for internal funds, e.g., investment needs or cash holdings. But those theories 
do not cover the entire aspect of corporate savings, so that it becomes necessary to combine the 
explanations of several models. A starting point for the empirical analysis in this study is 
Lintner’s model of the distribution of corporate income among dividends, retained earnings and 
taxes. Following Lintner (1956), I choose profits and the lagged saving rate as main determinants 
of the saving rate and supplement these two by further explanatory variables. In his simple 
model,  
(2.1)                                        
dividends (Divt) are determined by profits (Profitst) and by previous year’s dividends (Divt-1). 
Lintner argues that firms actively decide their dividend policy and that savings are therefore 
determined by the residual value of firm profits after this distribution of dividends. The rationale 
                                                          
8
 Poterba (1987) states that the top decile of the wealth distribution holds 85% of common stock.  
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for Lintner’s equation is the belief that because shareholders prefer a stable dividend, managers 
only partially adjust dividends to firm profits. Thus, although dividend payout ratios are not held 
constant, they are smoothened to avoid raising expectations regarding payouts if exceptionally 
high profits are realized in the current year. A constant stream of income via dividends reduces 
income uncertainty among shareholders and increases the credibility of firm managers who are 
able to provide a consistently positive firm performance.  
However, the decision about the amount of dividends to be paid out is at the same time a decision 
regarding the amount of earnings that are retained in order to conduct investments, increase cash 
holdings, reduce debt or buy back shares. Given an increasing stock turnover rate,
9
 a reduction of 
dividend payout ratios and the increasing share of listed companies that do not pay dividends at 
all,
10
 the argument that savings are merely a residual no longer holds true, and the investigation 
of corporate saving patterns is therefore necessary.  
Using the distribution of a firm’s profits between dividends and savings, (2.2), I reformulate 
Lintner’s model, (2.1), to derive a basic saving equation, (2.3): 
(2.2)                                    
(2.3)                                               
As argued above, this saving or dividend-smoothing based on Lintner is insufficient for 
estimating a more realistic savings equation. Consequently, to estimate the determinants of 
saving, I integrate further theories about the demand for internal funds.  
Current investment needs: According to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), a 
firm prefers to use internal funds instead of external funds for its investments. Thus, investment 
(Inv) is added to the list of explanatory variables. I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of 
this variable, given that higher investment is associated with a higher need for financing, and part 
of this financing is typically internally funded. The investment variable incorporates current 
investments.  
                                                          
9
 The stock market turnover rate in the U.S. increased from 0.61 to 3.5 between 1988 and 2009; in the United 
Kingdom, this rate increased from 0.75 to 2.67 between 1988 and 2007 (cf. database by Demirgüc-Kunt and Beck 
(2009)). 
10
 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French (2001) report that 2/3 of listed American companies paid cash dividends 
in 1978 but that only 1/5 of listed American companies paid dividends in 1999. 
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Future investment needs: Growth expectations further influence future investments and future 
capital requirements. To cope with future financing needs, firms that do not wish to rely on 
perfect capital markets must stockpile cash. In firm-level analyses, Tobin’s q is frequently used 
as a proxy for future investment opportunities. Because this paper conducts its estimations on a 
country level, I use GDP growth (GDPg) as a proxy of future investment needs. Higher levels of 
GDP growth should be accompanied by higher saving rates because of the positive investment 
outlook and show a positive sign in the analysis. Another indicator is the change in GDP growth 
(d_GDPg). Declining growth rates signal decelerating lower future investment demand and 
therefore lower capital demand; similarly, increasing growth rates may be regarded as an 
indicator of higher capital demand. Thus, the sign of this regressor is also expected to be positive.  
Risk and uncertainty: In addition to the influence of investment outlook, corporations also 
demonstrate a higher demand for capital when they increase their pile of cash during periods of 
higher idiosyncratic risk and higher macro uncertainty. Although idiosyncratic risks are 
diminished at the aggregate level in the macro analysis of this study, the inflation rate (cpi) is 
used as measure of macro-level uncertainty. The expected positive sign results from a 
precautionary motive. The higher the uncertainty, the more funds companies will set aside to 
maintain their liquidity. The cash can then be used to smooth dividend payments if profits are 
lower than expected and to invest if a more uncertain market outlook leads financial markets to 
restrict their provision of funds. However, inflation also produces an opposing effect. Higher 
inflation rates increase the costs of holding cash and lower the incentives to save. This negative 
effect is reinforced by the impact of inflation on corporate debt. The higher the rate of inflation, 
the more debt is inflated away and the lower are the incentives to save. Thus, the overall sign of 
the inflation variable is unclear and depends on which of the aforementioned effects prevails.  
Changing payout behavior/share repurchases: A further reason to increase savings are share 
repurchases (Buybacks), which are added to the model as a regressor. Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) show that share repurchases are a substitute for dividends and are conducted out of funds 
which would otherwise have been used to pay out dividends. Because share repurchases are 
carried out through retained earnings, this method of corporate payout increases the saving rate. 
The quantity of share repurchases has been constantly increasing since the 1990s and reached its 
peak prior to the financial crisis in 2007. In fact, in 2007, aggregate share repurchases have 
reached 4% of GDP in the United States. Share repurchases are an important factor for explaining 
Chapter 2: The Global Saving Glut Revisited – Corporate Savings and the Role of Share Repurchases 
 
25 
 
the increase in corporate saving and should therefore exhibit a positive sign in the regression 
estimation. Many motivations for share repurchases exist. In addition to the need to pay out funds 
to shareholders without increasing dividends and shareholders’ expectations of steady streams of 
income, managers also have a high incentive for share repurchases because these transactions 
increase the stock price and their remuneration is dependent on the performance of a firm’s stock. 
Institutional factors: Additional explanatory power for the demand for internal funds comes from 
institutional factors. One of these factors is the depth of financial markets. More advanced 
financial markets provide easier access to external financing and therefore involve lower 
requirements for internal funds. The reliability of financial markets and the banking system is 
crucial for planning the stock of cash that is held by a corporation. If external funds were always 
available at a fair rate, there should not be a need to hold on to cash reserves. The ratio of private 
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (finsystem) is a widely 
accepted proxy for the development of financial markets.
11
 Because pooling funds from savers 
and channeling these funds to borrowers is the inherent task of financial intermediaries, 
increasing credit provision is associated with deeper financial markets. Furthermore, lower 
spreads and less expensive risk-adjusted credit terms are indicators of the sophistication of 
financial markets and conditions for increasing credit provisions. The depth of financial markets 
should have a negative impact on the saving rate since firms need to rely less on internal 
financing.  
2.4.2 Dataset 
Macro-level variables 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses regarding the determinants of the saving rate, I use a 
unique panel dataset that is based on multiple sources. The main source for all of the savings-
related data that are used in this chapter is the UN SNA.
12
 The UN SNA provides saving data by 
institutional sector, including information on the non-financial corporate sector for 64 countries. I 
use a maximum time length of 39 years (1970-2008), depending on data availability. To increase 
the number of countries that are included in the assessed data and to derive a more balanced panel 
dataset, I append relevant statistics for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States 
                                                          
11
 A more detailed description of this proxy can be found in chapter 4. 
12
 http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=SNA.  
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from national sources because the UN SNA data for these nations either do not span the entire 
study period or are incomplete with regards to the different variables. The total country sample 
comprises 68 countries, including 30 out of the 34 OECD countries.
13
 The same data sources are 
used to obtain additional sector-specific variables, such as gross operating surplus (profits), 
consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) and gross fixed capital formation (investment). The 
sector variables exclude the financial sector because this sector behaves differently than the real 
sector in terms of saving and investment decisions. Furthermore, it is the corporate sector and not 
the financial sector that is accused of having excessively saved, whereas financial institutions are 
blamed for having accumulated overly high leverage and therewith too much debt. All of the 
variables from the UN SNA are obtained as levels but are transformed to ratios over GDP to 
exclude size effects, transform the data to stationary series and render the data comparable across 
countries.  
The World Development Indicators by the World Bank serve as the second source for cross-
country data for the 1970 to 2008 time period. All data on inflation (cpi), GDP growth (GDPg) 
and change in GDP growth (d_GDPg) for the 68 countries are based on this database. The data 
are again utilized in terms of percentages. Information regarding institutional factors, such as the 
depth of financial markets (finsystem), is based on the updated financial institutions database of 
Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt (2009), which is available through the World Bank. Beck and 
Demirgüc-Kunt provide the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP. This ratio serves as a proxy for the importance of financial intermediation in 
a country and the availability of external financing. According to Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt 
(2009, p.6), this metric “is a standard indicator of the finance and growth literature”. 
Micro-level variables – share repurchases 
A major contribution of this paper is the integration of share repurchases into macro-level 
research. Because information regarding share repurchases on an aggregate level is not available 
through any database, firm-level data regarding share repurchases were collected and aggregated 
to derive comparable data on the country level. These firm-level data are based on the 
                                                          
13
 Statistics for the OECD countries of Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg and Turkey are not available. 
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Worldscope database from Thomson Financial.
14
 Share repurchases are defined as Purchase of 
common and preferred stock based on the firms’ cash flow statements (Worldscope source code 
4751). Because the focus of this analysis is on the non-financial sector, I exclude all banks, 
insurance companies, holdings and other investment offices with SICs of 6000 to 6499 and 6700 
to 6799 from the aggregation of share repurchases. Worldscope claims to cover 95% of global 
market capitalization and has full coverage of the United States and Western European markets. 
The time series that is covered by Worldscope begins in 1980 and lasts until 2010. As share 
repurchases were of minor importance prior to 1980 in the United States
15
 and nonexistent in 
many other countries, I assume the aggregate quantity of share repurchases to be 0.0% of GDP 
prior to 1980 for the entire dataset. Worldscope offers data for all of the OECD countries and a 
total of 66 countries. As not all countries with information on non-financial saving are covered by 
Worldscope, I further reduce the dataset to all of the available OECD countries. This gives a 
more homogenous and less unbalanced dataset. More details on share repurchases on an 
aggregated level (table A2.1) and on a firm level (table A2.2) are provided in the Appendix. 
All of the variables that are used in the analysis are transformed into ratios with respect to GDP, 
if applicable. Total levels of saving are not of particular interest to this analysis; I assume that the 
size of a single firm affects its options to be active in the financial markets and therefore impacts 
its saving decisions but that the size of an economy does not influence its aggregated saving 
patterns in a systematic manner. The inclusion of total nominal GDP as a size variable in my 
analysis confirms this hypothesis because size did not turn out as significant. The dataset is 
unbalanced as not all countries provide the relevant variables for the entire time period. 
Unbalanced panel data are problematic if there is a systematic reason for the exclusion or 
inclusion of certain country years in the estimation. Following Stock and Watson (2007, p. 351), I 
argue that the unbalanced panel is not an impediment in this situation because the length of the 
data series for each country is random. There is no relation between saving patterns and the 
provision of data for OECD countries when countries like Canada, France and the United States 
provide data for the entire time period but Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom do not 
                                                          
14
 I am grateful to the Economic Business Data Center of the ifo institute and the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München for supporting this research by providing access to Worldscope. 
15
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) compute the value of repurchases/earnings-ratios for listed American US companies 
and find an average value of 3% for this proportion between the years 1972 and 1979, with a maximum of 5.4% in 
1973. During this period, dividends were an average of 12 times higher than share repurchases, and share 
repurchases were an average of 0.1% of GDP. 
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provide data prior to 2002, 1990 and 1987, respectively. Table A2.1 in the Appendix provides an 
overview of the years covered, the maximum and minimum saving rates, and the magnitude of 
share repurchases for each country.   
2.4.3 Descriptive analysis 
To build the dataset for the analysis, I begin with a balanced dataset that addresses a relatively 
short time period and includes countries without gaps in the data (N=20, T=10). Increasing the 
dataset in width and length alters the correlations of most variables only to a minor extent, which 
supports me in increasing the number of observations that are used in this analysis at the cost of 
the balanced panel. Two subsets of OECD countries with N=22 and N=30 are used for the 
analysis. The larger sample includes Eastern European and Latin American countries. The time 
period covers the years from 1979 to 2008 (T=30).
16
  
Table 2.3 
Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables 
The adjusted saving rate (saving rate less share repurchases) is labeled Saving_New. The prefix L indicates the first 
lag of a variable. The number of observations is 565 and covers 30 OECD countries over the years from 1979 to 
2008. Correlation coefficients that are insignificant at the 5% level are written in italics. 
Variable Saving LSaving Saving_New LSaving_New Buybacks Profits Inv GDPg d_GDPg cpi 
Saving 1.000 
 
 
       LSaving 0.899 1.000  
       Saving_New 0.984 0.876 1.000        
LSaving_New 0.893 0.979 0.894 1.000 
      Buybacks 0.110 0.144 -0.071 0.011 1.000 
     Profits 0.353 0.305 0.341 0.345 0.073 1.000 
    Inv 0.372 0.379 0.406 0.418 -0.178 0.258 1.000 
   GDPg 0.211 0.175 0.221 0.197 -0.051 0.160 0.349 1.000 
  d_GDPg 0.096 -0.019 0.103 -0.005 -0.038 0.009 -0.060 0.503 1.000 
 Cpi -0.251 -0.285 -0.225 -0.270 -0.144 0.012 0.172 0.015 -0.092 1.000 
Finsystem 0.089 0.129 0.004 0.061 0.468 0.037 -0.076 -0.245 -0.078 -0.400 
 
There is a high correlation between the current and the lagged saving rate for both the original 
and the adjusted saving rate. This result indicates the stationarity of the saving rate and shows the 
                                                          
16
 In particular, the correlations of Inv and cpi with Saving and Saving_New, respectively, increase by slightly more 
than 0.1 when the dataset is increased from N=22, T=20 to N=30, T=30. The shift to the larger dataset reduces the 
correlation of finsystem with Profits, Inv, GDPg and cpi by slightly more than 0.1.  
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importance of including the lagged saving rate as a regressor. Share repurchases are only slightly 
correlated with the saving rate. While profits, investment and GDP growth are correlated as 
expected, inflation is associated with a lower saving rate. Contrary to the hypothesis of inflation 
as a proxy for uncertainty and the precautionary motive, higher inflation appears to produce 
greater costs from holding internal funds than benefits from insuring against uncertainty; thus, 
because an inflationary environment causes the costs of holding cash and the benefits of reducing 
the real value of debt to outweigh the value of precautionary motives, inflation is negatively 
related to saving. The high correlation of the depth of financial markets with share repurchases 
builds on the fact that share repurchases are particularly prevalent in advanced financial markets. 
The adjusted saving rate exhibits the same properties as the saving rate except with respect to the 
correlations with share repurchases and the depth of financial markets. The latter of these factors 
is no longer correlated with the adjusted saving rate, whereas the former factor demonstrates a 
negative correlation. All of the variables exhibit relatively high variations across time and across 
countries and are therefore suited for panel analyses.
17
 
2.4.4 Econometric specification and estimation 
Based on the theories and hypotheses described in section 2.4.1, the model of interest is as 
follows: 
(2.4)                                                     
where      is a vector of further explanatory variables as explained above: profits, share 
repurchases (Buybacks), inflation (cpi), investment (Inv), GDP growth (GDPg), change in GDP 
growth (d_GDPg) and the depth of financial systems (finsystem). Yeardummies are added to 
capture time effects that are common for all countries. Econometric issues that need to be 
addressed in this type of estimations are nonstationarity, heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. 
Nonstationarity: A potential problem of nonstationarity can be neglected as the saving rate is 
calculated as ratio over GDP and is bound between 0 and 1. It can consequently be regarded as 
stationary.  
                                                          
17
 Cf. table A2.3 in the Appendix for a further description of the variables. 
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Heteroskedasticity: The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test strongly rejects the hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity so that I use robust standard errors in all estimations to deal with 
heteroskedasticity.  
Endogeneity: The issue of endogeneity is more severe: The econometric specification with a 
lagged dependent variable combined with the characteristics of this macro-level dataset (rather 
small N and large T) is not ideal for econometric analyses. There are country-inherent 
characteristics, like firm structure, sector mix and institutional factors that are not covered by the 
regressors in the estimation equation. A fixed effects model is a good choice to allow for this 
obstacle. Fixed effects models require exogenous regressors and thus do not work properly in 
combination with a lagged dependent variable as the lagged dependent variable is vulnerable to 
endogeneity and therefore violates an OLS assumption. This endogeneity causes a bias that 
increases for greater correlation coefficients. However, because the bias caused by the lagged 
dependent variable diminishes with increasing time periods, fixed effects models can still be used 
under certain circumstances. As shown by Alvarez and Arellano (2003), a fixed effects model 
can be used if one accepts a bias of the magnitude 1/T. Because panel data estimation methods 
are mostly developed for micro data (N→ ∞ and small T), the asymptotic properties of those 
estimators do not fit macro panels (moderate N and moderate to large T) very well. I still use the 
fixed effects model as the bias diminishes to 6% as T → 18.18 This has to be kept in mind when 
interpreting the coefficients. In his description of the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond GMM 
estimators, which are typically used for dynamic panel data, Roodman (2009) states that “If T is 
large, dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant and a more straightforward fixed effects 
estimator works”. To compare the fixed effects model with a GMM model, I use the Arellano-
Bond estimator. Both the Arellano-Bond and Blundel-Bond estimators require the number of 
instruments to be smaller than the number of groups. Overfitting a model by including too many 
instruments brings those GMM estimators closer to an OLS estimator, which is acceptable if the 
large number of instruments results from a large number of years (cf. Alvarez and Arellano, 
2003). Overfitting is apparent for this panel dataset with 30 OECD countries and more than 20 
years of observations, given that the number of instruments is increasing quadratically in T for a 
standard GMM setting (cf. David Roodman, 2007). As Alvarez and Arellano (2003) argue, the 
                                                          
18
 Although T=30, due to the unbalanced nature of the dataset, the average number of years for N=22 is 20, and the 
average number of years for N=30 is 18. 
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convergence to an OLS estimator is desirable if it is caused by a large T because the endogeneity 
bias is reduced by the number of time periods. Therefore I choose the Arellano-Bond estimator, 
albeit with the realization that this estimator will generate a bias that in this case approaches 1/N 
(cf. Alvarez and Arellano, 2003). Both regressions produce similar results, as shown in table 2.4.  
Table 2.4 
Regression analysis of the saving rate 
I estimate different models to examine the impact of the independent variables on the saving rate for the time 
horizon and country set covered in these data. T=30 and represents the years from 1979 to 2008. N=30 represent 
all OECD countries except for Iceland, Israel, Luxemburg and Turkey. N=22 is a further reduced subset of OECD 
countries that excludes all Eastern European and Latin American OECD countries. The Arellano-Bond model is 
estimated with the dynamic panel data command xtdpd. LSaving, Buybacks and Profits are treated as endogenous, 
and GMM-type instruments are used. Robust standard errors are used in all estimations. 
  
Fixed effects model 
 
Arellano-Bond 
  
Non-dynamic 
 
Dynamic 
 
Dynamic 
Variable 
 
N = 22 N = 30 
 
N = 22 N = 30 
 
N = 22 N = 30 
LSaving 
 
- - 
 
  .6808***   .6195*** 
 
  .6711***   .6264*** 
Buybacks 
 
  .2128   .3691 
 
  .0741   .2071 
 
  .0820   .1966 
Profits 
 
  .2545*   .3454** 
 
  .1211**   .1731** 
 
  .1276**   .1723** 
Inv 
 
  .0007   .1520 
 
-.0547   .0063 
 
-.0427   .0083 
cpi 
 
-.0007 -.0008 
 
-.0001   .0001 
 
-.0003   .0000 
GDPg 
 
  .0025*   .0009 
 
  .0005 -.0003 
 
  .0005 -.0004 
d_GDPg 
 
-.0001   .0003 
 
  .0018***   .0014*** 
 
  .0018***   .0014*** 
finsystem 
 
-.0164 ** -.0159 * 
 
-.0064*** -.0069** 
 
-.0063 *** -.0065** 
constant    .0775***   .0183    .0283**   .0060    .0261**   .0109 
# of observations 
 
475 588 
 
460 565 
 
460 565 
within-R² 
 
0.47 0.48 
 
0.73 0.68 
   between-R² 
 
0.07 0.13 
 
0.95 0.77 
   overall-R²   0.19 0.22   0.86 0.76       
Test for 2nd-order 
auto-correlation               0.05 0.09 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Before interpreting these results, I refer to a study by Judson and Owen (1999) who show that 
GMM produces an underestimation of coefficients, whereas an OLS estimator overestimates the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and underestimates the coefficients of the other 
regressors. Furthermore, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable suppresses the explanatory 
power of the other regressors. Therefore I estimate a model without the lagged saving rate for 
comparison. The lagged dependent variable can be regarded as conveying the long-run effects of 
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the other regressors and showing the persistence of the saving rate, independent from the most 
recent macroeconomic developments.   
Including the lagged saving rate in the regression increases the R² values of the N=22 and N=30 
estimations from .19 and .22, respectively, to .86 and .76, respectively. The high coefficient of 
LSaving indicates that approximately two thirds of the saving rate is predicted by factors from 
previous years. The current saving rate determines 24% of the saving rate in three years for the 
larger sample of countries (32% for the smaller sample of countries). Profits also have a large 
influence with 17% and 12%, for the N=30 and N=22 estimations, respectively. When the ratio of 
profits to GDP increases by 1 percentage point the saving rate increases by .17 percentage points. 
Not taking previous years saving into account would double the impact of profits on the saving 
rate. Changes in the rate of GDP growth do have a significant but only minor influence. 
Finsystem, the proxy for the depth of the financial system and the availability of credit, is as 
expected and has a negative and significant impact. Every increase of 10 percentage points in the 
ratio of private credit to GDP decreases the corporate saving rate by .06 percentage points. Most 
surprisingly, share repurchases as well as investment, both key uses of internal funds, do not 
influence the magnitude of corporate saving on an aggregated basis in the dynamic and non-
dynamic models. On an aggregate level, the corporate sector’s capital supply to the economy is 
independent of its actual capital needs but reacts to institutional settings, operating surpluses and 
changes in the rate of GDP growth. The main difference of including Eastern European and Latin 
American countries in the analysis is a lower impact of the lagged saving rate and a higher 
influence of profits, showing that these countries exhibit less stable saving rates. The results of 
the Arellano-Bond approach for the N=22 country sample show a high level of 2
nd
-order 
autocorrelation that can just be rejected at the 5 percent level. This means that the use of lagged 
instruments is not valid and that we cannot properly interpret the estimation results.  
Table 2.4 presents the effects for the non-financial corporate saving rate as measured by the SNA. 
In a second step I amend the definition of savings in order to derive a more accurate description 
of savings. Savings in this logic are all funds that are kept within a firm to fulfill an inherent task, 
i.e., to invest, to prepare for uncertainty by increasing cash holdings or to decrease outstanding 
debt. The derivation of this adjusted saving is described in the data section in detail. Nominal 
share repurchases are aggregated per year on the country-level, then a ratio of the aggregated 
share repurchases over GDP is build and this is subtracted from the standard corporate sector 
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saving rate to derive the adjusted saving rate. The estimation for this adjusted saving rate is 
shown in table 2.5.    
Table 2.5 
Regression analysis of the adjusted saving rate 
I repeat the regressions that are presented in table 2.4 but use the adjusted saving rate Saving_New as the 
dependent variable. The GMM-type instruments in the Arellano-Bond model are LSaving_New and Profits. Robust 
standard errors are used in all estimations. 
  
Fixed effects model   Arellano-Bond 
  
Non-dynamic 
 
Dynamic 
 
Dynamic 
Variable 
 
N = 22 N = 30 
 
N = 22 N = 30 
 
N = 22 N = 30 
LSaving_New 
 
- - 
 
  .6507***   .5977*** 
 
  .6335***   .5951*** 
Profits 
 
  .2800*   .3616*** 
 
  .1320***   .1833*** 
 
  .1405**   .1820** 
Inv 
 
  .0437   .1690*** 
 
-.0451   .0142 
 
-.0399   .0181 
cpi 
 
-.0008 -.0009*** 
 
-.0002   .0001 
 
  .0003   .00020 
GDPg 
 
  .0021**   .0007 
 
  .0003 -.0004 
 
  .0004 -.0005 
d_GDPg 
 
  .0001   .0004 
 
  .0018***   .0014*** 
 
  .0018***   .0015*** 
finsystem 
 
-.0189 ** -.0179 *** 
 
-.0077** -.0078** 
 
-.0072** -.0073** 
constant    .0646**   .0163    .0230***   .0067    .0277***   .0132 
# of observations 
 
475 588 
 
460 565 
 
460 565 
within-R² 
 
0.42 0.45 
 
0.68 0.65 
   between-R² 
 
0.12 0.16 
 
0.87 0.72 
   overall-R²   0.20 0.22   0.82 0.73       
Test for 2nd-order 
autocorrelation               0.10 0.14 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The regression analysis for the adjusted saving rate produce similar results as the regression 
analysis of the original saving rate. All regressors in the models with N=30 keep their signs and 
the only regressors that change their signs in the N=22 models are insignificant. The same 
regressors are significant in both sets of dynamic analysis, albeit with slight changes in the t-
values. Differences arise in the coefficients. Compared to the original saving rate, the impact of 
the lagged saving rate decreases and profits and the depth of the financial system are of higher 
importance. Contrary to my expectations, the exclusion of share repurchases, which are regarded 
as a measure to distribute additional profits to shareholders, does not smooth the saving rate but 
instead reduces the influence of the previous year’s saving rate and increases the impact of the 
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more volatile profits. However, the magnitude of the differences between the coefficients is 
small.  
The only specification that has different significant independent variables for the original and 
adjusted saving rate is the non-dynamic model in the case of 30 countries. In the estimation for 
the adjusted saving rate, investment and inflation turn out to be significant. This result is in line 
with the expectations. When I measure the saving rate as savings that are indeed maintained 
within the corporate sector, investment is highly significant and its impact is approximately 50% 
lower than the impact of profits.
19
 This result gives further support to amend the saving rate 
definition of the SNA for share repurchases, since one would expect that investment has to have 
an impact on retained earnings of the corporate sector. 
 
2.5 FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS AS ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Investigating the aggregate saving rate does not completely reveal the behavior at the firm level. 
To study which part of firm level behavior disappears by looking at the aggregate saving rate, the 
estimation of the macro level is repeated on a firm level for selected countries as a robustness 
check. All of the macro variables are from the sources that are described in section 2.4.2. The 
firm-level data are again based on Worldscope and cover the three largest European economies, 
namely, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The examined time period is 1980 to 2010, 
and the number of companies that are examined is 4399. I proceed as in section 2.4, and exclude 
companies with SIC 6000 to 6499 and 6700 to 6799. The regression equation is as follows:  
(2.5)                                                             
where      is a vector of macro variables (inflation (cpi),  GDP-growth (GDPg), change in GDP-
growth (d_GDPg) and the depth of financial systems (finsystem)), and      is a set of firm-level 
                                                          
19
 Extending the dataset to the maximum number of countries with information on share repurchases and 
aggregate corporate saving rates yields a dataset with 60 countries and approximately 900 country-year 
observations. This broader dataset has a similar coefficient for the lagged saving rates (both, the original and the 
adjusted saving rate) as the OECD countries. However, profits are insignificant, investment is significant and the 
coefficient of finsystem doubles. The implication of this result backs the theories that corporations need to rely 
more on internal financing in countries with less developed financial systems. But I abstain from elaborating on 
these results because the inclusion of the less developed countries reduces the average number of observations 
per country, which harms our econometric approach.  
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variables (profits/assets, capex/assets
20
, share buybacks/assets) instead of country-level variables. 
Yeardummy is again added to capture time effects. Following Bayoumi et al. (2010), all of the 
firm-level ratios are calculated over assets and not profits because profits can be negative, 
hindering proper estimation procedures. Profits are calculated by adding net income (Worldscope 
source code 01551), dividends (#04551) and depreciation (#01151). Capex (#04601) and assets 
(#02999) are taken as provided by Worldscope. Share buybacks (#04751) are set to 0 for a firm if 
no value for these buybacks is reported in Worldscope. The number of observations is reduced by 
building the ratios, excluding the top and bottom 1‰ of the saving/assets and capex/assets ratios 
and integrating the macro variables into the estimation that are not available for the whole time 
span from 1980 to 2010 for the three countries. Depending on the estimation process, the sample 
used comprises approximately 1,600 firms and 14,800 to 16,000 firm-year observations. 
Combining firm-level and macro variables produces certain drawbacks. Firm-level data are 
restricted to listed firms and do not represent the entire economy. Furthermore, listed firms are 
likely to be multinationals. Thus, data for these firms are likely to include profits and investments 
from foreign activities and therefore will not perfectly match the respective macro variables that 
are bound to a country’s borders. This explains part of the deviation from the results that are 
presented in tables 2.4 and 2.5. Furthermore, there is a higher variation in firm data than in macro 
data. The aggregated data are likely to be stickier due to the averaging effect over the whole 
economy. Table 2.6 presents the results for the firm-level estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Capex stands for capital expenditure, i.e., investment. 
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Table 2.6 
Firm-level analysis of the corporate saving rate 
Compared with the models that are presented in tables 2.4 and 2.5, the firm-related variables are constructed as 
ratios over assets. All of the models are estimated with xtdpd because a fixed effects model would lead to high 
biases due to the low value of T for these models. LSaving, LSaving_New, Buybacks/Assets and Profits/Assets are 
treated as GMM-type instruments. Robust standard errors are used in all estimations.    
 
  
UN SNA saving rate definition 
 
Adjusted saving rate 
Variable 
 
Aggregated model Including size var. 
 
Aggregated model Including size var. 
Fi
rm
-l
ev
el
 
LSaving 
 
.0525 .0517 
   LSaving_New 
    
.0516 .0413 
Buybacks/Assets 
 
-.0307 .0099 
   Profits/Assets 
 
.7102*** .5930*** 
 
.7347*** .6709*** 
Capex/Assets 
 
.0405** .0441** 
 
.0534*** .0558*** 
Log_Assets 
  
-.0241*** 
  
-.0198** 
M
ac
ro
- 
le
ve
l 
cpi 
 
.0017 .0006 
 
.0011 .0002 
GDPg 
 
.0009 .0016 
 
.0009 .0012 
d_GDPg 
 
.0026 .0010 
 
.0023 .0011 
Finsystem 
 
.0028 .0202 
 
.0082 .0223 
 Constant  .0304** .4732***  .0170 .3837** 
 # of observations 
 
15,990 15,990 
 
14,842 14,842 
 # of groups 
 
1,607 1,607 
 
1,550 1,550 
 Test for 2nd-order 
autocorrelation   0.33 0.41   0.23 0.22 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The profit and investment ratios are the significant explanatory variables of the saving rate on a 
firm level. Compared with the macro level, the lagged dependent variable does not significantly 
influence the current saving rate. These findings are in line with the conclusions of the finance 
literature presented in section 2.2 of this chapter. Approximately two thirds of every additional 
unit of profit are retained within the firm. Higher investment and capital demand lead to higher 
savings, but the effect of these factors (4%) is relatively low. In highly developed financial 
markets, such as the countries in this sample, external financing should be available at fair rates; 
this condition explains the low coefficient of the investment variable. The results change only 
marginally if the adjusted saving rate is considered. The impact of profits is slightly lower and 
capital expenditures are slightly more important. The largest and most surprising difference 
between the two measures of saving is the coefficient of a firm’s size. Larger firms should 
experience easier access to capital markets and bank lending. We should therefore observe a 
significant negative coefficient for log_assets because larger firms should experience less 
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financing frictions and thus experience a lower requirement to save. However, this link is only 
apparent for the original saving rate and disappears if the saving rate is adjusted for share 
repurchases. Moreover, none of the included macro variables significantly influences a firm’s 
saving rate. A firm’s saving decision is based on its own profits and investment needs, but does 
not respond to inflation or overall GDP growth. This might occur on the one hand because firms 
that are included in the dataset are largely multinationals that are less dependent on the national 
economic environment compared to smaller domestic companies and on the other hand because 
these firms may be more dependent on sector-specific dynamics than on the status of the overall 
economy of their home country. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This study confirms the hypothesis of a global saving glut, although this confirmation only 
applies if corporate savings are measured through the methodology of the System of National 
Accounts. The investigation of corporate saving in this study show that in the G7 countries 
between 1996 and 2004, an average of 7 percent of corporate savings were not retained within the 
corporate sector to conduct investment, increase cash holdings or reduce debt; instead, these 
savings were distributed to shareholders via share repurchases. In 2007, the share of corporate 
savings that was distributed to shareholders via share buybacks even reached 23% for the G7 
countries. Adjusting the saving rate for this changing payout behavior consequently leads to the 
rejection of the hypothesis that the corporate sector experienced a saving glut between 1996 and 
2004. The reasons for different payout behaviors (dividends vs. share repurchases) are not 
investigated in this study, but I demonstrate that share repurchases gained importance on an 
aggregate level in OECD countries and were responsible for a corporate saving glut with regards 
to the official aggregated corporate saving rate. Declining household saving rates in advanced 
economies should also be regarded under this aspect. There is no income flow to households, but 
households benefit from increased wealth by share repurchase programs. However, this increased 
wealth may be temporary in nature and furthermore benefits only the small fraction of the 
population who owns shares. Adjustments for payout behavior do not generally alter the 
significance of the factors that determine the corporate saving rate both on an aggregate level and 
on a firm level because they produce only marginal changes in the coefficients of these factors. 
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The non-dynamic specification of the adjusted saving rate for the case of N=30 shows the only 
divergence from the results of the traditional saving rate. Yet, this change is important since it 
shows that once the saving rate really measures retained earnings, investment needs turn out to be 
a significant determinant of corporate savings. While share repurchases have large aggregate 
effects and may affect the behavior of managers who nurse the share price by share repurchase 
programs, the effect on the determinants of the saving rate is limited.     
Aggregate corporate saving rates are most dependent on previous years’ saving rates; the next 
most important determinants of corporate saving rates are profits, changes in the rate of GDP 
growth and the depth of the financial system. If policy makers want to change the capital supply 
of the corporate sector, they need to keep in mind the following two observations: First, the 
aggregate saving rate is sticky, and adjustments to this rate occur over several years. Second, 
profits are the most important lever for affecting these rates, a conclusion that is confirmed by the 
micro-level analysis of this study. In OECD countries, efforts to encourage or discourage 
investment produce at maximum slight effects on corporate propensities to save. To counter a 
potential saving glut, politicians should foster their nation’s financial systems, as the depth of 
financial systems produces a significant and negative effect on corporate savings, but foremost it 
is the profit share of the corporate sector that has the highest impact on corporate savings. 
Furthermore, the next revision of the System of National Accounts should consider new 
classifications for corporate payout behavior. Share repurchases that even surpass the volume of 
dividend payments for some country-year observations merit different treatment than normal 
corporate savings and should be regarded as a payout to shareholders not only in the finance 
literature but also in other economic contexts. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is that to the best of my knowledge, it is the first 
cross-country analysis of the corporate saving behavior of the non-financial corporate sector for a 
large set of countries. Furthermore, this study is the first to aggregate share repurchases on a 
country level for several countries and to include this in the study of corporate savings. The 
saving glut hypothesis is frequently adopted by the media, and this paper establishes certain facts 
that supplement the common beliefs about this hypothesis. The field of share repurchases, 
corporate savings and the saving glut offers a wide range of interesting topics that should be 
addressed by future studies. Among these is the effect of share repurchases on current account 
imbalances or how a reversion towards more dividend payments would affect household saving. 
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The latter issue is particularly interesting because of the contrast between highly volatile stock 
market performances and the anticipated stability of the direct flow of money through dividends.   
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APPENDIX 
Table A2.1 
Non-financial corporate saving rates and share repurchases in OECD-countries 
Data on share repurchases is based on firm data from 1980 to 2010. Years that are not mentioned in the table 
reflect years without any share repurchase in the respective country. 
    Non-fin. corporate saving rate   Share repurchases 
  
Years T Min Max Mean 
 
years 1
st
year Max Mean 
Australia 
 
1988-2009 22 2.5% 10.2% 6.6% 
 
1993-2008 0.0% 0.9% 0.1% 
Austria 
 
1995-2008 14 9.7% 12.7% 11.4% 
 
1993-2009 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 
Belgium 
 
1985-2008 24 10.4% 15.2% 12.4% 
 
1999-2009 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 
Canada 
 
1970-2009 40 5.7% 13.0% 9.9% 
 
1984-2008 0.0% 1.2% 0.4% 
Chile 
 
1996-2008 13 5.3% 10.5% 8.6% 
 
1988-2008 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 
Czech Republic 
 
1995-2008 14 11.2% 16.0% 13.9% 
 
2001-2008 0.0% 1.5% 0.2% 
Denmark 
 
1981-2009 29 9.5% 15.4% 13.0% 
 
1988-2009 0.0% 1.1% 0.3% 
Estonia 
 
1994-2008 15 3.2% 19.2% 12.8% 
 
2002-2008 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Finland 
 
1975-2009 35 2.9% 16.6% 12.1% 
 
2000-2009 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 
France 
 
1970-2009 40 3.4% 8.9% 6.7% 
 
1987-2009 0.1% 0.8% 0.2% 
Germany 
 
1991-2008 18 6.9% 11.0% 8.7% 
 
1988-2009 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 
Greece 
 
1995-2008 14 4.4% 13.2% 9.1% 
 
2000-2009 1.0% 2.2% 0.8% 
Hungary 
 
1995-2008 14 7.4% 12.1% 10.4% 
 
1992-2008 0.0% 2.0% 0.2% 
Ireland 
 
2002-2008 7 7.7% 10.1% 8.9% 
 
1984-2009 0.1% 1.1% 0.2% 
Italy 
 
1980-2008 29 1.3% 8.9% 5.6% 
 
1987-2009 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Japan 
 
1980-2007 28 10.9% 17.8% 13.5% 
 
1985-2007 0.0% 0.8% 0.2% 
Mexico 
 
1993-2008 16 3.7% 11.9% 9.7% 
 
1986-2008 0.0% 1.0% 0.3% 
Netherlands 
 
1980-2008 29 9.5% 16.5% 12.6% 
 
1988-2009 0.1% 2.7% 0.6% 
New Zealand 
 
1999-2007 9 9.7% 16.7% 13.3% 
 
1986-2008 0.0% 0.8% 0.2% 
Norway 
 
1978-2007 30 11.0% 15.8% 13.0% 
 
1987-2008 0.0% 0.8% 0.2% 
Poland 
 
1995-2008 14 5.7% 10.7% 8.6% 
 
1998-2008 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Portugal 
 
1995-2009 15 3.0% 9.7% 7.4% 
 
1989-2009 0.0% 0.8% 0.2% 
Slovakia 
 
1995-2008 14 12.7% 16.6% 14.7% 
 
2006-2007 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Slovenia 
 
1995-2008 14 0.0% 12.4% 9.6% 
 
2002-2009 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
South Korea 
 
1975-2009 35 6.4% 15.1% 10.9% 
 
1988-2009 0.0% 1.3% 0.4% 
Spain 
 
1995-2008 14 5.1% 12.0% 9.5% 
 
1985-2009 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 
Sweden 
 
1993-2009 17 7.5% 14.1% 11.8% 
 
1991-2009 0.0% 2.1% 0.5% 
Switzerland 
 
1990-2007 18 10.5% 16.9% 13.8% 
 
1992-2008 0.0% 4.0% 1.3% 
United Kingdom 
 
1987-2008 22 7.3% 12.1% 10.4% 
 
1986-2009 0.0% 3.1% 0.8% 
United States   1970-2008 39 8.0% 10.9% 9.5%   1980-2008 0.1% 4.1% 1.1% 
Average 
  
21 6.7% 13.4% 10.6% 
  
0.1% 1.2% 0.3% 
 
Data source: UN SNA, World Bank and National Statistic Agencies for non-financial saving data; Worldscope for 
share repurchases.  
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Table A2.2 
Share repurchases on a firm level 
Table A2.2 includes active and inactive companies. Only countries with more than 100 companies in the 
Worldscope database are included in this table. 
      # of companies with share repurchases between   Share of companies  
that uses share 
repurchases 
Country  # of 
companies 1980 and 1999 2000 and 2010 1980 and 2010 
 Australia  2,072 68 465 484 23% 
Austria  106 1 47 47  44% 
Belgium  162 1 68 68  42% 
Brazil  388 38 123 136  35% 
Canada  1,750 219 465 517  30% 
Chile  213 4 26 28  13% 
China  2,518 5 114 118  5% 
Denmark  203 41 107 113  56% 
Finland  130 22 60 64  49% 
France  895 29 364 370  41% 
Germany  1,101 17 250 254  23% 
Greece  305 1 78 78  26% 
Hong Kong  1,078 161 334 402  37% 
India  2,325 43 424 441  19% 
Indonesia  418 7 52 57  14% 
Israel  248 13 86 90  36% 
Italy  301 19 135 138  46% 
Japan  3,985 106 1,636 1,652  41% 
Kuwait  183 0 116 116  63% 
Malaysia  1,049 29 258 271  26% 
Mexico  134 50 83 91  68% 
Netherlands  205 50 118 126  61% 
New Zealand  156 7 28 30  19% 
Norway  239 16 87 89  37% 
Pakistan  164 2 1 3  2% 
Philippines  253 32 73 83  33% 
Poland  373 4 72 74  20% 
Russia  295 3 89 89  30% 
Saudi Arabia  125 0 9 9  7% 
Singapore  688 11 154 159  23% 
South Africa  393 23 147 154  39% 
South Korea  1,266 207 796 816  64% 
Spain  163 37 113 119  73% 
Sweden  470 11 103 106  23% 
Switzerland  289 26 217 217  75% 
Taiwan  1,569 24 430 433  28% 
Thailand  559 3 64 65  12% 
Turkey  243 1 8 9  4% 
United Kingd.  2,403 316 1,060 1,117  46% 
United States   9,687 3,214 5,094 5,694   59% 
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Table A2.3 
Overview of variables in dataset 
All variables are generally suited for a panel data analysis as there are (1) high variations across the dataset 
(overall), (2) high variations between the countries (between) and (3) high variations within the countries (within). 
N gives the overall number of observations for each variable. n gives the number of countries and T-bar gives the 
average time period covered per country per variable. All variables but cpi, GDPg and d_GDPg are given as ratio 
over GDP.  
Variable     Mean Std.Dev. Min Max   Observations 
Saving overall 
 
0.107 0.032 0.000 0.192 
 
N = 598 
 
between 
  
0.024 0.056 0.147 
 
n = 30 
  within 
 
  0.020 0.011 0.170 
 
T-bar = 19.9 
Saving_New overall 
 
0.104 0.031 0.000 0.192 
 
N = 598 
 
between 
  
0.024 0.055 0.147 
 
n = 30 
  within 
 
  0.020 0.008 0.168 
 
T-bar = 19.9 
LSaving overall 
 
0.106 0.031 0.000 0.192 
 
N = 578 
 
between 
  
0.024 0.056 0.146 
 
n = 30 
  within 
 
  0.020 0.011 0.170 
 
T-bar = 19.3 
LSaving_New overall 
 
0.104 0.031 0.000 0.192 
 
N = 578 
 
between 
  
0.024 0.056 0.146 
 
n = 30 
  within 
 
  0.020 0.008 0.168 
 
T-bar = 19.3 
Buybacks overall 
 
0.002 0.005 0.000 0.041 
 
N = 900 
 
between 
  
0.002 0.000 0.010 
 
n = 30 
  within 
 
  0.004 -0.008 0.035 
 
T = 30 
Profits overall 
 
0.210 0.058 0.000 0.436 
 
N = 606 
 
between 
  
0.062 0.120 0.407 
 
n = 30 
 
within 
  
0.025 0.078 0.320 
 
T-bar = 20.2 
Inv overall 
 
0.125 0.034 0.001 0.252 
 
N = 598 
 
between 
  
0.031 0.074 0.197 
 
n = 30 
 
within 
  
0.017 -0.004 0.191 
 
T-bar = 19.9 
GDPg overall 
 
2.841 2.868 -14.570 12.280 
 
N = 854 
 
between 
  
1.052 1.711 6.323 
 
n = 30 
 
within 
  
2.669 -14.520 10.630 
 
T-bar = 28.5 
d_GDPg overall 
 
-0.047 2.675 -15.060 16.340 
 
N = 847 
 
between 
  
0.283 -0.353 0.828 
 
n = 30 
 
within 
  
2.665 -14.982 16.526 
 
T-bar = 28.2 
cpi overall 
 
8.228 23.803 -13.850 555.380 
 
N = 828 
 
between 
  
9.345 1.332 46.645 
 
n = 30 
 
within 
  
21.831 -37.627 516.963 
 
T-bar = 27.6 
finsystem overall 
 
0.803 0.433 0.087 2.107 
 
N = 827 
 
between 
  
0.339 0.176 1.474 
 
n = 30 
  within     0.277 0.047 2.198   T-bar = 27.6 
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Table A2.4 
Firm-level correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables 
The adjusted saving rate (saving rate less share repurchases) is labeled Saving_New. The prefix L indicates the first 
lag of a variable. The number of observations is 14,842. Correlation coefficients that are insignificant at the 5% level 
are written bold in italics. 
Variable Saving LSaving 
Saving 
_New 
LSaving 
_New 
Buybacks/ 
Assets 
Profits/ 
Assets 
Capex/ 
Assets 
Log- 
assets cpi GDPg d_GDPg 
Saving 1.000 
      
 
   
LSaving .481 1.000 
     
 
   
Saving_New .943 .442 1.000 
    
 
   
LSaving_New .435 .924 .422 1.000 
   
 
   
Buybacks/ 
Assets 
.101 .085 -.235 .007 1.000 
  
 
   
Profits/ 
Assets 
.567 .220 .542 .202 .035 1.000 
 
 
   
Capex/ 
Assets 
.198 .219 .199 .215 -.017 0.118 1.000  
   
Logassets -.076 -.122 -.082 -.130 .023 -.002 -.005 1.000 
   
cpi .066 .063 .059 .060 .018 .04 .086 -.058 1.000 
  
GDPg .092 .040 .086 .053 .011 .053 .099 -.02 .252 1.000 
 
d_GDPg .064 .010 .066 .029 -.011 .033 .049 -.012 .114 .780 1.000 
Finsystem -.024 .020 -.059 -.027 .106 -.047 -.095 -.074 -.068 -.356 -.382 
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Figure A2.1 
Piercing the corporate veil? – private and corporate sector saving 
Private sector (household and corporate) saving rates on the vertical axis and corporate sector saving rates on the 
horizontal axes are shown as percentage of GDP and cover the years 1980 to 2008. The dashed line shows the 
values at which corporate savings would make up 100% of private savings.   
 
Data source: UN SNA, Reserve Bank of India, BIS, National Statistic Agencies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Effect of Household Debt on Unemployment 
– Evidence from Europe and Spanish Provinces 
 
Abstract 
Most European countries faced steep and persistent increases in unemployment following the 
financial crisis of 2007-08. With this study we seek to investigate whether some part of these 
increases can be attributed to indebted households who reduced their consumption in order to 
restructure their balance sheets. We establish a link between household debt and aggregate 
demand based on a cross-country study of 18 European countries and show how household sector 
debt affects unemployment via the aggregate demand channel. We strengthen the results with an 
analysis of Spanish provinces. The level of household sector debt in Spanish provinces is highly 
significant in determining the increase in provincial unemployment from 2007 to 2010 via the 
aggregate demand channel. We find that on aggregate, approximately 1/3 of the increase in 
Spanish unemployment can be traced back to high household debt levels.      
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many countries in the world are now in their sixth year of economic crisis. The downturn began 
in the United States with the subprime crisis. Low interest rates and rising house prices, together 
with an unregulated subprime mortgage market, encouraged an increasing number of Americans 
to fulfill their lifelong dreams of buying their own apartments or houses or moving into larger 
and fancier homes. In 2006-2007, the housing bubble burst, first home owners, then banks and 
finally real sector companies came under distress. This subprime crisis led to the global financial 
crisis in 2007-2008, which, in most of the economies of the developed world, was followed by a 
deep recession beginning in 2008-2009. This recession was accompanied by increasing 
unemployment rates and debt-financed government programs intended to support the economy. 
Today, in 2012, many economies around the world continue to suffer from high unemployment 
rates and debt levels that exceed the pre-crisis levels.   
All of the episodes of this long-lasting crisis period are closely linked to debt. First, households 
realized their over-indebtedness after the real estate bubble burst. Then, issues with financial 
sector debt and leverage led to a systemic financial crisis. Since 2010, it is government debt that 
worries rating agencies, investors who have purchased government bonds and the public, who 
ultimately guarantees public debt through the tax basis. To non-economists, it appears obvious 
that substantial debt loads are a source of worry. A larger nominal amount of debt leads to higher 
debt service burdens. The more a household, bank, corporation or state has to pay in interest, the 
less money is available for consumption and investment if the household or organization’s 
income remains constant. Once the debt service becomes too high, bankruptcy occurs.  
This situation may also be viewed differently. The debt of one person, corporation or state is 
wealth of another person, corporation or state. If John Doe must service a debt of 10,000 dollars 
and pays interest of 10% on that debt, he loses 1,000 dollars that he could otherwise spend. 
However, if Jane Doe lent 10,000 dollars to John, she now has an additional 1,000 dollars to 
spend. The same is true for a government. When the government must pay more interest on its 
debt, the lender receives these higher interest payments and spends the money. Thus, in a closed 
economy or more precisely if the net foreign asset position and the resulting net income are 
insignificant, the majority of the interest should be paid and received within the country, with the 
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two amounts canceling each other out. Based on this line of argument, do we really need to care 
about debt levels or is the public debate falling for a zero-sum game?  
This paper contributes to the academic and public debate regarding the relationship between debt 
and aggregate demand and its effect on unemployment. Theory might give reasons for believing 
that the debt levels itself need not be a source of concern, though even the theoretical evidence is 
far from conclusive. Nevertheless, although the research in this area remains controversial, the 
amount of empirical work being conducted on this relationship is increasing. Two recent and very 
influential analyses that will be discussed in further detail later in this paper are the studies by 
Mian and Sufi (2012) and Dynan (2012). However, both of these papers focus on the United 
States.  
This paper instead looks at Europe and investigates how the level of household debt and the 
changes in household debt are linked to aggregate demand in this region which translates into 
unemployment. The household sector is the focus of this paper because of the importance of 
household consumption expenditure to aggregate demand and because the household debt in 
many European countries increased rapidly prior to the crisis, whereas government deficits and 
debt levels exhibited rather modest increases or even decreases in many countries. Furthermore, 
there is substantial variation in the development of household debt among and within European 
countries. A comparison of 18 European countries shows that there is a high and significant 
correlation between the debt build-up prior to 2007 and the changes in employment that occurred 
from 2008 to 2010. The economic performance of these countries has suffered because of the end 
of the debt-fueled growth there and in some cases because of a decline in outstanding debt. Thus, 
there appears to be a link between changes in debt and aggregate demand.  
The underlying transmission mechanism that is investigated in this study begins with a shock to 
the balance sheets of individual households. The shock for households is greater if they must 
expend more effort to restructure their balance sheets. The more debt a household has 
accumulated relative to its income before the shock occurred, the more deleveraging the 
household must arrange by increasing savings and reducing spending after the shock to 
restructure its balance sheet. Given the elasticity of employment with respect to demand, these 
changes generate increased unemployment.  
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There are at least two different theoretical mechanisms that could explain the deleveraging needs 
of households. First, these deleveraging needs may be a function of increased credit constraints 
or, to put it differently, of falling debt limits due to lower collateral values. Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012) model the deleveraging needs of borrowing households using an exogenous 
decrease in the debt limit. If the real interest rate cannot adjust to its natural or full employment 
level, aggregate demand will fall. Second, the deleveraging needs of households may also be a 
function of changing perceptions of lifetime income or wealth. For instance, housing prices, 
which determine the value of one of the most important assets for most households, almost 
certainly affect household wealth (or indebtedness). It is now generally understood that the 
Spanish housing market experienced a significant boom in the early 2000s and that this boom 
ended rather abruptly in 2007. Thus, it appears very likely that Spanish households not only were 
forced to deleverage due to more tightly binding credit constraints as their collateral lost value 
but also suffered large decreases in their net wealth. In addition to the disruptions at the real 
estate market, the crisis made clear to many Spaniards that future income levels would be smaller 
than expected. All three, the credit constraints, the wealth effects and the adjusted expectations 
about life time income may explain the increased deleveraging needs of the indebted Spanish 
household sector. We will try to disentangle these effects in our empirical analysis by controlling 
for housing prices.   
Importantly, because aggregate demand will decline more in regions with higher deleveraging 
needs than in those with lower deleveraging needs, we should see different responses in regional 
sectoral unemployment rates depending on whether we analyze the tradable or non-tradable 
sectors (cf. Mian and Sufi (2012)). More precisely, tradable sector employment (unemployment) 
in each region, which depends on the aggregate demand from all regions, should fall (rise) 
irrespective of the particular deleveraging needs of that specific region. However, the opposite 
should be true for the non-tradable sector. In the non-tradable sector, employment 
(unemployment) should fall more (rise more) in those regions that have high deleveraging needs. 
In a sense, by selling tradable goods, the tradable sector employment insures itself against 
idiosyncratic regional demand shocks. Non-tradable sector employment, however, is vulnerable 
to regional demand shocks. Thus, if the Spanish provinces’ debt-to-GDP levels are good 
indicators of the deleveraging needs that followed the shock to those provinces, the demand 
channel predicts higher increases in unemployment in the non-tradable sector in those provinces 
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that had high debt-to-GDP ratios, whereas the increases in tradable-sector unemployment should 
be independent of those debt-to-GDP ratios.   
We find that these theoretical mechanisms hold for the European country data, which we use in 
section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents a more granular analysis based on the regional data for Spain. 
This analysis supports the finding that high household debt levels decrease consumption and 
aggregate demand and lead to increasing unemployment. Based on this evidence of the role of 
debt in aggregate demand and unemployment in Spain, we calculate the magnitude of this effect 
using our findings for unemployment in the non-tradable sector. We find that approximately 1/3 
of the increase in the aggregate Spanish unemployment between November 2007 and November 
2010 is due to debt-related decreases in household spending.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the 
related literature. Section 3.3 describes a cross-country study of 18 European countries. Section 
3.4 presents the within-country study of Spain, including the calculation of the aggregate effect of 
debt on unemployment. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.         
 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The effect of household debt on the economy has been repeatedly examined in combination with 
recessions. Fisher (1933) postulated the debt deflation theory for great depressions. Mishkin 
(1978) empirically examined the Great Depression and considered how household balance sheets 
served as a transmission mechanism for changes in aggregate demand. The American recession 
of 1973-75 is empirically investigated by Mishkin, Gordon and Hymans (1977), who focus on the 
role of household debt and stock market developments. All of these papers find an important 
negative effect of debt on economic activity. However, whereas Fisher (1933) examines the 
effect on asset prices, Mishkin (1978) and Mishkin et al. (1977) focus on consumption and 
aggregate demand. Palley (1994) builds a model of the effects of household debt on aggregate 
demand based on the different propensities to consume among creditor and debtor households 
and applies the model to the recession of the early nineties. Palley (1994) concludes that 
increases in household debt fuel aggregate demand but that the servicing of this debt 
subsequently lowers aggregate demand. The financial crisis and economic downturn of 2007-09 
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have again drawn attention to the role of household sector debt. Keen (2009) emphasizes the role 
of debt in aggregate demand. Changes in the volume of debt as a percentage of GDP explain how 
much of the aggregate demand is debt financed. Keen (2009) validates the link between the 
household debt and aggregate demand for Australia by showing how both increasing debt and 
declining unemployment and decreasing debt and rising unemployment move together. The link 
between household debt and aggregate demand in the recent recession is evident for the United 
States in Mian and Sufi (2012) and Dynan (2012). Dynan (2012) uses the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) to examine the effect of household debt on consumption. She estimates the 
effect of leverage and that of debt service burdens on the changes in consumption that occurred 
from 2007 to 2009 and confirms that a significant negative impact exists even after income and 
wealth effects are controlled for. This approach provides a microfoundation for the deleveraging 
shock that depresses consumption in addition to wealth and income effects.  
Overall, this chapter is most closely related to the work by Mian and Sufi (2012), which 
investigates the link between household sector debt levels and aggregate demand with a regional 
analysis. These authors use county-level data from the United States and estimate how household 
debt levels, measured as debt over income, influence consumption, which fuels aggregate 
demand. The size of the debt level is interpreted as the magnitude of the household balance sheet 
shock and of the need for adjustment to household-level finances. Mian, Rao and Sufi (2012) use 
local retail sales data to show that household debt levels affect consumption. Having illustrated 
the link between household debt and consumption, Mian and Sufi (2012) use the elasticity of 
employment to aggregate demand to measure the transmission of household debt via 
consumption and aggregate demand on employment and thus, to the severity of the crisis in the 
United States. The distinction between employment in the tradable and non-tradable sectors is 
important to the analysis. The demand for tradable goods is determined on a national level, which 
renders the shocks to the household balance sheet in one county unimportant. The demand for 
non-tradable goods, in contrast, is only dependent on local consumption. Thus, regional 
employment in tradable industries is independent of local debt levels, and employment in non-
tradable industries should be highly dependent on local debt levels. Mian and Sufi (2012) confirm 
the validity of their model by regressing the changes in total employment, tradable employment 
and non-tradable employment from 2007 to 2009 on the 2006 debt to income ratio. Controlling 
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for structural shocks by including the shares of the construction, tradable and non-tradable 
industries does not change the outcome.  
The International Monetary Fund (2012) and the McKinsey Global Institute (2010, 2012) reports 
cover more than one country. The IMF finds that larger increases in household debt lead to more 
severe recessions and examines country-level case studies in seeking to determine how to address 
large household debts and house price decreases. The McKinsey Global Institute examines 
deleveraging across all economic sectors and describes how historic deleveraging processes have 
taken place (cf. McKinsey Global Institute (2010)) and how the major economies have 
meanwhile progressed in their deleveraging process (cf. McKinsey Global Institute (2012)). The 
case studies presented in that report suggest that during an economy-wide deleveraging, a country 
should begin with deleveraging in the private sector while the public sector compensates for the 
loss in aggregate demand; then, the latter should begin deleveraging once the nation’s economic 
growth regains its momentum.  
This study contributes to the literature by using existing approaches to investigate household debt 
and aggregate demand in Europe and particularly in Spain and its provinces. This research can 
thus confirm that the previous results for the United States and Australia are also valid for a 
legally and culturally quite different region. Furthermore, this research indicates which portion of 
the increase in Spanish unemployment is traceable to the high household sector debt. Thus, this 
chapter provides a fact base for Spanish policy makers as well as for macro-prudential regulators 
who are concerned with the effects of household sector debt on the economy.  
 
3.3 HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND UNEMPLOYMENT – A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
To investigate whether there is a link between household debt and aggregate demand in Europe, 
one can compare the debt data for European countries to two indicators for aggregate demand. 
One possible measure of the effect of debt on aggregate demand is the contribution of household 
consumption expenditure to GDP growth. The other (more indirect) measure of aggregate 
demand is employment, which is suitable because of the high elasticity of employment to 
aggregate demand, albeit with some time delay. The hypotheses tested in this research are as 
follows: 
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Regions with (1) larger increases in debt or (2) higher debt levels prior to an economic 
downturn will experience a lower growth of aggregate demand during an economic 
downturn than regions with (1) smaller increases in debt or (2) lower debt levels because 
of household balance sheet restructuring.   
Lower growth of aggregate demand means thereby that it can also turn negative. The 
transmission mechanism of household debt to aggregate demand is as described by Keen (2009), 
Mian and Sufi (2012) or Dynan (2012). Using the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) or life 
cycle hypothesis (LCH), the households that expect higher future income (PIH) or that benefit 
from increased housing wealth (LCH) should adapt their consumption behavior and consume 
more. If the household’s expectations regarding future income are sufficiently high, the 
household can rationally take on debt today to smooth consumption. When a negative exogenous 
shock lowers the expectations of the household, the individuals in the household will need to 
change their consumption and investment behavior accordingly. Households that have increased 
their debt more than others or that hold higher debt levels must reduce their debt by a larger 
amount. The household balance sheet is restructured through reductions in consumption 
spending. Still, it is not unquestionable that the aggregate demand is affected by the households 
that restructure their balance sheets. Households that have acted as lenders in the first place will 
have the option to consume more when the debt is repaid. Thus, in aggregate, there should be no 
effect on aggregate demand if the propensity to consume out of income is the same across 
households. Nevertheless, the aggregate demand might indeed be reduced if the debt overhang is 
sufficiently large and if the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound (cf. Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012)).  
To test our hypothesis, we compare changes in household debt as well as levels of household debt 
using our two measures of aggregate demand. If we find no effect on spending, the contribution 
of household consumption expenditure to GDP growth should be independent of debt. If debt has 
no influence on aggregate demand, neither changes in household debt nor the level of household 
debt will be linked to the changes in employment that follow aggregate demand. Both hypotheses 
are tested using aggregated country-level data for European economies. 
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3.3.1 Data sources   
The cross-country study builds on 18 European countries regarding the measure of employment 
and 9 euro-area countries regarding the measure of household consumption expenditure’s 
contribution to GDP growth. All of the debt data are obtained from Eurostat’s annual sector 
accounts and are amended using data from the national statistical agencies and central banks 
when the Eurostat data coverage is insufficient. Household debt is used as provided by Eurostat 
(total financial liabilities of the household sector including non-profit institutions serving 
households). The GDP and disposable income data are also based on Eurostat’s annual sector 
accounts. To establish the link between household sector consumption expenditure and its 
contribution to GDP growth, data from the European Central Bank are used. These data are 
captured on a quarterly basis but are not provided for all euro-area countries, which limits the 
number of observations to 9 countries. The second test of the hypotheses uses employment data 
from the EU’s Labor Force Survey, which are sourced from Eurostat. 
3.3.2 Empirical analysis 
The American subprime crisis in 2007 only spread to the European real economy in 2008. There 
was a peak in debt issuance in 2007 and a peak in employment in 2008. Thus, 2007 serves as a 
starting point for our analysis of the effects of household debt on aggregate demand. We argue 
that debt levels and changes in debt have an effect on consumption and, consequently, on 
aggregate demand. The transmission channel is the necessary restructuring of the household 
balance sheet. In a boom period, a household takes on debt, anticipating increases in future 
income and asset prices. The household spends this debt on the purchase of assets, the most 
important of which is housing, and on consumption expenditure. When the boom period ends, 
asset prices stagnate or shrink, and future income streams become more uncertain. Households 
consequently restructure their balance sheets in accordance with their updated expectations. The 
restructuring of balance sheets comes along with increasing saving and decreasing consumption 
expenditure. The higher the debt level of the household sector, the larger the amount of debt that 
the sector must repay and the greater the reduction in consumption and, thus, aggregate demand. 
The same rule holds for changes in debt. The higher the increase in debt prior to the shock, the 
greater is the need to pay back debt and save after the peak of the boom. Both measures, changes 
in debt and the level of debt, are important. The level of debt is a good indicator because there is 
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a natural limit to household debt in terms of debt service. The more debt a household sector 
holds, the larger the debt service burden, and this burden cannot exceed disposable income if one 
rules out Ponzi games. The increase in debt serves as a good indicator for the magnitude of the 
shock because it shows how far households have deviated from their usual level of debt. If 
interest rates do not change, an increase in the debt-to-income ratio will alter the debt service 
burden proportionally. If the aggregated household sector long-term consumption behavior does 
not change accordingly, a short-term drop in consumption must occur to soften the process of 
adjustment to the previous debt-to-income ratios. This drop in consumption will dampen the 
aggregate demand and, consequently, will decrease employment. For there to be an effect on 
aggregate demand, it is not even necessary for there to be a nominal decrease in debt volume. A 
reduction in the debt growth rate is sufficient to reduce the aggregate demand relative to previous 
periods when the income levels do not change because the total amount that is available for 
consumption is reduced. The first method of validating this line of argument involves 
demonstrating the high correlation between changes in debt and the contribution of household 
consumption expenditure to GDP growth, as shown in figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 
Changes in household sector debt and contribution of consumption expenditure to GDP growth  
Household sector debt is measured in euro. Changes in debt and the contribution of household consumption 
expenditure to GDP growth are measured quarterly as a moving average over four quarters. The countries included 
(time span covered) are Austria (2003-2011), Belgium (1997-2011), France (1996-2011), Germany (1992-2011), 
Ireland (2002-2011), Italy (1998-2011), the Netherlands (2000-2011), Portugal (1998-2011) and Spain (2001-2011).  
 
Data source: National Central Banks, European Central Bank. 
Contr. of cons. = 11.061 ∆debt - 0.0221 
R² = 0.356; p-value of ∆debt: 0.000 
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Most of the data points in figure 3.1 show that nominal debt is, in fact, increasing; the nominal 
deleveraging in countries such as Spain only began in 2010. A nominal quarterly increase below 
0.5% may still be considered to indicate real deleveraging if the inflation rate is close to 2%. 
When we compare the extremes in this figure – e.g., increases below 0.5% and above 3.0% – it is 
clear that high debt growth is associated with a high share of consumption contribution to GDP 
growth, whereas when debt grows slowly or declines, the contribution of consumption to GDP 
growth is low or negative. Thus, figure 3.1 has two implications. First, mortgages, which 
represent the largest fraction of household sector debt, are not exclusively linked to housing 
expenditures. Second, an increase in household debt will be accompanied by an increasing 
positive impact of household consumption expenditure on GDP growth. One might expect 
changes in European household debt not to be closely linked to consumption because most debt is 
used to purchase housing assets. However, due to the positive correlation between increases in 
household debt and the contribution of consumption to GDP growth, even though direct 
mortgage equity withdrawals are of minor importance in Europe, a higher volume of real estate 
mortgages is still associated with a higher contribution of consumption to GDP growth. This 
connection may be a function of indirect effects such as wealth effects. The connection may also 
be explained by the PIH. The data that show increasing nominal debt stem from the years after 
the introduction of the common currency in Europe. The introduction of the euro, especially in 
the Mediterranean, led to a reduction in credit constraints. This development, together with the 
capital inflows from Northern Europe, fed people’s expectations regarding their future incomes, 
which they expected to be permanently higher. These expectations, together with low interest 
rates, encouraged housing investments (which appeared to be more affordable) and higher 
consumption based on the positive economic outlook. The PIH not only holds in upward markets 
but is valid for downturns as well. The shock of the financial crisis, whose size varied from 
country to country depending on the debt-to-income ratios of the various nations as stated in our 
hypothesis, generated lower expectations regarding income. In turn, lower lifetime incomes 
required the restructuring of household balance sheets, i.e., reductions in debt through increased 
saving and reduced consumption. 
This relationship also exists beyond the pooled euro area. A closer look at the single countries in 
the currency union confirms the results (cf. table A3.1). Eight of the nine euro-area countries 
under consideration show a high correlation between changes in household sector debt and the 
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contribution of household consumption expenditure to GDP growth; Belgium is the only country 
without this link. Furthermore, in the countries for which we have data for longer time periods, 
the correlation was especially strong during the last decade – in the years preceding the crisis and 
during the crisis itself. The next interesting result is that the countries that face the most severe 
problems in the euro crisis are those with the highest correlation between changes in debt and the 
contribution of consumption expenditure to GDP growth. Ireland, Portugal and Spain have 
correlation coefficients of approximately 80%, and Italy’s coefficient for the period from 2000 to 
2011 is 65.6%.
21
 These data may suggest that debt-financed, consumption-driven GDP growth is 
vulnerable to shocks. The high correlation coefficients for the Mediterranean countries relative to 
Austria, Germany or the Netherlands may result from the debt boom after the introduction of the 
euro. Whereas the latter countries were used to low inflation rates and rather low interest rates, 
the former benefitted more from the introduction of the euro in this regard. The decreasing 
interest rates stimulated demand for credit that was partially provided by the northern euro 
countries. The increasing provision of credit and capital inflows stimulated these economies and 
encouraged consumption spending. This trend partially explains why the country-level 
correlation between the changes in credit and the contribution of consumption to GDP growth is 
higher for the years preceding the crisis, i.e., the years following the introduction of the euro. 
Explicitly grouping the observations into those from the period prior to the crisis and those from 
during the crisis (cf. figure A3.1(a)) reveals that the slope of the relation between the changes in 
debt and the contribution of consumption expenditure to GDP growth is 1.5 times steeper during 
the crisis, though the explanatory power of these findings is smaller. In addition, analyzing the 
data from the worst-affected countries and the more stable countries (cf. figure A3.1(b)) shows 
that the contribution of consumption expenditure to GDP growth in the pooled, stable countries is 
marginal, whereas we observe a steep slope and high explanatory power of debt for the other 
group. Our first measure of aggregate demand thus works for these subsamples and for the euro 
area more generally, but its quality depends on the precise sample composition.  
The second and more indirect measure of aggregate demand is illustrated in figure 3.2, which 
shows the high correlation between the changes in debt prior to the crisis and the subsequent 
magnitude of the changes in employment. 
                                                          
21
 Using quarterly data instead of smoothed moving average data also yields high and significant coefficients. 
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Figure 3.2  
Changes in household sector debt and employment 
Household sector debt is measured as the ratio of financial liabilities to disposable income. Employment is 
measured as the ratio of the employed population aged 15 to 64 to the total population aged 15 to 64. The number 
of European countries included is 18. 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
The hypothesis that a larger increase in the debt ratio leads to a stronger decline in employment is 
confirmed for the 18 European countries for which data for both debt and employment are 
available for the relevant time span. The correlation coefficient of -69.2% demonstrates the 
substantial negative relationship between increases in household debt and the subsequent 
adjustments in aggregate demand. A regression without further control variables indicates that for 
every increase in debt of 10 percentage points from 2000 to 2007, the employment ratio 
decreased by 0.6 percentage points from 2008 to 2010.  
The level of household sector debt can be used in lieu of the increase in household sector debt. 
Household sector debt relative to disposable income prior to the crisis is depicted in figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 
Levels of household sector debt and changes in employment 
Figure 3.3(a) includes the same 18 countries as figure 3.2. Figure 3.3(b) presents a country sample that excludes the 
outliers Lithuania and Latvia. 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
Using the same country sample to test this paper’s underlying hypothesis fails to prove the 
hypothesis, and it appears as though the level of household sector debt is irrelevant. However, 
there are two outliers in the country sample: Latvia and Lithuania. Both countries had very low 
levels of household debt in the 1990s and experienced a substantial increase in household debt 
prior to the crisis. Given the small size of our sample the outliers can have a significant effect on 
the outcome of the analysis, we therefore exclude Latvia and Lithuania due to their structural 
differences from other European countries. This step further backs the hypothesis regarding the 
effect of debt on aggregate demand (cf. figure 3.3(b)). Increases in debt and levels of debt during 
a boom are good indicators of the magnitude of the changes in aggregate demand that will occur 
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in the downturn.
22
 The current Eurostat data do not yet include the years 2011 and 2012; 
otherwise, it would have been possible to precisely measure the degree of adjustment in 
household sector debt: whether the debt growth decreased, whether there was no debt growth at 
all or whether there was a nominal reduction in the debt-to-income ratio. The conclusion to be 
drawn from the data presented in this section is nevertheless clear. Household sector debt fuels 
aggregate demand in an upswing, but during a time of debt moderation, when debt growth 
decelerates or becomes negative, the impact on aggregate demand is severe.  
This cross-country study therefore provides results that support our hypotheses. We hence 
confirm the results of the analyses of American household sector debt deleveraging conducted by 
Mian and Sufi (2012) and Dynan (2012) and by Keen (2009) for Australian household sector debt 
and aggregate demand. A sharp reduction in debt growth and deleveraging by European 
household sectors severely reduced aggregate demand.  
 
3.4 HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND UNEMPLOYMENT – THE CASE OF SPAIN  
These 18 European economies are significantly more diverse than Australia or the United States, 
so that these results are more likely to be affected by unobserved country characteristics. The low 
number of observations also hampers the use of econometric regressions. To address both issues, 
this section presents a regional analysis of a single country. Criticism against results from 
aggregation on a national level and comparison of European countries is less problematic for a 
comparison of more granular regional data. The case of Spain is also used in order to address one 
of the countries that is currently most heavily hit by the euro crisis, that experienced particularly 
high increases in debt and high levels of debt and that currently suffers from exceptionally high 
unemployment rates. Spanish households decreased their nominal debt outstanding in the 1st 
quarter of 2009 for the first time in over 20 years. On a yearly basis, modest deleveraging started 
in 2009 and paused in 2010; deleveraging accelerated in 2011 (cf. figure 3.4).  
When we focus on the Spanish provinces, the number of observations increases to 50,
23
 which is 
a more suitable number for econometric regressions. In addition, the shocks that apply to all 
                                                          
22
 The correlation coefficient for these two measures, the level of debt and the increase in debt, is 69% in the 
sample with 18 countries. Excluding the outliers Latvia and Lithuania increases the correlation coefficient to 81%. 
23
 Spain has 52 provinces, but the relevant data are only available for 50 provinces. 
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Spanish provinces are more homogenous in nature than the shocks that apply to the 18 European 
countries. However, the size of the shocks among provinces in Spain does still vary. By using the 
provinces’ debt-to-GDP ratios, we ensure that the shock is heterogeneous in size and is thus 
suited to our analysis. Compared to a European analysis, the Spanish economy is more 
homogenous in terms of institutions such as the labor market, the educational system, and credit 
provisioning. Because we focus on the non-tradable sector, we also benefit from the fact that 
structural differences across provinces are larger for industrial production and tradable goods 
than for consumption behavior for non-tradable goods. This difference gives further support to 
using provincial data from a single country. Therefore, this section focuses on regional analyses 
of Spain.  
We will first introduce the theoretical foundation of the empirical analysis in section 3.4.2 and 
then describe the data, which we use in the empirical analyses (section 3.4.4), for robustness 
checks (section 3.4.5) and for the calculation of the share of the increase in Spanish 
unemployment that can be traced back to household sector debt (section 3.4.6).   
3.4.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical foundation for the investigation of the effect of household debt via the aggregate 
demand channel on unemployment is provided in Mian and Sufi (2012, p. 10 ff. and 29, 30). The 
model described here in a short version mirrors the model of Mian and Sufi (2012). Differences 
arise because we look at increases in unemployment at a provincial level     and the elasticity of 
unemployment to a reduction in consumption and aggregate demand   instead of employment 
losses at a county level    and the elasticity of employment with respect to output demand  .    
The model setup is as follows: households spend a fraction   of their income on non-tradable 
goods NT and the rest of their income     on tradable goods T. When households reduce their 
consumption, both, tradable and non-tradable goods are affected. Unemployment reacts to this 
reduction in demand and increases according to the elasticity of unemployment to a reduction in 
aggregate demand  . 
In this model, province   is hit by the demand shock   . However, the total shock to a province 
   consists of a reduction in demand for non-tradable goods in the respective province and a 
reduction in demand for tradable goods from the whole country that hits this province: 
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(3.1)                
where    is the average shock for tradable goods for each province: 
(3.2)    
 
 
   
 
   
 
The total demand-driven increase in unemployment in province   depends on the elasticity of 
unemployment with respect to output, i.e.    . Each province is furthermore exposed to a country 
wide shock   that is equal to all provinces and a structural shock    that just affects province  . 
The total increase in unemployment     in a province can thus be written as:  
(3.3)                        
The aggregate increase in unemployment that results from the debt-driven demand shock only 
(3.6) can then be calculated as the sum of the increases in unemployment in non-tradable sectors 
(3.4) and the sum of the increases in unemployment in tradable sectors (3.5).  
(3.4)      
 
   
       
(3.5)          
 
   
           
(3.6)                     
To derive econometrically the effect of this demand shock, the structural shock in province   and 
the country wide shock that affects all provinces equally need to be excluded. By using a narrow 
definition for the non-tradable sector that focuses on regional consumption that is not likely to be 
prone to a regional structural shock, we aim to exclude    from our calculation. The change in 
non-tradable sector unemployment for a province that is not exposed to a regional structural 
unemployment shock is given by equation (3.7): 
(3.7)    
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As a next step, country-wide shocks are excluded by taking the differences between the 
provinces. We thereby assume that the decile of provinces with the lowest debt level (       ) 
does not suffer from a deleveraging shock, but that these provinces are a benchmark for 
developments that affect all provinces. We consequently compare all provinces to the province 
with the fifth-lowest debt level (   ):  
(3.8)      
       
      
              
     
    is set to zero for the five provinces with the lowest debt levels.  
If we could directly observe the demand shock   , the aggregated increase in unemployment in 
the non-tradable sector due to a debt-driven reduction in demand could be estimated as  
(3.9)            
 
   
     
               
 
   
            
However, we cannot directly measure the demand shock   . Therefore we proxy the size of this 
demand shock for each province by the level of household debt relative to GDP. Households with 
more debt need to reduce their spending by a larger amount. Thus, provinces with higher debt-to-
GDP ratios experience larger drops in aggregate demand and larger increases in unemployment. 
We use our indicator of household sector debt in province   for the calculation of the increase in 
unemployment:  
(3.10)       
          
               
           
This approach is suitable because we have a linear relationship between household sector debt 
levels and changes in non-tradable sector unemployment, which is shown in the empirical 
analysis and figure 3.5. The increase in total unemployment that is related to the debt-related 
reduction in consumption can then be calculated by solving (3.9) for     ; i.e., multiplying the 
increase in non-tradable unemployment with the inverse of the share of non-tradable 
unemployment in total unemployment:    
(3.11)      
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The term      is thereby neglected in (3.11) because we make the conservative assumption that 
the decile of provinces with the lowest debt levels did not face a demand shock from too high 
debt burdens. This approach is taken to the Spanish data in section 3.4.6.    
3.4.2 Description of the data 
The Spanish regional data are taken from the Instituto Nacional de Éstadística (INE), the Spanish 
Ministry of Employment and Social Security (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social), the 
Spanish Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Fomento) and Eurostat. The 
regional level used in the analyses is NUTS-3,
24
 i.e., the Spanish provincias are analyzed. 
Because there is no information on the overall household debt levels or the changes in household 
debt for the Spanish provinces, we require an alternative measure. This is found in the mortgage 
data for the Spanish provinces, which are provided by the INE. Mortgages account for 84% of 
total household debt, and this share is almost independent of the income percentiles according to 
the survey of household finances.
25
 Thus, in this research, the volume of mortgages is a good 
alternative measure to total household debt. All of the mortgage data are monthly data that is 
available from January 2003 onwards. However, there is no information on the total level of 
mortgages outstanding but the monthly information indicates the number and volumes of newly 
issued mortgages, which we use to proxy the total level of mortgages outstanding. The mortgage 
data from the INE are split into different categories. This allows us to focus on housing 
mortgages.
26
  
                                                          
24
 NUTS levels (fr. Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques – Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) 
are used for regional statistics in Europe. NUTS-3 is used to distribute the regional funds of the European Union.  
25
 The ratio of 2008 mortgage debt to total debt ranges from a maximum of 85.3% for the top income percentile to 
a minimum of 82.3% for the second highest income percentile. The overall average is 84%. The differences in the 
income percentiles can be traced to the fact that the highest income percentile uses less than half of its mortgages 
for main residences, whereas the poorest 40% of households use 87% of their mortgages for main residences (cf. 
Bank of Spain (2011), p. 111 table 6). 
26
 The two major categories are agricultural land (which had a share of 6% from January 2003 to April 2011) and 
urban land (which had a share of 94%). Within urban land, there are multiple categories: housing (61%), lots (11%), 
and other urban land (22%). “Other urban land” includes commercial properties, garages, offices, and industrial 
buildings, but also buildings that include dwellings. Using total mortgages instead of housing mortgages generates 
results that are similar to the ones presented in this section; the significance levels remain the same, although the 
coefficients are smaller. These results are as expected because the effect of debt taken on for agricultural or 
business purposes should have less of an effect on household consumption (and, thus, employment in the non-
tradable sector) than debt taken on for the purpose of housing.    
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The mortgage data are used in the analyses in two different ways. First, because we do not have 
data on the level of household debt, which would allow for a straightforward calculation of the 
growth rate as in section 3.3, we compare the aggregated mortgage issuances from 2003 and 2004 
over the 2004 GDP with the aggregated mortgage issuances from 2005 to 2007 over the 2007 
GDP. This comparison leads us to approximate the growth rate from the three years preceding the 
crisis compared to that of the two prior years. It also enables us to investigate the effects of an 
increase in mortgage issuances on the subsequent changes in aggregate demand. Second, the 
volume of mortgages at a certain point in time can be approximated by the aggregated volume of 
newly issued housing mortgages in the five years preceding the crisis, i.e., from January 2003 
until December 2007.
27
 The household mortgage debt calculated in this indirect way is 85.3% of 
the total household liabilities in Spain at the end of 2007 (as documented by the Bank of Spain). 
This calculated debt level is a really good approximation of the actual debt level because it 
almost equals the total mortgage debt of households, which is at 84.1% of total household debt 
according to the survey of household finances (cf. Bank of Spain (2011), p. 111). The main 
reason why we underestimate the total household debt level is that our measure does not include 
credit card debt or personal loans. Our measure can be used if we assume that there is no 
systematic difference in the structure of household debt across regions.  
For the analysis related to the debt level, we construct a ratio of debt to provincial GDP. The 
provincial GDP data that are used to calculate the debt-to-GDP ratios are based on Eurostat 
figures. The unweighted mean household sector debt-to-GDP ratio across all provinces was 63% 
with a standard deviation of 27%. The average GDP per province in 2007 was 20.2 billion EUR. 
Excluding the two most important provinces (Barcelona and Madrid) yields an average GDP of 
14.2 billion EUR. Eurostat also serves as the source of the population data used in this study, i.e., 
the data regarding changes in the size of the workforce, which are measured as the percentage 
change in the population of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64.  
Real estate prices are included in the analysis to determine how the effects of household debt 
differ across the provinces that did or did not experience booms in the real estate sector. If the 
increase in debt was associated with a parallel increase in real estate prices, then the adjustments 
                                                          
27
 Mian and Sufi (2012, p. 12 and 13) use the debt-to-income ratio in their analysis but state that using the 
accumulation of household debt in the five years preceding the crisis as an alternative measure would not change 
the results of their analysis.   
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in aggregate demand might result from either real estate price developments or excessive debt 
levels. Controlling for real estate prices thus helps us to identify the purely debt-driven aggregate 
demand channel. The relevant data are provided by the Spanish Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport. All of the prices are mean prices of residential real estate transactions by province and 
quarter from 2004 to 2012. The average Spanish residential real estate price in the first quarter of 
2004 was approximately 124,000 EUR. The price increased to approximately 190,000 EUR in 
the fourth quarter of 2007 (+ 53%) and reached approximately 148,000 EUR in the first quarter 
of 2012 (-22% vs. peak, +19% vs. Q1/2004). The unweighted mean increase in the prices across 
all provinces from the first quarter of 2004 to the maximum in each province was 89% with a 
standard deviation of 44%.  
Aggregate demand is measured using the employment and unemployment channel. Employment 
rates and total nominal employment figures for the provinces are obtained from the INE. The 
Spanish employment rate was 51.1% in the first quarter of 2005. That rate increased to 54.4% in 
the third quarter of 2007 and decreased to 45.3% in the first quarter of 2012. The employment 
and unemployment rates
28
 already show a high and significant correlation with the provinces’ 
household debt figures. To determine the effect of debt on aggregate demand, it is necessary to 
identify the portion of unemployment that results from consumption in the individual provinces. 
To identify this effect, the unemployment data
29
 by economic activity on a provincial level are 
obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. The economic activities 
are split into 22 different groups. These groups are then clustered by the type of economic 
activity into the tradable sector, the non-tradable sector, construction or other sectors. Due to a 
change in the classification system for economic activities that occurred in 2009, we need to 
match the earlier classification system with the recoded one (cf. table A3.2). Consequently, not 
all of the groups are exactly matched, but the tradable and non-tradable sectors can be identified.   
                                                          
28
 We use the term “unemployment” for the sake of simplicity throughout this section, but the data from the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Security are somewhat broader and also include individuals such as seasonal 
workers and job seekers who are employed part time but are looking for full time jobs. In November 2007, the ratio 
of job seekers to total unemployed persons was 147%, indicating a future increase in unemployment. The ratio 
decreased to 136% in November 2010 and to 133% in September 2012. In 2007 and 2010, the majority of the 
excess job seekers were still regularly employed (approximately 50%).     
29
 For this investigation, we use sectoral unemployment data from the regional level due to the dearth of data on 
sectoral employment in the provinces. 
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Because the demand for tradable economic activities is not bound to the place of production but 
to the entire economy the tradable sector faces similar shocks across all provinces. The economic 
activities that we classify as tradable are the extracting industries, the manufacturing industries, 
agriculture and fishing. All of the goods produced in these industries can generally be shipped to 
other provinces within Spain, although some agricultural and fishery products are linked to local 
markets, and the same applies to manufacturing industries that, for example, supply the local 
construction sector. However, employment data for the subgroups within the manufacturing 
sector are only available at the aggregate national level. Ideally, we would distinguish between 
manufacturing industries that produce for the entire Spanish market, such as the automobile 
industry, and manufacturing industries that only produce for local markets. Because some of the 
employment in the manufacturing sector is linked to the local markets, we expect to see a 
correlation between local spending and manufacturing. An even stricter distinction would 
eliminate any correlation between manufacturing, i.e., tradable goods, employment effects and 
household sector debt. Thus, the outcome of this exercise should be seen as rather conservative 
estimate for the tradable sector. If we could draw a more exact line within the manufacturing 
sector, the results would be even stronger.  
The non-tradable industries produce goods that are linked to local consumption spending, as 
indicated by the 1993 definition “trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household goods 
and personal items” and “private households with employed persons”. (Retail) Trade activities 
like those conducted by grocery stores or clothing and shoe stores crucially depend on local 
consumption. The same is true of the personnel employed in household services. It is not 
necessarily true that the non-tradable sectors experience higher increases in unemployment than 
the tradable sectors because the employment elasticities with regards to consumption may be 
different and consumption on durables may be more affected. However, it is important to note 
that the non-tradable sector depends on aggregate demand on the province level, and the 
hypothesis to be tested builds on this link between debt and aggregate demand. To compare 
Spanish provinces with an average population of less than one million provides a granular view 
that is suited to disentangling the effect of household debt on aggregate demand.   
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3.4.3 Empirical analysis 
The literature reviewed in section 3.2 examines mainly the effect of deleveraging on the 
economy. The Spanish household sector as a whole has barely begun to reduce its debt 
outstanding relative to GDP. However, for us to investigate the deleveraging effect, the 
households do not necessarily need to have reduced their nominal debt outstanding. It is 
sufficient that they exhibit reduced growth in liabilities and consume less than in previous 
periods. The case of Spain is a good example of the mechanism in question: on average, from the 
beginning of 2003 to the end of 2007, the liabilities of Spanish households increased by 
approximately 6 percent of GDP per year.
30
 In the period from the beginning of 2008 to the end 
of 2010, household sector debt increased on average by 1 percent of GDP.
31
 Under the two 
simplifying assumptions that households spend all of their income and the net incurrence of 
liabilities on consumption and investment and that their income share as well as total GDP 
remained approximately constant from 2007 to 2010, a reduction in the debt growth from 6 
percent of GDP to 1 percent of GDP means a reduction in spending of 5 percent of GDP without 
deleveraging (cf. figure A3.6 for a graphical illustration). An increase in the debt outstanding can 
thus still go in hand with a reduction in consumption expenditure. Therefore, an analysis of the 
debt-consumption link should not exclusively examine nominal deleveraging.  
The sharp increase in Spanish household liabilities that occurred from 2003 to 2007 and the 
sudden elimination of these growth rates in 2008 due to a rather stable volume of total liabilities 
in 2009 and 2010 makes Spain a good case for analysis. Because substantial nominal 
deleveraging in Spain did not begin until 2011, the effect of the debt shock on consumption in 
Spain should therefore be smaller than it was in the United States, where deleveraging started 
earlier. Figure 3.4 depicts the development of the Spanish nominal household sector liabilities. 
Figure 3.4 also illustrates the relationship between debt and unemployment and thus supports our 
hypothesis. Starting in the mid-nineties, the unemployment rate in Spain decreased parallel to an 
increase in household liabilities. When the average quarterly net incurrence of household 
liabilities was at a peak, unemployment was at a low. When the growth of debt decelerated in 
                                                          
30
 This percentage reflects an annual growth rate for nominal debt of 18% or an annual growth rate for the debt-to-
GDP ratio of 10%. 
31
 This percentage is equal to an annual growth rate for nominal debt of 1% or an annual growth rate for the debt-
to-GDP ratio of 1%. 
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2007, unemployment stopped decreasing and as the debt growth paused in 2008 and became 
negative in 2009, unemployment intensified.       
Figure 3.4 
Spanish household liabilities and unemployment 
The total liabilities of the household sector, including non-profit institutions serving households, are plotted using 
end-of-quarter data as represented using the light blue dashed line (right axis). The net incurrence of liabilities for 
the sector is plotted using a four-quarter moving average in dark blue (left axis). The quarterly unemployment rate 
is plotted in red (left axis). The correlation between the unemployment rate and the net incurrence of liabilities is 
87%.  
 
Data source: Bank of Spain, INE. 
Using the data to evaluate the hypothesis, we first examine the correlation between the increases 
in the provision of debt from the years 2003-04 to the years 2005-2007. Next, we examine the 
correlation between the level of debt in 2007
32
 and the changes in unemployment in the different 
economic sectors from 2007 until 2010. The starting point for the employment figures is 
November 2007, and the end point is November 2010. We use the November figures because the 
real estate prices peaked in the fourth of quarter of 2007 and because the employment rate was at 
a high in the third quarter of 2007, which still includes the effects of tourism, i.e., part of the 
tradable sector. In addition, we do not wish to include year-end effects in employment or 
unemployment. We limit the analysis to November 2010 to capture the first-round effects of the 
                                                          
32
 As explained in the paragraph with the data description, we treat the aggregated mortgage issuances from 2003 
to 2007 as a proxy for the debt level. 
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reduction in consumption. The decline in employment lost momentum in the second half of 2010, 
but the recession intensified again towards the end of 2011 and in 2012, along with capital 
flights. Using year-over-year changes, we select the data from November as the newest data in 
this study.    
The correlation between household debt and unemployment at the province level is shown in 
table 3.1. The results for the total unemployment rate are similar to the results for employment at 
the European country level. The level of debt is highly, significantly and positively correlated 
with the total unemployment rate. These results do not hold for increases in debt. Spanish 
households reduce their consumption more based on their total debt level and the resulting debt 
service and to a lower extent based on changes in their debt prior to the crisis.
33
 When we 
distinguish between economic activities, larger increases in debt are linked to higher 
unemployment rates in the sectors that depend on local consumption, but the relationship is much 
stronger for debt levels. Unemployment in the economic sectors that are classified as non-
tradable is even more closely tied to household debt than is unemployment in the construction 
sector. Unemployment in the tradable sector has no significant correlation with the level of debt. 
These correlation results support the hypothesis that household debt restrains consumption 
because employment that is linked to local spending is also tied to local household debt, whereas 
employment linked to nationwide spending is not.       
Table 3.1 
Correlation of household sector debt and unemployment 
The increase in debt is measured as the increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio from the cumulated 2003-04 level to the 
cumulated 2005-07 level. The level of debt is measured as the cumulative mortgage provision from 2003 to 2007 
over GDP in 2007.  
 Sectoral unempl. Increase in debt Level of debt 
Total 0.1901 0.5212*** 
Tradable 0.1383 0.2143 
Non-Tradable 0.2498* 0.6490*** 
Construction 0.0106 0.3889*** 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.    
Data source: INE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Socia, Eurostat. 
                                                          
33
 This relationship also holds when the increase is calculated as the increase in the average monthly mortgages 
issued in 2003 as compared to 2007, which reflects the second derivative of the debt level. 
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A further illustration of the described link is provided by a map of the Spanish provinces that 
shows the debt levels and the changes in non-tradable unemployment (cf. figure A3.3).  
An alternative to examining the debt level and its subsequent effects on aggregate demand is to 
directly investigate the magnitude of the deleveraging. As described above, there are no debt data 
for individual provinces at the absolute household debt level. Thus, we compare the nominal 
volume of mortgages issued in the five years preceding the crisis to the amount of mortgages 
issued from the beginning of 2008 until April 2011, the latest month in our dataset. The reduction 
in mortgage issuance, calculated as the difference between the ratio of mortgage issuances to 
GDP from 2003 to 2007 and the same ratio for 2008 to 2011, is almost perfectly correlated with 
the debt level in 2007. The correlation coefficient of -98.3% clearly demonstrates that the debt 
level in 2007 is a good indicator of the subsequent developments in the debt ratio. For example, 
using the deleveraging effect in table 3.2. changes the sign of the correlation coefficients, but the 
significance levels remain the same, and the coefficients change only marginally. Still, we abstain 
from using the deleveraging variable because it might generate endogeneity issues because it 
evolves simultaneously with unemployment.    
Regressing sectoral unemployment on household sector debt validates these results (cf. table 3.2). 
The level of household sector debt prior to the crisis has a significant positive effect on overall, 
non-tradable and construction unemployment and does not affect unemployment in the tradable 
sector. The effect of debt is approximately 10% stronger for the construction sector than for the 
non-tradable sector. Like the significance of household debt, the explanatory power of this 
household balance sheet shock is quite high, with an R² of 42% for the non-tradable sector. It is 
especially high compared to the results by Mian and Sufi (2012) who regress changes in 
employment on household debt levels without further control variables and obtain an R² of 8%. 
The coefficient of 0.78 implies that when the ratio of debt to GDP increases by one percentage 
point, the change in non-tradable unemployment from November 2007 to November 2010 is 0.78 
percentage points higher. Whereas a province with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% experiences an 
increase in non-tradable unemployment of 39%, a province with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 51% 
experiences an increase of 39.78%.  
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Table 3.2 
OLS regression of unemployment on household sector debt 
The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used 
when necessary. The level of household debt in 2007 is calculated as the sum of the household mortgages from 
2003 to 2007. The real estate boom dummy takes a value of 1 if the respective province is among the 25 provinces 
with the highest increase in real estate prices prior to the crisis or takes a value of 0 otherwise. “Change in the 
workforce” measures the percentage increase or decrease in the size of the working-age population, i.e., the 
number of 15- to 64-year-olds, in a province from January 1
st
 2008 to January 1
st
 2011. The “share of construction 
in Q1 2008” represents the share of construction employment in total employment in the first quarter of 2008, 
since figures for 2007 were not available from the same database.  
OLS estimation   Percentage change in unemployment from Nov. 2007 to Nov. 2010 
    Total   Tradable sector   Non-tradable sector   Construction 
    (a) (b)   (a) (b)   (a) (b)   (a) (b) 
Level of household  
debt in 2007   0.70 0.60   0.41 -0.02   0.78 0.67   0.86 1.24 
(p-value)   (0.00) (0.03)   (0.14) (0.96)   (0.00) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Change in workforce   0.73     5.19     1.40     -6.46 
(p-value)     (0.76)     (0.24)     (0.62)     (0.18) 
Real estate 
boom dummy     -0.00     -0.04     -0.06     -0.09 
(p-value)     (0.97)     (0.79)     (0.43)     (0.60) 
Share of construction 
in Q1 2008   1.22   2.13   0.24   -0.20 
(p-value)   (0.40)   (0.49)   (0.88)   (0.95) 
Constant   0.40 0.30   0.58 0.56   0.27 0.33   1.05 0.91 
(p-value)   (0.00) (0.18)   (0.00) (0.17)   (0.01) (0.19)   (0.00) (0.04) 
N   50 50   50 50   50 50   50 50 
R²   27.2% 28.0%   4.6% 8.6%   42.1% 43.1%   15.1% 19.8% 
Data source: INE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Eurostat. 
Model (a) uses the level of household debt as the only explanatory variable. In model (b), we 
amend the estimation to include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respective 
province is among the 50% of provinces with the highest increase in real estate prices in the years 
preceding the crisis or a value of zero otherwise. Including an indicator for the provinces that saw 
a boom in home prices reflects the idea that these households may have over-borrowed to finance 
a house and may be especially vulnerable to decreases in house price during a recession. These 
decreases might also be steeper given a stronger increase beforehand. The results are robust to 
different definitions of the real estate dummy, e.g., if it takes the value of 1 for the top ten 
provinces only. The coefficients and significant levels also change only marginally if the real 
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estate boom dummy is replaced for a variable that measures the percentage increase in real estate 
prices from 2004 to 2007. The second control variable is the change in the working-age 
population from 2008 to 2010. An increase in unemployment might only be linked to a stable 
total number of jobs and an increasing work force. However, changes in the workforce do not 
significantly affect unemployment in any sector. The third factor we control for is the share of 
construction employment in total employment. Provinces with a larger construction sector may 
suffer more from an increasing number of unemployed construction workers who cut back on 
consumption. This control variable is insignificant, too, and the inclusion of these three variables 
increases the R² by only a small amount.     
Plotting the 50 provinces in diagrams for the tradable and non-tradable sectors further illustrates 
these relationships with household sector debt (cf. figure 3.5).  
Figure 3.5 
Household sector debt and changes in tradable and non-tradable unemployment 
The level of mortgage debt is calculated as the sum of all mortgages provided from 2003 to 2007 divided by the 
GDP in 2007. The “unemployment” figures for the tradable and non-tradable industries include unemployed 
persons and employed persons who are looking for jobs (e.g., part-time workers or seasonal workers). The scatter 
plots for the underlying economic activities are presented in figure A3.2 and A3.3 in the Appendix.  
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Data source: INE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Eurostat. 
The vertical axes of figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) both have the same scale. Using the same scale 
highlights the larger variation in the tradable sector (which does not exhibit a relationship with 
the provincial household balance sheet shocks) relative to the non-tradable sector, for which the 
observations are within a narrower band.  
The reduction in consumption that generates increasing unemployment via the elasticity of 
employment to aggregate demand may be caused by a reduction in income (the PIH), a reduction 
in wealth, particularly housing wealth (part of the LCH), or an additional deleveraging effect 
caused by high leverage rates. Dynan (2012) disentangles these effects using micro data for the 
United States and finds that after income and wealth effects are controlled for, leverage is still 
highly significant and negative. The results presented in this study might also be attributed to a 
wealth effect following the burst of the real estate bubble. This pure wealth shock is difficult to 
separate from the shock that results from lower expected income or high leverage because all 
three lead to a household balance sheet adjustment via lower consumption expenditure. We try to 
address this issue with different robustness checks in the next section. 
3.4.4 Robustness checks 
The control variable for real estate price developments in table 3.2 is a first robustness check for 
a potential wealth effect. We use a boom variable rather than a bust variable to avoid simultaneity 
bias because the change in unemployment during the crisis negatively affects real estate prices. 
Because the real estate boom dummy is not significant, we ensure that the provinces with a real 
∆unempl. = 0.7815 debt + 0.2667 
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estate boom prior to the crisis did not perform better or worse in terms of local consumption (and 
thus non-tradable unemployment) during the crisis. Hence, the likelihood of a pure housing 
wealth effect is small.   
A second robustness check that can be used to explore the distinction between real estate prices 
and household debt involves splitting the provinces into two groups and investigating their 
extremes.
34
 We distinguish between the provinces that show a high correlation between the 
changes in real estate prices and the changes in employment and those with a low correlation. A 
high correlation coefficient implies either that there is a direct link between real estate prices and 
employment or that there is at least one factor that is simultaneously determining the two 
variables. This group is prone to a wealth effect because decreasing house prices, i.e., decreasing 
wealth, may lead to decreasing consumption and reduced employment. A low correlation 
coefficient is a good criterion for the inclusion in a control group, as the provinces in question do 
not exhibit parallel movements in employment and real estate prices, nor are their employment 
and real estate figures subject to a common influence; thus, no wealth effect should be present in 
these provinces. Of the Spanish provinces, 5 provinces are assigned to the high correlation group, 
as these have a correlation coefficient of 70% or higher. The 5 provinces with correlation 
coefficients of 5% or less, including negative correlation coefficients, are assigned to the low 
correlation group. The coefficient itself is calculated for year-on-year changes in real estate prices 
and employment levels between 2005 and 2012.  
Next (cf. table 3.3), we compare these two groups with regard to the change in real estate prices, 
employment and debt in the years prior to the crisis and during the crisis. This allows us to 
identify commonalities and differences between the groups and potential asymmetric effects of 
debt in the growth and contraction periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 This approach is similar to a case study approach. A case study is an appropriate method of investigation for this 
purpose because the small number of observations makes econometric tests unreliable. 
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Table 3.3 
Development of real estate prices, employment and debt in the provinces with high and low 
correlations between changes in employment and real estate prices 
The correlation coefficients for changes in employment and real estate prices differ across provinces. The first 
cluster of provinces consists of the 5 provinces (Alicante, Balears, Castellón, Madrid and Málaga) with the highest 
correlation coefficients (>70%) in the period from the first quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2012. The second 
cluster consists of the 5 provinces (Caceres, Lugo, Ourense, Palencia and Soria) with the lowest correlation 
coefficients (<5% or even negative). The correlations are calculated using year-over-year changes and quarterly 
data. Forming the groups using correlations between the levels of real estate prices and employment yields similar 
results. Developments in real estate prices and employment are measured from the start of the time series until 
the national peak for real estate prices and from that point in time until the latest available data. Debt is provided 
as described above and is comprised of the total mortgage issuance from 2003 to 2007, which (1) serves as an 
indicator for the increase in debt during the boom period and (2) serves as proxy for the debt level and the size of 
the shock at the end of 2007. All of the data are unweighted means across the groups.  
  Group (a)  Group (b) 
Boom-period Time span High (≥ 70%), 5 provinces   Low (≤ 5%), 5 provinces 
Real estate prices (Q1/2004 to Q4/2007) +61%  +69% 
Employment rate (Q1/2005 to Q4/2007) +5%   +5% 
Non-tradable 
unemployment (05/2005 to 05/2007) -1%  -9% 
Debt over GDP (1) 
Accumulation of debt 
from 2003 to 2007 
95%   34% 
     
Crisis-period        
Real estate prices (Q4/2007 to Q1/2012) -24%  -8% 
Employment rate (Q4/2007 to Q1/2012) -20%  -14% 
Non-tradable 
unemployment (11/2007 to 11/2010)
 
+102%  +48% 
Debt over GDP (2) 
Accumulation of debt 
from 2003 to 2007 - 
size of the shock 
95%   34% 
 
Real estate prices: On average, the provinces in both groups experienced a similar increase in 
real estate prices prior to the crisis. The high-correlation provinces experienced an increase of 
61% from 2004 to 2007, and the value for the low-correlation provinces is slightly higher at 69%. 
Consequently, it appears that the boom in real estate prices and the resulting wealth effect are not 
good individual indicators of the subsequent changes in employment. Nor can we say that some 
provinces experienced a real estate price bubble and others did not simply by examining the 
isolated increase in real estate prices. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that an 
increase of 60% in one province is speculative but that the same increase in another province is 
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based on fundamentals. During the crisis, the provinces with a high correlation coefficient 
suffered from decreases in real estate prices that were three times higher than the decreases in the 
provinces with a low correlation coefficient. The declines in the price levels from the fourth 
quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2012 for the high- and low-correlation provinces were 24% 
and 8%, respectively. Consequently, these two groups were similar prior to the crisis but differed 
during the crisis.                    
Employment: Both groups of provinces experienced the same increase in employment during the 
boom. The low- and high-correlation provinces both experienced an increase of 5%. The declines 
in employment rates during the crisis differed, but the difference is not as large as the gap 
between the declines in real estate prices in the two groups. The low-correlation provinces 
experienced a decline of 14% in employment, and the high correlation provinces suffered a 
decline of 20%. The differences between the two groups are larger when we consider non-
tradable unemployment. The first group had a decrease of -1% during the boom, whereas the 
second group faced a decrease of -9%. During the crisis, the divergence became even more 
apparent: the first group had an increase of 102%, whereas the second group experienced an 
increase of 48%. As with real estate prices, there were similarities during the boom and 
divergences during the crisis.  
Household debt: According to our hypothesis, the explanation for the difference between the 
high- and low-correlation provinces should be the debt level. Although the two groups had a 
similar increase in real estate prices and employment, the group with higher employment losses 
should have been exposed to a higher debt level that created a greater need for household balance 
sheet adjustments. In both groups, a decline in real estate wealth puts pressure on consumption 
via the mechanism described by the life cycle hypothesis. However, the group that is exposed to 
higher debt should suffer more because of the additional deleveraging effect. Indeed, the 
provinces with a high correlation coefficient had a higher debt level at the beginning of the crisis 
and also accumulated more debt prior to the crisis. The debt levels are almost three times higher; 
they are 95% and 34% for the high- and low-correlation provinces, respectively.     
There might be other factors that distinguish the two groups from one another and that act as the 
underlying drivers of development. Income levels or industry structures could be affected by 
idiosyncratic shocks independent of the debt level. The provinces with the high debt levels are, 
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for example, much larger in terms of population and GDP, and their GDP per capita exceeds that 
of the low-correlation provinces by 22%, primarily because of Spain’s capital, Madrid. The 
employment structure, which is an indicator of the industry structure, also differs across the two 
groups. The low-correlation provinces depend more on agriculture (11% vs. 2%) and industrial 
employment (17% vs. 13%) but less on service sector employment (60% vs. 71%). However, the 
shock that affects the provincial service sector more strongly than it affects the provincial 
agricultural or industrial sector is a reduction in demand. When we consider these regional 
discrepancies, household over-indebtedness again emerges as a reasonable explanation for the 
shock affecting those provinces.   
Thus, we conclude that high household debt levels force households to cut back on consumption 
expenditure, which then triggers a decline in employment. The wealth effect is still apparent, and 
real estate prices and employment during the crisis are intertwined, but an analysis of these two 
groups of provinces makes it clear that household debt has a strong and negative effect on 
aggregate demand in times of crisis. Another interesting result of this robustness check is the 
asymmetric effect of household debt. Although neither employment nor real estate prices react to 
differences in debt accumulation prior to the crisis, there is a large difference in their reactions 
once the debt growth stops and debt is reduced.  
3.4.5 The aggregate effect of household debt on unemployment 
The change in household expenditure patterns does not exclusively affect local non-tradable 
employment through the consumption channel. Households also cut back on spending on durable 
goods and housing. If there were a proportional reduction in consumption and investment 
spending and if net exports did not matter, then employment in manufacturing and other tradable 
industries would be reduced on the same scale as in the non-tradable industries. Using this 
corollary, we follow Mian and Sufi (2012) and their theoretical framework, which we adapted for 
the case of Spain (cf. section 3.4.1). In this section we calculate the aggregate increase in 
unemployment in Spain that resulted from a drop in household expenditures due to deleveraging 
which was transmitted to the labor market via the aggregate demand channel. 
The estimation results presented in table 3.2 reveal that every additional percentage point of debt 
relative to GDP leads to an increase of 0.78 percentage points in the change in unemployment. 
We first calculate the number of unemployed persons in the non-tradable sector that resulted 
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from the high level of household debt. For this purpose, we use the linear relationship between 
the debt levels in 2007 and the changes in unemployment that occurred from 2007 to 2010. 
However, we account for the fact that households have always been indebted to some extent; in 
the analysis, we only incorporate the debt that exceeds the debt level of the five provinces with 
the least debt; i.e., we subtract 0.37 from every province’s debt level to calculate the related 
increase in unemployment. The debt-related change in non-tradable unemployment    
   is then 
calculated as follows: 
(3.12)    
                     
  =                     
   
where       is the level of debt in province   in 2007, and       is the level of debt in the 
province at the lowest debt percentile. The effect of debt on unemployment is expressed by   and 
is 0.78.   
   is the total number of unemployed in the non-tradable sector in province   in 
November 2007. Aggregating equation (3.12) across all provinces with             yields 
the total increase in debt related non-tradable sector unemployment in Spain. Non-tradable 
unemployment, as classified in section 3.4.2, increased from approximately 368,000 in 
November 2007 to approximately 677,000 in November 2010. According to the calculation used, 
an increase by approximately 100,000, or 33% of this increase, is related to the indebtedness of 
the household sector.  
The change in total unemployment is then calculated by applying the effect of debt on non-
tradable unemployment to all of the other sectors. The share of non-tradable unemployment 
within total unemployment increased slightly from 11.9% in November 2007 to 12.1% in 
November 2010. Therefore, the change in non-tradable unemployment is divided by the share of 
non-tradable unemployment (cf. equation (3.11)). This calculation yields a total of approximately 
860,000 unemployed persons, or 34.5% of the change in unemployment, as a result of the 
household debt or aggregate demand shock.
35
  
According to the approach introduced in this study, 2/3 of the increase in Spanish unemployment 
is unrelated to the demand effects that stem from over-indebted households. According to our 
estimates, the policies directed at reducing the debt burden of households therefore address only 
                                                          
35
 This method is valid, when we consider a closed economy. Jobs in tradable sectors that partly depend on foreign 
demand are not subject to the Spanish reduction in demand.  
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1/3 of the unemployment issue. However, our results do not necessarily point towards structural 
problems of the Spanish economy and labor market because the remaining 2/3 of the increase in 
unemployment that is not explained may result from other demand factors, such as a reduction in 
government spending. Further disentangling and explaining the surge in unemployment in detail 
is beyond the scope of this study, but we briefly describe some other major sources for this 
important issue. Most construction activities stopped when the real estate bubble burst, which 
resulted in an increase in unemployment in this sector. The construction sector accounts for 21 % 
of the total increase in unemployment that occurred from November 2007 to November 2010, 
and the increase of 159 % that was observed in this sector is twice as high as the average increase 
in unemployment.
36
 The household balance sheet restructuring and the end of the real estate 
bubble explain more than half of the increase in unemployment. Finally, the sectors that exhibit 
an above-average increase in unemployment include trade and repair of vehicles (86 %), the hotel 
sector (83 %), transportation and warehousing (84 %) and health and social work activities (91 
%).
37
 The increase in unemployment in the group of people classified as “without previous 
employment” contributes 7.4% of the total increase of unemployment. The increase in this 
category is 64.2% and consequently below the average national increase, but it cannot be 
compared to the changes in other sectors because it represents unemployed persons that have 
only recently entered the working population. Thus, only a few sectors exhibit an above-average 
increase in unemployment, which highlights the problems stemming from the construction and 
non-tradable sectors.   
 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
In addition to providing an empirical overview and explanation of the European debt problem, we 
investigated in greater detail the situation of the Spanish provinces. We found that the pre-crisis 
mortgage debt levels had strong positive effects on changes in the provincial unemployment rates 
during the crisis. This finding is consistent with the results of Mian and Sufi (2012) and 
highlights the relevance of household indebtedness to unemployment. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
36
 Unemployment in the construction sector was approximately 331,000 in November 2007 and 858,000 in 
November 2010. However, this increase of 527,000 is not completely related to the construction sector due to the 
reclassification of the employment groups in 2009 (cf. table A3.2).    
37
 We cannot provide the amount of increase for all sectors due to the reclassification of the economic activities. 
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explanatory power of the estimation presented in this study is more than five times higher 
compared to the estimation presented by Mian and Sufi (2012), which has an R² of 8%. Our 
results indicate that approximately 1/3 of the aggregate increase in unemployment in Spain can 
be traced back to high household debt levels. This increase in Spain correlates to approximately 
half of the effect for the United States that Mian and Sufi (2012) found. There are many reasons 
why the household debt levels might be somewhat less important in explaining the increase in 
unemployment in Spain than in the United States: unsolved problems in the Spanish banking 
sector, ongoing problems with labor market rigidities, a different consumption share in the 
economy, and, perhaps most important, the fact that Spanish households have not yet reduced 
their debt relative to GDP on an aggregated basis on a comparable level relative to US 
households. A slight decrease (less than 1 percent) was observed in nominal liabilities in 2009. In 
2010, this decrease was even lower (approximately 0.5%). The household sector increased its 
deleveraging on a nominal basis in 2011 with a decrease by 3% and 2% in the first and second 
quarters of 2012, respectively. If we take inflation into account, the nominal decrease of 6% from 
the peak is even larger in real terms. In the United States, in contrast, households have decreased 
their debt-to-GDP ratio by more than 13 percent since the end of 2009, which has exacerbated the 
decrease in consumption spending. The results of this analysis are unambiguous. The increasing 
unemployment in Europe is an explicit consequence of the relative lack of consumer demand. 
The combination of private sector balance sheet restructuring with a parallel government 
austerity program is currently amplifying the effects of shrinking consumption on aggregate 
demand and employment. 
This study corroborates the findings of previous studies using aggregated data and household 
survey data for other European countries and the United States. These data support the hypothesis 
that debt levels do matter for consumption at the household and household sector levels. The 
transmission mechanism from debt levels via the aggregate demand channel to unemployment 
rests upon the assumption that the household sector suffers from a negative economic outlook, 
which lowers lifetime incomes and forces households to cut back on consumption to adjust their 
balance sheets. Furthermore, different income and wealth groups have different propensities to 
consume, and thus, the reduced consumption of debtors is not equally offset by the increased 
consumption of creditors who are paid back the money that they have loaned.  
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Although this paper has elucidated an important question regarding how debt and demand are 
interlinked, interesting and important related questions should be considered in future research. 
For instance, what occurs if more foreign debt is affected by deleveraging? How do simultaneous 
processes of private and government sector balance sheet restructuring compare to a two-step 
deleveraging process in which one sector initially stabilizes the other? Furthermore, a portion of 
the increase in unemployment is attributed to the creation of jobs during the debt-fueled period of 
economic growth. Comparing two groups of provinces to control for the effects of real estate 
price development, we partially address this issue of asymmetric developments. However, a more 
detailed comparison of the employment effects of debt during expansionary and contractionary 
periods will be necessary to provide policy makers and regulators with advice on how to combine 
sound finances with employment growth. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A3.1 
Changes in household sector debt and contribution of consumption expenditure to GDP growth 
The correlation coefficients and R² values are based on quarterly data that indicate the contribution of household 
consumption expenditures to GDP growth and the growth of household sector debt. The moving average data are 
calculated as four-quarter moving averages. Two results are shown for the countries with data prior to 2000 
(results for the starting year through 2011 and results for 2000 through 2011).  
   Moving Average  Quarterly Data 
Country Period  
Correlation  
coefficient Trend - R² 
Trend - 
coefficient  
for change in 
debt  
Correlation  
coefficient Trend - R² 
Trend - 
coefficient  
for change in 
debt 
Austria 2003-2011  64.4 41.4 9.4  33.3 11.1 4.9 
Belgium 1996-2011   0.6 0 0.08   8.7 0.8 1 
France 1996-2011  16.6 2.8 4.6  23.3 5.4 8.6 
France 2000-2011  31.6 10 8.3  25.5 6.5 9.1 
Germany 1993-2011   48.9 23.9 8.5   20.1 4 9.6 
Germany 2000-2011   48.5 23.5 18.7   16.5 2.7 14.1 
Ireland 2002-2011  80.7 65.1 16.1  61 37.2 15.2 
Italy 1997-2011   35.7 12.8 8.7   25.4 6.3 6.1 
Italy 2000-2011   65.6 43 12.9   42.9 18.4 10.1 
Netherlands 2000-2011  42 17.7 5.7  24.8 6.2 5.6 
Portugal 1998-2011   79.1 62.6 18.6   53.8 28.9 18 
Spain 2000-2011  81.4 66.2 18.2  64.6 41.7 16 
Data source: Eurostat, European Central Bank. 
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Table A3.2  
Economic activities with old and new classifications 
Economic activities are matched based on their old and new descriptions. The percentage of subcodes indicates 
how many of the previous subcodes could be matched one to one.  
Category Economic activity (CNAE 1993) Economic activity (CNAE 2009) 
Percentage of subcodes 
that are matched 
Share in total 
unemployment 
Nov. 2007/ 
Nov. 2010 
Tradable A - Agriculture, livestock farming, 
hunting and forestry 
B - Fishing 
A - Agriculture, livestock 
farming, forestry and fishing 
90% 
21.3% / 
18.7% 
Tradable C - Extracting industries B - Extracting industries 87% 
Tradable D - Manufacturing industries C - Manufacturing industries 94% 
Non-
Tradable 
G - Trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles, household 
goods and personal items 
G - Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles 
93% 
11.9% / 
12.1% 
Non-
Tradable 
P - Private households with 
employed persons 
P - Activities of households as 
employers; undifferentiated 
goods- and services-producing 
activities of households for own 
use 
100% 
Construction F - Construction F - Construction 98% of the old "F"  
category can be matched  
to entries in the new "F"  
category, but these entries 
 cover only 81% of the 
new "F" category 
10.7% / 
15.4% 
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Figure A3.1 
Changes in household sector debt and contribution of consumption expenditure to GDP growth 
Figure A3.1(a) differentiates between different year groups. The data points for the period until the end of 2007 are plotted 
using round blue marks. The data points for the period beginning in 2008 are plotted using square red marks. Figure A3.1(b) 
differentiates between the countries that have been severely hit by the crisis, i.e., Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which 
are represented using square red marks, and the countries that have been less affected by the crisis, i.e., Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, which are represented using round blue marks.   
 
 
Data source: National Central Banks, European Central Bank. 
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Figure A3.2 
Household sector debt and tradable employment sectors 
 
 
 
Data source: INE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. 
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Figure A3.3 
Household sector debt and non-tradable employment sectors 
 
 
Data source: INE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. 
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Figure A3.4 
Debt and unemployment in the Spanish provinces 
Provinces with higher debt levels in 2007 (darker colors) experience a steeper increase in unemployment.  
 
Data source: INE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. 
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Figure A3.5 
Changes in real estate prices and employment in the Spanish provinces 
Table A3.2 shows the development of real estate prices, employment, and debt in two groups of Spanish provinces. 
The groups are clustered depending on the correlation between the changes in real estate prices and the changes 
in employment from the first quarter in 2006 until the first quarter in 2012. Group (a) consists of the five provinces 
with the highest correlation, which are shown in figure A3.5(a), and group (b) consists of the five provinces with the 
lowest correlation, which are shown in figure A3.5(b). The linear trend lines illustrate the high and low correlations. 
 
 
Data source: INE, Ministerio de Fomento. 
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Figure A3.6 
How a reduction in debt growth affects spending 
 
 
2007 2010
Income
(percentage points of GDP)
Net incurrance of liabilities
(percentage points of GDP)
Total 
spending
- 5 p.p. of GDP
95 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Financial Development and Income Inequality –  
A Panel Data Approach 
 
Abstract 
We analyze the link between financial development and income inequality for a broad 
unbalanced dataset of up to 138 developed and developing countries over the years 1960 to 2008. 
Using credit-to-GDP as a measure of financial development, our results reject theoretical models 
predicting a negative impact of financial development on income inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Controlling for country fixed effects and GDP per capita, we find that financial 
development has a positive effect on income inequality. These results are robust to different 
measures of financial development, econometric specifications and control variables.  
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4.1  INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008-09, many public commentators debated over the 
benefits and harms of the financial sector for the rest of society. The privatization of banks’ 
profits and the socialization of their losses is a common bon mot in political debates in many 
developed countries. Together with widening income gaps and social inequality in the United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany and many other countries, this crisis has led the question of 
the contribution of the financial system to the economy and, more generally, to society, to arise. 
The merits of efficient financial systems fall short in being acknowledged by the public as 
bankers are recognized as highly paid individuals who serve only their own interest. In the view 
of many economists, there exists a more benign view of the financial sector: financial markets 
boost economic growth, enable wealthy as well as poor people to borrow and finance investments 
and thereby ensure that capital is distributed most efficiently – and, in particular, in a manner 
unrelated to inherited wealth. Generally, so the story goes, when financial markets are more 
efficient and well developed, a specific borrower can borrow more with a given amount of 
collateral. The success of microcredits for the poor in developing countries is just one example of 
what banks are able to do for society.38 There are parts of society that were previously unable to 
borrow and now can build their own businesses, increase income and climb the social ladder. The 
remaining income inequality would then be optimal or justified in the sense of being independent 
of inherited wealth. However, there are also more critical voices that have recently been raised. In 
particular, banks and financial markets are highly criticized for being ruthless in developed 
countries where almost everybody is supposed to have access to finance and where income 
inequality is a phenomenon thought to be part of the past. Anecdotal evidence appears to provide 
arguments in favor of and against an inequality-reducing effect of financial development.  
We thus aim to empirically assess the link between financial development and the distribution of 
income in a society. Does financial development always reduce income inequality in society? Are 
there important differences across and within countries based on their stage of economic 
development, or is the influence the same around the world, independent of country 
characteristics and the time we live in? We analyze the link of financial development and income 
                                                          
38 Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2009) provide a brief overview of the relation between microfinance and income 
inequality and also cite studies that do not confirm that microfinance lowers inequality. 
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inequality using standard proxies in the financial development literature, the ratio of private 
credit over GDP and the Gini coefficient of income distribution within countries.  
We extend the existing literature by using a larger database covering a longer time horizon and 
more countries with a measure for the Gini coefficient that is consistent across the dataset. We 
further control for year effects and time-invariant country characteristics. Finally, we conduct 
various robustness checks for our benchmark specification. These include a sample split of the 
dataset in subsamples according to income levels. In contrast to previous empirical work on this 
topic, we reject theories that predict an income inequality-reducing effect of financial 
development. This finding is robust over most specifications. Due to these more general and 
robust findings, we believe that our work is of importance to the literature and the profession.   
While investigating the link of financial development and income inequality, we do not judge or 
examine whether there exists an optimal or fair level of inequality. On the one hand, higher levels 
of inequality may have boosting effects on an economy from an incentive point of view. If 
everybody was receiving the same final incomes, independent of effort, naturally nobody would 
have an incentive to incur extra efforts for the production of goods and services, and the economy 
would suffer. On the other hand, excessive inequality may lead to social unrest and political 
instability.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 presents an overview of related 
literature and what we contribute to the literature. Section 4.3 describes the data used in our work. 
In section 4.4, we conduct the econometric analysis, section 4.5 presents our robustness tests and 
section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2  OVERVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Our work adds to the literature on financial development, income inequality and economic 
development. There is an extensive literature on the link between financial development and 
growth. A good overview of theoretical as well as empirical work on this issue has been provided 
by Levine (2005). In general, financial development is expected to enhance growth by enabling 
the efficient allocation of capital and reducing borrowing and financing constraints. However, 
this literature does not address the issue of which part of society benefits from the growth enabled 
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by financial development. Growth may benefit the poor by creating more employment 
opportunities, but it may also favor entrepreneurs and their profit margin. The relationship 
between the distribution of income and economic development was initially investigated by 
Kuznets (1955), who established the inverted U-shaped path of income inequality along 
economic development – the well-known Kuznets curve. Kuznets’ argument was that rural areas 
are more equal and have a lower average income compared to urban areas in the beginning of 
industrialization and thus that through urbanization, a society becomes more unequal. When a 
new generation of former poor rural people who moved to cities is born, they are able to profit 
from the urban possibilities. Wages of lower-income groups rise, and overall income inequality 
narrows. One factor backing Kuznets’ argument of urban possibilities is financial development, 
which enables formerly poor migrants to choose the education they desire and to build their own 
businesses – regardless of their inherited wealth. This is the basic reasoning why economic 
theories predict a negative impact of financial development on income inequality. Financial 
development fosters the free choice regarding education and the founding of businesses. Because 
both lead to growth and growth is associated with more jobs, average income will rise and 
inequality will fall.  
The three major theoretical papers explaining the financial development and income inequality 
nexus are by Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) and Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990). Whereas the first two predict that better developed financial markets lead to a 
reduction in income inequality, the latter predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
financial development and income inequality. In other words, in the early stages of financial 
development – during which only a small part of society benefits from this development – 
income inequality increases. However, after a certain stage of financial and economic 
development is reached, more financial development begins to reduce income inequality.  
Whereas the specific economic mechanisms behind these predictions differ, the key reason why 
better developed financial markets – at least after some stage – reduce income inequality is 
always that better credit availability allows household choices and decisions to be made based 
more on economic optimality and less on inherited wealth. The relevant choices differ according 
to each study, but they all concern the individual’s future income possibilities and whether these 
are optimal for the individual. To that end, Banerjee and Newman (1993) model households’ 
occupational choice, which depends on credit availability. Alternatively, Galor and Zeira (1993) 
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model human capital investment, which again depends on credit. Finally, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) model household portfolio selection where the use of financial intermediaries 
generally improves household capital incomes but comes at a small fixed cost. Initially, poor 
households cannot afford using banks for their savings, leading inequality to increase with 
financial development, as only wealthy-born households are able to use bank finance. However, 
as the economy develops and grows over time, poorer households become richer and can also 
begin using bank finance. Therefore, inequality after some point decreases with financial and 
economic development.  
These models theoretically motivate the use of the ratio of private credit over GDP as a proxy for 
financial development. On the one hand, better-developed financial markets lead to either more 
investment in occupational choice or human capital, which requires financing by credit. 
Consequently, financial development and private credit growth should go hand in hand. On the 
other hand, better-developed financial markets allow more households in a society to benefit 
from improved use of investment possibilities through the financial sector. This should thus 
increase bank deposits and overall savings in the economy, which are then funneled into more 
credit in the economy.  
These theories are subjected to empirical research that uses cross-country datasets on income 
inequality to test for the negative and inverted U-shaped relationships of financial development 
and income distribution. Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003, 2006) test these different theories. Using 
datasets of 91 and 83 countries over the period from 1960 to 1995 and averaging the data over 
five-year periods, they confirm the theories of Kuznets (1955), Banerjee and Newman (1993) and 
Galor and Zeira (1993) and reject Greenwood and Jovanovic’s (1990) model. To construct a 
measure of financial development, they use both private credit over GDP and bank deposits over 
GDP. The control variables are GDP per capita and its squared term to follow the Kuznets curve. 
Further control variables include the risk of expropriation, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 
government consumption, inflation and the share of the modern sector. In addition to the linear 
negative impact of financial development on income inequality, the maximum of the Kuznets 
curve is calculated – depending on the econometric specification – as approximately 1,400 USD 
and 2,350 USD.  
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Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2004) also test the three theories about the impact of financial 
development. They use private credit over GDP as a proxy for financial development and, in 
contrast to Clarke et al. (2003, 2006), use not 5-year averages but the average over the entire time 
horizon covered per country with a between estimator. Their 52-country sample from 1960 to 
1999 also confirms the linear negative influence of financial development on income inequality. 
Li, Squire and Zou (1998) explain variations in income inequality across countries and time. 
They approximate financial development as M2 over GDP, which has a significantly negative 
effect on inequality in their sample of 49 countries. They also distinguish between the effect of 
financial development on the poor and rich and find that it helps both groups. Further research 
backing Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) is, for example, Kappel 
(2010), who uses a sample of 59 countries for a cross-country analysis and 78 countries for a 
panel analysis over the period 1960 to 2006. Kappel also distinguishes between high- and low-
income countries. Whereas credit over GDP remains significant and negative for high-income 
countries, it does not show any influence for low-income countries. Jaumotte, Lall and 
Papageorgiou (2008) investigate income inequality with a focus on trade and financial 
globalization. In their sample of 51 countries from 1981 to 2003, they have the measure of 
private credit over GDP only as a control variable. In contrast to Beck et al. (2004) and Clarke et 
al. (2003, 2006), they obtain a positive and significant coefficient for financial development in all 
different econometric specifications of their estimation. Without explicitly stating it, they thus 
reject the theories explained above and contradict work that simply focuses on the link between 
financial development and inequality. All of the described studies have in common that they 
examine a broad set of countries, development over time and the theories we describe in detail. 
Furthermore, they begin with simple OLS estimations and pursue two-stage least squares 
estimation to tackle eventual omitted variable biases. Both random effects and between effects 
models are used, but no study compares fixed effects estimations that control for time invariant 
country characteristics with their results. Further empirical research (natural experiments, 
household studies, firm- and industry-level analyses and case studies) on the link between 
financial development and income inequality is summarized in Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine 
(2009).    
Finally, there is a new and growing strand of literature emphasizing the political dimension in the 
inequality and finance nexus. Rajan (2010), a leading proponent of this view, argues that the 
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increased credit given to American households was a direct consequence of the rising inequality 
trend over the last two decades. Together with the political inability to use traditional forms of 
redistributive taxation, it seemed better and by far easier for politicians to improve access to 
credit for poorer American households. In this way, credit to GDP, or the literature’s traditional 
measure of financial development, is influenced largely by politics and depends on increased 
inequality. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) construct a theoretical model that endogenously 
explains how high credit growth and financial crises may result as a consequence of rising 
income inequality. The two argue that the periods 1920-1929 and 1983-2008 exhibited this type 
of pattern. However, the hypothesis that rising inequality generally leads to a credit boom is 
empirically rejected in a recent study by Bordo and Meissner (2012), who use a much larger 
dataset than Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) and conclude that there is no evidence that rising 
inequality leads to credit booms. This finding is naturally very important for our study because 
we ideally wish to treat financial development as a variable that is reasonably independent from 
income inequality. However, to be very sure, we add relevant robustness tests that also 
specifically allow for the endogeneity of financial development.  
Our research adds value to the aforementioned literature, especially in the scope of analysis. The 
basic sample consists of 138 countries with observations covering the years 1960 to 2008. In 
total, we use 3228 country-year observations and 802 observations for the estimation with five-
year averages. The large sample also allows us to distinguish between the effect of financial 
development in different country groups regarding income and region. This is to the best of our 
knowledge the largest dataset for an analysis of financial development and income inequality in 
terms of years as well as countries. This paper further controls for year effects with year dummies 
and country characteristics to isolate the effect of financial development and to reduce omitted 
variable bias. Finally, we conduct various robustness checks that support our key result that the 
data generally rejects the theoretical models.  
 
4.3 DATA 
4.3.1 Description of dataset 
We combine different datasets to derive what is to the best of our knowledge the largest dataset 
concerning financial development and income inequality. Income inequality is measured both as 
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gross income before redistribution and net income after redistribution using the Gini coefficient. 
Redistributive policies may blur the theoretical relationship between financial development and 
income inequality, which is modeled without an explicit role for redistribution. Therefore, we use 
both gross and net Gini coefficients in our empirical analysis. The underlying source is Solt’s 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (2009), which “is the most 
comprehensive attempt at developing a cross-nationally comparable database of Gini indices 
across time” [Ortiz and Cummins (2011), p. 17].39 The SWIID uses the World Income Inequality 
Database by the United Nations University, which is the successor of Deininger and Squire’s 
(1996) database, data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), Branko Milanovic’s World 
Income Distribution data, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the ILO’s 
Household Income and Expenditure Statistics. The total coverage is at 171 countries with 4,285 
country-year observations for the gross Gini and 4,340 country-year observations for the net Gini.  
The other important source for our research is the updated 2010 version of the Financial Structure 
Database by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2010), who collected data on both of our 
measures for financial development – private credit divided by GDP and bank deposits divided 
by GDP. Private credit is calculated based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and 
consists of credit provided by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private 
sector. It does not include credit provided to the state or by central banks. Bank deposits are also 
based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and consist of demand, time and savings 
deposits in deposit money banks. Both variables are standard measures of financial development 
and are used in the empirical literature described above.  
Finally, we control for a host of other variables that have traditionally been used to explain 
inequality. GDP per capita is used in constant USD and taken from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the definitions and sources of 
all variables used in this paper.40  
 
                                                          
39  Other datasets that claim to have a broad coverage and that are widely used in cross country studies include 
different measures of the Gini, e.g., household consumption or income, household or per person levels and gross or 
net income.  
40 Table A4.5 in the Appendix provides an overview of our measures for financial development and income 
inequality for all countries in our sample. Figure A4.4 in the Appendix provides a 3-D chart of income inequality 
against GDP p.c. and financial development. 
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Table 4.1 
Overview of variables and sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Gini (gross) and Gini (net) Gini coefficient of gross and net 
income 
Solt (2009) 
Financial development (1) –  
Private credit/GDP 
Private credit divided by GDP; claims 
on the private sector by deposit 
money banks and other financial 
institutions  
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine 
(2010) 
Financial development (2) –  
Bank deposits/GDP 
Bank deposits divided by GDP; 
demand, time and savings deposits 
in deposit money banks 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine 
(2010) 
GDP per capita Constant 2000 USD; country groups 
based on four income categories 
(high, upper middle, lower middle 
and low income) 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Legal origin Dummy variable regarding the origin 
of the legal system (British, French, 
German, Scandinavian, Socialist) 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny 
(2008) 
Inflation Consumer price index; change on 
previous year 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Agricultural sector Value added by the agricultural 
sector as a share of GDP 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Government consumption Government share of total 
expenditure 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank (2011) 
Access to finance Different measures for the access to 
finance, e.g., number of ATMs per 
100,000 inhabitants, minimum 
amount required to borrow as ratio 
over GDP p.c. 
Financial Access Survey, 
International Monetary Fund (2011) 
Ethnolingusitic fractionalization 
(ELF) 
Degree of the fractionalization of 
the population in 1985 with lower 
values indicating lower 
fractionalization 
Roeder (2001) 
 
Private credit over GDP can be used as a proxy for financial development, as it reflects the ease 
with which households and corporations may obtain credit. When more credit is provided to the 
private sector, private institutions find it easier to signal their creditworthiness at the respective 
lending rate and private individuals find credit markets to be more accessible. This argumentation 
does not always hold, as can be observed with real estate credit and the subprime crisis in the 
United States in 2007-08, but it is fairly robust over our entire sample. Furthermore, we do not 
have micro-level data regarding the distribution of credit in the population and among businesses 
and thus cannot asses how different groups in the population benefit from increasing credit 
provision and how this credit is used. Nonetheless, we do believe that it is a good proxy for 
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financial development, as there is a high correlation between private credit over GDP and access 
to finance, measured by other measures such as the number of ATMs or number of bank branches 
per population or per square mile.41 The alternative measure we use, bank deposits over GDP, 
serves as a proxy, as it again describes access to finance. With less or no financial development, 
fewer people have access to bank accounts. Lower values of bank deposits over GDP also reflect 
the lack of trust of creditors in their financial system and their banks. There are again some 
caveats, as we do not know the distribution of bank deposits among the population and 
businesses, and we have no data on the turnover rate of the deposits. Overall, and most 
importantly, both measures explain how effective the financial system performs its inherent task 
– channeling funds and intermediating between creditors and debtors.  
4.3.2 Income inequality over time and around the world 
Income inequality may be measured on a gross and on a net basis. Gross income excludes all 
income from non-private sources; i.e., it excludes pensions provided by the state to pensioners, 
all types of social transfers to economically poor people and abstains from subtracting taxes as 
well as social contributions. Net income, in contrast, includes all types of public transfers and 
deductions. Net income measures the amount an individual possesses and may use for 
consumption and saving. Neither gross nor net income is the ideal instrument to measure the 
market outcome when individuals determine whether to follow a career opportunity, as gross 
income does not reflect what amount an individual can spend and save today, and net income 
does not consider individuals’ earning entitlements on pensions and other social benefits. This 
paper consequently uses both measures of income inequality and investigates how gross and net 
income inequalities are affected by financial development and other explanatory factors.  
Income inequality (gross and net) is measured with Gini coefficients. The Gini for gross (net) 
income inequality is normally distributed for the entire pooled sample with a mean of 44.3 (38.4), 
standard deviation of 9.6 (10.1), skewness of .36 (.41) and kurtosis of 3.0 (2.5).42 Income 
inequality generally changes only slowly over time. Splitting the sample in observations by year, 
the Gini coefficient becomes more normally distributed over time with lower standard deviations. 
This process is accompanied by higher means. Figures A4.1 and A4.2 in the Appendix show the 
                                                          
41 Cf. table 4.7 for correlations between different measures of financial development. 
42 A normal distribution has a skewness of 0 and a kurtosis of 3. 
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distribution of gross and net inequality around the world, measured as the average over the years 
2000 to 2004. Inequality is highest in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Very high and 
increasing levels of gross income inequality can also be observed in developed countries, such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the level of net income 
inequality, i.e., after redistribution, is much lower than gross income inequality in developed 
countries, as shown in figure 4.1. Even countries that are considered as being very equal, such as 
Sweden, have a high level of gross income inequality. These examples show that in discussing 
equality aspects, one must be explicit whether equality before or after redistribution is 
considered. In Germany and Sweden, net inequality is relatively constant compared to gross 
inequality, unlike the United Kingdom and the United States, where net and gross inequality 
move in parallel. Redistribution in these countries does not change when gross inequality 
increases or decreases. This is a very interesting result on its own, as it demonstrates how 
different societies address the issue of unequal income distribution.  
A correlation analysis of gross and net Ginis with the other explanatory variables used shows that 
net income inequality has higher correlations with most variables compared to gross income 
inequality. From a theoretical point of view and with respect to the economic theories we 
outlined above, we must note that the theoretical case for financial development decreasing gross 
inequality may in fact be weaker than the case for financial development decreasing net 
inequality. Financial development may encourage risk taking, which may increase the gross Gini; 
meanwhile, financial development may allow households and countries to share their risks, thus 
reducing net Ginis. For all these reasons, we will focus on describing and interpreting the results 
of the estimations with net income inequality, but we will nevertheless report all results for gross 
income inequality throughout this paper.  
Figure 4.1 
Inequality over time 
The dark blue (light blue) line shows the Gini for gross income inequality (net income inequality).  
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4.3.3 Financial development over time and around the world 
Financial development, defined by private credit over GDP, is increasing over time. Figure 4.2 
shows our measure of financial development for a selection of developed countries. The process 
of financial development is generally more monotonic than the development of gross inequality. 
The mean for the entire sample is .45 with a standard deviation of .39. Figure A4.3 in the 
Appendix shows the stage of financial development for the countries in our sample for the years 
2000 to 2004. As expected, financial development is especially high in OECD countries, with the 
highest levels found in countries of Anglo-Saxon origin. The countries with the highest values are 
Iceland, Luxembourg and the United States. The distribution of financial development across 
countries and time is not as normal as it is for inequality, and thus, we transform the variable with 
logs for all estimations. This transformation changes the skewness from 1.5 to -.3 and the kurtosis 
from 5.0 to 2.8. In contrast to inequality, credit over GDP becomes more uniformly distributed 
across countries over time when examining different income country groups. Therefore, we do 
not observe a convergence to one level but rather that some countries remain at lower levels 
while other countries increase their credit provision more quickly. The second measure for 
financial development is bank deposits over GDP, which is used as a robustness check for credit 
over GDP. The development of bank deposits is similar to that of private credit (the mean is .42 
and the standard deviation is .38). However, we point out that these measures do not determine 
each other equally. Whereas bank deposits are a prerequisite for the provision of credit and may 
be viewed as a main determinant of credit, this relation does not hold in the other direction. 
Financial intermediaries pool deposits and provide credit. Debtors use this credit to invest or 
consume but do not put this money in their bank account. Reverse causality can thus be excluded. 
This characteristic is important when we address potential endogeneity issues in the empirical 
part of this paper.  
Figure 4.2 
 Financial development over time 
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4.4  ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
4.4.1 Basic estimation – comparison with previous research 
We test the hypotheses of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993), namely that 
financial development has a negative impact on income inequality, and the hypothesis of 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) that this influence follows an inverted U-shape. In the 
following, we label these hypotheses as GZ, BN and GJ. Our basic estimation thus allows for 
nonlinearities due to the Kuznets curve as well as the first increasing and then decreasing 
influence of financial development. Equation (4.1) enables a comparison of our dataset with Gini 
coefficients that are suited for cross-country research with the results from other research.  
(4.1)  𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐.𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐.𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Following the hypothesis of a linear negative influence, 𝛽1 should be negative and significant and 
𝛽2 should be insignificant. According to the inverted U-shape hypothesis, 𝛽1 should be 
significant and positive and 𝛽2should be significant and negative. We add GDP per capita and its 
squared term to control for the Kuznets curve. Therefore, 𝛽3 should be positive and significant 
and 𝛽4 should be negative and significant. Gini is normally distributed and rather stable and 
consequently is not transformed into logs. Both FD (financial development) and GDP p.c. are 
transformed into logs, as both variables have a skewed distribution. The square of the variables is 
taken from the log. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents the control variables used. Following Clarke et al. (2003, 
2006), we include ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), inflation, the share of government 
expenditure in GDP and the share of the agricultural sector in total value added.43 All measures 
but ELF are transformed in logs. Our second proxy for FD is bank deposits, which is also log-
linearized and treated similarly to credit. We estimate the model with ordinary least squares 
(OLS). One impediment to our estimation is heteroskedasticity, which we address by using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Furthermore, there are different approaches on how to 
proceed with yearly data.44 Yearly data may represent cyclical movements, whereas using a five-
year average yields a more balanced panel but at the same time means a loss in the number of 
                                                          
43 Clarke et al. (2003, 2006) use the share of the modern sector (industry and services), which is equivalent to one 
minus the agricultural share. 
44 Romer and Romer (1999) and Papageorgiou et al. (2008) use yearly data. Five-year averages are used by Clarke et 
al. (2003, 2006), Li et al. (1998) and Kappel (2010). Beck et al. (2004) and Kappel (2010) do not use information 
provided by yearly data or averages over several years and estimate the effect of financial development on income 
inequality with country means. 
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observations. To compare the results of this larger and more suitable dataset with previous work, 
we focus on five-year averages. Most variables change slightly between years, which also leads 
to greater variation with five-year averages.  
Table 4.2 
Basic estimation 
Income inequality, measured as the Gini coefficient, is the dependent variable for all models. Model 1 uses the Gini 
coefficient of gross income and model 2 uses the Gini coefficient of net income. All data are five-year averages and 
the models are estimated with default heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Model a is estimated without 
control variables and model b includes control variables. Model 2b’ includes all control variables except inflation, as 
omitting inflation increases the adjusted R². The Max/Min of FD (financial development) and GDP indicate the level 
at which the sign of the explanatory variable changes. Neither country fixed effects nor time dummies are included 
to make the results comparable to previous research. We also abstain from using cluster-robust standard errors to 
compare these results with previous research. The estimation results with bank deposits as a proxy for financial 
development are found in table A4.4 in the Appendix. 
 Model 
Gini (gross) Gini (net) 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b’) (2b) 
FD -3.17 -0.83 -6.83*** -4.17** -2.33 
FD² 0.58* 0.25 1.17*** 0.72** 0.44 
GDP p.c. 13.39*** 13.11*** 22.42*** 21.83*** 21.85*** 
GDP p.c.² -0.93*** -0.87*** -1.68*** -1.62*** -1.63*** 
ELF  6.57***  9.25*** 9.08*** 
Inflation  -0.46   -0.20 
Gov. expendit.  1.66*  -1.26 -0.96 
Agriculture  0.33  -1.57*** -1.56*** 
Constant 3.90 -9.79 -20.82*** -20.99** -24.27*** 
N 802 637 802 666 637 
R² 0.07 0.10 0.38 0.45 0.44 
Max/Min of:      
FD (priv. credit)  strictl. positive not significant  18.48% 18.11% not significant 
GDP (in USD) 1,376 1,933 784 832 828 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Using the approach of previous research, not correcting for clusters in the sample and not 
including a time trend or time dummies, this dataset confirms some of the earlier results. Pooling 
all observations while disregarding time-invariant country characteristics shows that GDP per 
capita is positive and significant in its linear form and negative and significant in its quadratic 
from. Therefore, the influence of GDP per capita mirrors an inverted U-shape – a Kuznets curve. 
Kuznets’ hypothesis on the development of income inequality during the process of economic 
development appears to be true, and the values for gross income inequality are in line with Clarke 
et al. (2003), who estimated the maximum of the Kuznets curve between 1,250 and 2,350 USD. 
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The maximum net income inequality is reached earlier at approximately 800 USD. This finding 
indicates that societies begin to redistribute income before the peak in gross income inequality is 
reached.  
The effect of financial development on income inequality is not so clear. Controlling for other 
factors, there is no significant effect of financial development on gross income inequality, which 
does not support the above theories. Estimating the effect on net income inequality, financial 
development appears to generate a U-shaped response in inequality, which is contradictory to the 
theories. BN and GZ are backed only up to a certain degree of development, whereas GJ can 
reasonably be rejected. Up to the provision of private credit over GDP of approximately 18%, 
financial development lowers net income inequality but increases inequality afterwards. A 
robustness check with the second proxy for financial development indicates that financial 
development does not have a significant effect on net income inequality and has only a small 
negative effect on gross income inequality (cf. table A4.4 in the Appendix). The results on the 
effect of financial development are consequently inconclusive, but we cannot fully confirm any 
of the theoretical models described above. In a second step, we correct the default standard errors 
in the pooled OLS estimation for clustered data.45 The Kuznets curve remains apparent, but the 
link of financial development and income inequality disappears.  
To summarize, using the approach of former papers with an advanced dataset confirms the results 
for the effect of GDP but backs the theoretical and known empirical effects of financial 
development only to a certain degree. 
4.4.2 Econometric hurdles 
Former research considered endogeneity and used an instrumental variable approach to estimate 
the impact of financial development, allowing for the possibility that inequality influences 
financial development or for an omitted variable bias. The results did not differ much from the 
OLS approach. Instruments for financial development were in line with the literature on financial 
development the origin of a country’s legal system. Following the same approach and using legal 
origin dummies as exogenous instruments leads to an R² of 57% in the first-stage regression in 
our sample when we include GDP p.c., the other exogenous explanatory variables of the second 
                                                          
45 Clarke et al. (2003) and Kappel (2010) do not report what type of standard errors they use. Therefore, we 
compare heteroskedasticity robust as well as cluster robust estimations with their results. 
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stage regression and the time dummies. The fitted values for FD have a correlation of 76% with 
the original values and thus may be viewed as having a good fit. 
However, legal origin may not be a good instrument for financial development when 
investigating the inequality nexus. This is best shown by the French motto “liberté, egalité, 
fraternité”, which of course includes equality. This characteristic shows that the origin of the 
legal system is not independent of inequality and is consequently not suitable as an instrument. 
To ensure that reverse causality is still not a problem, we conduct estimations with lagged 
explanatory variables, two-stage least square estimations and GMM estimation in our robustness 
section (cf. section 4.5 below).  
However, an endogeneity problem may also occur due to omitted variables. We address this issue 
by using a fixed effects regression including time dummies, which is also the main difference 
separating our econometric approach from previous research. Country dummies are included to 
control for country-specific characteristics that do not change over time but are potentially 
influential with regard to income inequality. These can be cultural factors, religion, colonial 
background and others. Time dummies are included to control for common shocks for all 
countries such as major international political events or large business cycle fluctuations. Finally, 
we allow for a linear time trend, as we expect credit and GDP p.c. to grow over time as countries 
become better developed and richer.  
Another problem often occurring in estimations is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity reduces the 
power of the OLS estimator, but the estimator remains unbiased and efficient. The Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) shows a high degree of multicollinearity, which is due to the structure of 
our base estimation with linear and squared terms of financial and economic development. 
Estimating the influence of financial and economic development on income inequality with either 
linear or squared terms only reveals a low result for the VIF and confirms that multicollinearity is 
not an issue in estimation.  
The estimations in table 4.2 may face an omitted variable bias because there are no country-
specific effects included aside from ethnolinguistic fractionalization that explains income 
inequality. Therefore, as a next step, we control for country-specific effects by conducting a fixed 
effects estimation. Fixed effects are not a cure for all omitted variable problems as time-variant 
country characteristics are not included, but it is a good first approach to tackle a potential 
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omitted variable bias (cf. Acemoglu et al. (2008)). A further potential critique regarding the 
estimation process is endogeneity caused by reverse causality. An option to solve reverse 
causality is to use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, which is performed in the next 
section.  
4.4.3 Fixed effects estimation 
Key to this paper is the explanation of the influence of financial development on income 
inequality within and not between countries. Therefore, the results are not to be used to compare 
the levels of income inequality across countries. The estimation results answer the question how 
financial development in the countries included in this broad dataset influences the income 
distribution. To estimate this influence, we use the fixed effects estimator, also known as a within 
estimator. The within estimator has the advantage of controlling for country characteristics and, 
in contrast to the between estimator, uses all observations of the dataset and developments over 
time. Amending the basic estimation (4.1) by time dummies 𝛾𝑡 and country-specific time-
invariant effects 𝛼𝑖 leads to the new estimation equation (4.2).  
(4.2) 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐.𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐.𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The fixed effects estimator subtracts the country-specific mean from each variable so that all 
time-invariant factors drop out. Table 4.3 shows the results of the fixed effects estimation. To 
ensure that reverse causality does not disturb the estimation, the results of a 2SLS-estimation with 
bank deposits taken as exogenous variable are included in table 4.3. As before, yearly data and 
five-year averages lead to similar coefficients, and we report five-year averages.  
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Table 4.3 
Fixed effects and 2SLS estimation 
Model 3 is estimated with Gini coefficients of gross income as the dependent variable, and model 4 uses Gini 
coefficients of net income. Model a is a fixed effects estimation without further control variables, model b is a fixed 
effects estimation with control variables and model c is a 2SLS estimation, where the first-stage results are shown 
in table A4.3 in the Appendix. All models use data averaged over five-year periods and are estimated with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Max/Min of FD (financial development) and GDP p.c. indicate the level 
at which the sign of the explanatory variable changes. All estimations include time dummies. The estimations with 
bank deposits as proxy for financial development are found in table A4.4. 
 Model 
Gini (gross) Gini (net) 
 (3a) (3b) (3c) (4a) (4b) (4c) 
FD 2.57*** 2.75***  1.76*** 1.89***  
FD - fitted  2.82***  2.13*** 
FD² not significant1 not significant1 
GDP p.c. -24.10*** -21.90*** -21.86*** -6.88 -9.04** -9.31** 
GDP p.c.² 1.56*** 1.40*** 1.39*** 0.43 0.56* 0.57* 
Inflation  -0.53* -0.55**  -0.35* -0.34* 
Govern. exp.  1.38 1.20  0.84 0.68 
Agriculture  0.13 0.07  -0.05 -.08* 
Constant 133.95*** 123.39*** 124.10*** 61.15*** 64.00*** 65.69*** 
N 802 668 669 802 668 669 
R² (within) 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.10 
Max/Min of:       
FD (priv. credit) strictl. pos. strictl. pos. strictl. pos. strictl. pos. strictl. pos. strictl. pos. 
GDP (USD) 2,240 2,547 2,659 not signif.  3,090 3,797 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
1Both terms for FD are insignificant in a quadratic estimation; therefore, FD only enters linearly in the model. 
 
We proceed in several steps, each of which produces similar results for the influence of financial 
development on income inequality. Independent of the inclusion of control variables, of the 
investigation of gross or net income and of a fixed effects or 2SLS-fixed effects model, financial 
development has a significantly positive effect on income inequality. In other words, our findings 
somewhat surprisingly suggest that financial development increases income inequality. The 
distribution of gross income reacts more strongly than the distribution of net income to financial 
development. For the normal fixed effects models, the impact is approximately 45% larger, and 
for the 2SLS, the magnitude of the effect is 33% larger. The influence is statistically highly 
significant, but its economic consequences are of a small magnitude. An increase of financial 
development by ten percent increases the net Gini by approximately 0.2 points.  
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Equally surprising are our results for the effects of GDP per capita or economic growth on 
inequality. In contrast to Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped hypothesis, income inequality first 
decreases with the process of development and increases after surpassing a threshold of roughly 
2,500 USD for gross income and over 3,000 USD for net income. A possible explanation for this 
behavior is that Kuznets was focusing on the time of industrialization over the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. The time period covered in this paper begins much later. The earliest observations in 
our dataset are from the 1960s, enabling an initial decreasing inequality to remain in line with 
Kuznets. However, when a country reaches a certain development level – which was not yet 
reached when Kuznets wrote his work – a small fraction of the population may be better able to 
extract rents from using their abilities, thereby increasing inequality again. Nevertheless, this fact 
does not exclude the possibility that the absolute income level of the poor also increases and that 
the poor benefit from economic and financial development. 
Inflation is the only control variable that is constantly significant. Considering inflation as an 
indicator of macroeconomic stability, the estimation results indicate that higher levels of 
uncertainty tighten the income distribution. Nonetheless, the small coefficient of inflation signals 
that the effect is economically minor. The explanatory power of the fixed effects estimation 
differs between gross and net income. The within-R² for gross income is over twice the size of 
that for net income, and thus, the estimation is more effective in explaining the development of 
gross income inequality over time. The main reason for the differences in explanatory power may 
reflect that gross income is closer related to the market outcome than net income which is also 
determined by redistributive policy.  
To summarize, both measures of financial development, private credit over GDP and bank 
deposits over GDP, support the first part of GJ that the use of financial intermediation does not 
hamper the poor but favors rich people. This claim is supported by our empirical analysis. In 
contrast, the predictions of BN and GZ are rejected by the estimation results. Because our results 
stand in contrast to theoretical models and some earlier empirical work, the next section will 
provide several robustness checks.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Financial Development and Income Inequality – A Panel Data Approach 
 
114 
 
4.5  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The robustness checks include estimations for subsamples of countries (cf. table 4.5), additional 
estimations with a lagged dependent variable and lagged explanatory variables (cf. table 4.6) and 
correlation analyses to further support the ratio of private credit over GDP as measure for 
financial development (cf. table 4.7).  
First, we investigate whether the effects on income inequality hold for different country groups. 
This estimation requires the use of yearly data, as five-year averages would provide only a small 
number of observations. We split the sample into four groups according to the income categories 
defined by the World Bank. The high-income group consists of 1,035 country-year observations, 
the upper-middle-income group consists of 633, the lower-middle-income group consists of 637, 
and the low-income group consists of 349. All estimations are performed with fixed effects 
estimators and yearly data, including time dummies, to identify the influence of financial and 
economic development on the variation of income inequality independent of a time factor and 
country-specific characteristics. We include the same control variables as before. Robust standard 
errors are used when necessary. Splitting the sample into country groups, we expect the signs of 
the coefficients for economic and financial development as follows:  
Table 4.4  
Financial development and the Kuznets curve in different income groups  
 Low inc. Lower middle income Upper middle income High income Rational/theory 
GDP positive positive 
or 
positive negative 
or 
positive negative   
Kuznets 
GDP² insig. insig. negative insig. negative insig.   
FD positive positive 
or 
positive positive 
or 
positive positive 
or 
negative Greenw. & 
Jovan. FD² insig. insig. negative insig. negative negative insig. 
 
Depending on the exact turning point in the models of Kuznets and Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
the squared terms of GDP per capita and financial development in the lower, upper middle and 
high income group may be insignificant, and we expect different signs of the linear terms for the 
high and low income groups. Table 4.5 shows that splitting the countries into subsamples backs 
the results of the previous section.  
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Table 4.5 
Fixed effects estimation by income group 
All estimations are fixed effects estimations with time dummies and robust standard errors. Max/Min of FD and 
GDP indicate the level at which the sign of the explanatory variable changes. All data are yearly data, as there are 
too few observations for this robustness check using five-year averages. The correlation coefficients for income 
inequality, financial development and GDP per capita by subgroup are provided in table A4.1. 
 Model 
 Gini (gross) Gini (net) 
Income level Low  Lower middle  
Upper 
middle  High  Low  
Lower 
middle  
Upper 
middle  High  
FD 4.80** 2.81*** 5.89* 15.87*** 2.72** 2.26** 1.77*** 1.75* 
FD² not significant1 -0.72 -1.70** not significant1 
GDP p.c. -0.18 18.39 34.41 -36.69* -99.39* 23.38* 8.94 -16.46 
GDP p.c.² -0.16 -1.51 -2.43 1.67 9.32* -1.90* -0.55 0.61 
Inflation 0.17 0.22 0.04 0.08 0.62* -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
Govern. exp -2.44 0.76 0.13 1.39 -0.56 -0.41 0.61 -0.64 
Agriculture -3.48 0.63 1.91*** -2.21* -0.88 0.27 2.60*** -1.42 
Constant 58.46 -15.69 -77.04 202.37** 302.04** -32.74 -13.73 126.93** 
N 349 633 637 1,035 349 633 637 1,035 
R² (within) 0.39 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.24 0.29 
Max/Min of:         
FD (credit) strictly 
positive 
strictly 
positive 
strictly 
positive 
107% strictly 
positive 
strictly 
positive 
strictly 
positive 
strictly 
positive 
GDP (USD) not 
signif. 
not 
signif. 
not  
signif. 
strictly.  
neg 
200 457 not 
signif. 
not 
signif. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
1Both terms for FD are insignificant in a quadratic estimation so that FD only enters linearly in the model. 
 
The estimation by country sample reveals that financial development has a positive effect on net 
income inequality for all country groups, which leads to the rejection of BN and GZ and confirms 
the part of GJ that explains rising inequality. For gross income inequality, we do find an inverted 
U-shaped influence. With regard to financial development, which is reflected by a ratio of private 
credit to GDP of 107%, increasing financial development leads to increasing income inequality. 
Only after this level is surpassed is income inequality reduced.  
For the influence of GDP, we only observe significant effects on gross income inequality in high-
income countries, where increasing income leads to a reduction in income discrepancy. For net 
income, there are only significant effects in the two lower-income groups. For very low incomes, 
i.e. below 200 USD, inequality is decreased before it rises. In the lower-middle-income group, 
inequality first increases and is reduced after reaching 457 USD. This finding indicates that a 
Kuznets curve may be observed for the lower-middle-income countries, but the p-values are close 
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to 0.1. Furthermore, GDP is of no significant influence for upper-middle-income and high-
income countries. As before, the control variables are mostly without a significant influence.  
Second, we adjust the fixed effects estimations to consider that income inequality changes slowly 
over time. Therefore, we include a lagged dependent variable that represents the long-term effects 
on income inequality. The variable is highly significant and shows that approximately half of 
gross income inequality is determined by its level of the previous five-year term. The coefficient 
for net income inequality is smaller, at approximately one third. Net income inequality thus reacts 
more to short-term factors and policy action compared to gross income inequality. Governments 
are consequently not as active (or as possible to act) on gross income inequality than they are on 
redistributing income and influencing the distribution of net incomes. Regarding the influence of 
financial development, the results are in line with our main fixed effects estimation: more 
financial development is associated with a more unequal income distribution, which is more 
pronounced for gross than for net income. For economic development, there is again an inverted 
Kuznets curve. Including the lagged dependent variable substantially increases the explanatory 
power of the estimations; the within-R² for the net Gini triples.  
Third, we control for potential reverse causality by taking lags of the explanatory variables. 
Addressing the arguments that the explanatory factors need time to influence income inequality 
and that there could be a simultaneity bias; this estimation measures the influence of financial and 
economic development on the income distribution in five years. The explanatory power on gross 
income inequality is reduced but remains approximately the same for net income inequality. The 
sign of financial development remains positive, and the coefficient increases by 107% for the 
gross Gini and 70% for the net Gini. The medium-term influence of financial development on 
income inequality is substantially more profound than the short-term influence. Furthermore, 
there is again the inverted Kuznets curve for gross income at the same GDP per capita level as 
without lagged variables. The influence of GDP per capita on net income inequality becomes 
negative. Higher levels of income, combined with increasing gross income inequality, therefore 
lead to higher redistribution and lower net income inequality. However, GDP per capita is 
significant at only the 10% level, with a p-value of 0.094.   
As a fourth step, the first difference estimator and GMM estimators are taken as further 
approaches to exclude potential endogeneity problems. As discussed above in the literature 
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review, there is an important recent view that growing inequality – at least in the United States – 
was in fact the driving cause of the recent credit boom and subsequent financial crisis (cf. e.g., 
Rajan (2010) or Kumhof and Ranciere (2010)). Whereas the issue appears to be empirically 
settled by Bordo and Meissner (2012), who use a large panel dataset and find that this view is 
incorrect, we nevertheless wish to examine how robust our results are to treating financial 
development as possibly endogenous variable and using a GMM estimator. The GMM estimator 
used tackles potential endogeneity problems by instrumenting the questionable variable with its 
own lag. A test on endogeneity of the financial development and GDP per capita variables 
following the GMM estimation states that the variables may be treated as exogenous and 
confirms the validity of our main fixed effects estimation. The GMM estimation also results in an 
inverted Kuznets curve for gross and net income inequality; however, the levels of GDP per 
capita when the influence of economic development on income equality changes are substantially 
higher. Regarding financial development, the projection of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) is 
supported. Up to a provision of private credit to GDP of 127% for gross income and 140% of net 
income, more financial development leads to higher inequality. Thereafter, financial development 
reduces inequality. The predictable power of this result should be treated with caution, as only 
very few OECD countries reached this high level of credit provision in the five years averaging 
2000-04 (cf. figure A4.3).    
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Table 4.6 
First difference estimator and lagged variables 
All estimations are performed for gross and net income inequality. The first model includes the lagged Gini 
coefficient and is estimated as a fixed effects model. The second model uses the first lag of all explanatory variables 
and is estimated as a fixed effects model. The third model is a first difference model and estimates the effect of 
changes in the explanatory variables on changes of the dependent variable. The fourth model is a 2-step GMM 
estimation (STATA command xtivreg2) using lagged variables of financial development and GDP per capita as 
instruments. All data are five-year averages, and all models except GMM, which uses a time variable, are calculated 
with time dummies and robust standard errors. 
 Model 
Gini (gross) Gini (net) 
(1) Lagged 
dependent  
(2) Lagged 
explanatory  
(3) First 
difference 
(4) GMM 
(1) Lagged 
dependent  
(2) Lagged 
explanatory  
(3) First 
difference 
(4) GMM 
Gini-lagged 0.48***    0.35***    
FD 4.35** 5.69** 1.39*** 16.58*** 3.61** 3.22** 1.34*** 11.51*** 
FD² -0.34 -0.61 0.43 -1.71* -0.28 -0.30 0.56 -1.17** 
GDP p.c. -15.05*** -25.40*** -0.96 -38.51*** -8.40** -7.89* -2.86** -16.54** 
GDP p.c.² 0.85** 1.62*** 4.43 2.06*** 0.45* 0.48 10.33** 0.81* 
Inflation -0.12 -0.15 -0.37* -0.23 -1.50 -0.44 -0.04 -0.25 
Gov. exp 0.83 1.35 0.48 0.35 1.44 1.57 1.53 0.16 
Agriculture -0.06 -0.21 -1.18 -1.37 0.24 -0.10 -018 -0.71 
Constant 76.64*** 130.08*** -3.14  49.44*** 60.62*** -0.64  
N 605 532 524 552 605 532 524 552 
R² (within) 0.45 0.18   0.30 0.14   
Max/Min of:         
FD (credit) strict. pos. strict. pos. strict. pos. 127% strict. pos. strict. pos. strict. pos. 140% 
GDP (USD) 6,836 2,530 not sig.  11,409 10,500 strict. neg.  26,372 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Another possible criticism of our approach concerns our measure of financial development. Does 
the magnitude of credit provision truly indicate financial development? We strongly believe so. 
First, the amount of credit over GDP indicates the level of financial intermediation. If financial 
intermediaries were unable to assess credit risk, to overcome a maturity mismatch and to pool 
savings, they would provide less credit to households and enterprises. Second, the amount of 
credit may be biased towards few borrowers with high amounts outstanding and many borrowers 
with low amounts of credit and even more potential borrowers with no access to finance at all. 
We address this criticism, which essentially asks whether the amount of credit does in fact 
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measure access to finance by investigating the empirical link between our measures of financial 
development and other maybe more direct measures of access to finance. The IMF’s Financial 
Access Survey (2011) and Demirgüc-Kunt, Beck and Honohan (2008) provide different measures 
for the access to financial intermediaries. Correlations of these measures with credit are shown in 
table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 
Access to finance and the provision of credit 
The number of ATMs is taken from the IMF’s Financial Access Survey. The other measures are taken from the 
World Bank. 
 Correlation 
coefficients 
Access to finance 
ATMs per 
100,000 
inhabitants 
(2004) 
Loans per 
1,000 people1 
Bank 
branches per 
100,000 
people1 
Minimum 
loan volume 
to SMEs as % 
of GDP p.c.1 
Share of adult population with 
access to an account with a 
financial intermediary1 
Credit over 
GDP 0.74 0.57 0.57 -0.26 0.69 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
# of countries 73 39 86 54 80 
1 Year may differ by country; credit over GDP is taken as the average from 1999 to 2003 
The measures for access to finance are only available as cross-section data and not as panel data 
and differ with regard to the number of countries covered. Therefore, a replication of the previous 
fixed effects panel estimations is not feasible, and a cross-country analysis remains the best 
option to investigate the appropriateness of the credit measure for financial development. The 
first out of five ratios under consideration is the number of ATMs per 100,000 inhabitants, which 
indicates how many people use bank accounts. If credit and bank access were only relevant for a 
few, there would be fewer ATMs. The correlation of 0.74 for a set of 73 countries backs our use 
of credit as a proxy for financial development. The number of loans and the number of bank 
branches point in the same direction. If only a small proportion of the population would use 
financial intermediaries for the provision of credit, there would be fewer banks and fewer loans. 
Financial development in the sense of Banerjee and Newman (1993) means that funding for small 
and medium enterprises becomes easier. In particular, small loans may help to start a business or 
grow a small business. The minimum loan volume should also be lower in better-developed 
financial markets, as credit evaluation and provision processes should be more efficient and 
worthwhile for banks, even for relatively lower amounts of credit. The negative correlation of 
minimum loan volume with total credits confirms this fact. Lower minimum credit volumes are 
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associated with a greater provision of credit. The fifth indicator we use is based on survey data 
and measures the overall access of the adult population to a bank account. Even developed 
countries in the European Union have values below 100%, as some people abstain from banking 
voluntarily or involuntarily due to discrimination or the fee structure. Again, more people using 
financial services are correlated with higher amounts of credit. All these correlations over 
different measures and different sets of countries are significant and legitimize in our view the 
use of the private credit over GDP ratio as a proxy for financial development.    
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Two phenomena can be observed over the last five decades around the world – increasing 
financial development and increasing gross income inequality in many countries, especially in the 
developed world. We discuss theoretical models, which explain the link between financial 
development and income inequality and predict that better-developed financial markets lead to 
decreasing levels of income inequality regarding labor and entrepreneurial income and first 
increasing and then decreasing levels regarding capital income. Earlier empirical research 
focusing on this financial development income inequality nexus broadly confirms the decreasing 
effect of financial development. This research either is built upon a pure cross-country 
perspective that cannot account for the many country-specific characteristics or uses panel data 
approaches but, again, neglects country-specific characteristics.  
Using a broader dataset and time-invariant country specifics in our panel estimation, we reach a 
different conclusion in the analysis of this nexus and reject these earlier theories and previous 
empirical research. Integrating time-invariant country characteristics, we find a positive 
relationship between financial development and income inequality within countries. Further 
developed financial markets lead to higher gross and net income inequality. This finding holds 
for several robustness checks, e.g., for subsamples by different income groups, neglecting 
country characteristics and including further control variables, as well as bank deposits as an 
alternative measure for financial development. The positive relationship is highly significant but 
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is only of a small magnitude. An increase in the provision of credit by ten percent leads to an 
increase in the Gini coefficient by 0.23 for the within estimation.46  
We do not exclude the possibility that all income groups within a country benefit from more 
financial development, but we do find that those who are already better off benefit more because 
income inequality is increasing. These results add to the existing literature on financial 
development and income inequality by using new estimation techniques and a dataset with more 
countries for a longer time horizon compared to previous research. Our results should, at the very 
least, allow researchers to remain somewhat skeptical when confronted with the supposedly 
beneficial effects of financial development. It appears instead to be very important to target 
financial development towards the poorest in society. Only then can we hope for inefficient and 
excessive inequality to reduce. Nonetheless, the relationship between finance, financial 
development and income inequality offers more research opportunities and merits more resources 
and effort.   
                                                          
46 This value ranges from 0.17 to 0.26 depending on the subsample and specification. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A4.1  
Correlation analysis 1 
Correlation of Gini coefficients with financial development (credit over GDP) and GDP per capita for the full sample 
and for subsamples along income groups. Correlations and significance levels were calculated in Stata by pwcorr, 
sig; FD (financial development) and GDP p.c. are in logs. 
 Complete Dataset (N=3228) 
 Gini (gross) Gini (net) FD GDP p.c. 
Gini (gross) 1.000    
Gini (net) .7852*** 1.000   
FD -.089*** -.397*** 1.000  
GDP p.c. -.145*** -.537*** .753*** 1.000 
 
  High income (N=1285)  Upper middle income (N=739) 
 Gini(g.) Gini (n.) FD GDP p.c. Gini (g.) Gini (n.) FD GDP p.c. 
Gini (gr.) 1.000    1.000    
Gini (net) .525*** 1.000   .825*** 1.000   
FD .142*** .063** 1.000  .298*** .301*** 1.000  
GDP p.c. .048*** -.231***    .642*** 1.000    .054 .206***      .235*** 1.000 
Gini (gr.) 1.000    1.000    
Gini (net) .826*** 1.000   .903*** 1.000   
FD -.083** -.049 1.000     .048 -.001 1.000  
GDP p.c. .242***  .350***    .511*** 1.000 .256*** .254*** .259*** 1.000 
  Lower middle income (N=765)  Low income (N=439) 
   ***,**,* denote statistical significance levels of the correlation coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table A4.2 
Correlation analysis 2 
Correlation of Gini coefficients, measures for financial development (both, private credit over GDP and bank 
deposits over GDP), GDP per capita and the control variables used in the analyses (N = 2,565). 
 
Table A4.3 
First stage regression – financial development 
The first-stage regression yields the fitted values of financial development (private credit over GDP) for the second-
stage regression for the Gini coefficients. The estimation is a fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors 
and time dummies. 
Dep. var: FD (credit) Coefficient p-Value 
Bank deposits 0.8145 0.000 
GDP p.c. 0.3381 0.435 
GDP p.c.² 0.0057 0.845 
Inflation -0.0071 0.676 
Government expenditure 0.1208 0.205 
Agriculture -0.0699 0.443 
Constant -2.3159 0.145 
N 668  
R² - within 0.67  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Gini  
(gross) 
Gini  
(net) 
FD  
(credit) 
FD  
(depos.) 
GDP 
p.c. 
Infla- 
tion 
Share of  
gover. 
expendi
ture 
Share of 
agricult. 
in GDP 
Ethno- Ling. 
Fractio-
nalization 
(ELF) 
Leg. 
org. 
UK 
Leg. 
org 
FR 
Leg. 
org 
GE 
Gini (gross) 1.00 
  
  
   
  
    Gini (net) 0.71 1.00 
 
  
   
  
    FD (credit) -0.04 -0.38 1.00   
   
  
    FD (deposits) -0.14 -0.40 0.86 1.00                 
GDP p.c. -0.12 -0.53 0.74 0.68 1.00 
  
  
    Inflation 0.08 0.23 -0.41 -0.40 -0.29 1.00 
 
  
    Gov exp. -0.02 -0.31 0.37 0.37 0.43 -0.21 1.00   
    Agriculture 0.08 0.42 -0.69 -0.66 -0.87 0.35 -0.41 1.00         
ELF 0.20 0.45 -0.34 -0.35 -0.52 0.11 -0.24 0.36 1.00 
   Legal org. UK 0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.04 -0.13 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.30 1.00 
  Legal org. FR 0.04 0.27 -0.19 -0.18 -0.16 0.12 -0.22 0.19 0.06 -0.69 1.00 
 Legal org. GE -0.22 -0.31 0.17 0.15 0.20 -0.09 0.09 -0.19 -0.31 -0.25 -0.37 1.00 
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Table A4.4 
Robustness check with bank deposits as proxy for financial development 
Bank deposits are used as a proxy for financial development. Model 1 is a pooled OLS estimation with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Model 2 uses cluster-robust standard errors. Model 3 is a fixed effects 
model with robust standard errors. All data are five-year averages and models are estimated with time dummies. 
 Model 
Gini (gross) Gini (net) 
(1) Pooled  
OLS 
(2) Pooled 
OLS-Cluster 
(3) Fixed  
effects 
(1) Pooled  
OLS 
(2) Pooled 
OLS-Cluster 
(3) Fixed  
effects 
FD -1.01* -1.01 2.34*** -0.67 -0.67 1.72*** 
FD² not signif.1 not signif. not signif.1 not signif. not signif. not signif.1 
GDP p.c. 12.05*** 12.05*** -21.49*** 20.38*** 20.38*** -9.08** 
GDP p.c.² -0.81*** -0.81*** 1.49*** -1.51*** -1.51*** 0.67** 
ELF 5.72*** 5.72* time invariant 9.23*** 9.23*** time invariant 
Inflation -0.60* -0.60 -0.52* -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 
Gov. exp 2.24** 2.24 1.78 -0.84 -0.84 1.04 
Agriculture -1.04* -1.04 0.01 -1.81*** -1.81* 0.03 
Constant 9.84 9.84 115.73*** -22.78** -22.78 57.84*** 
N 638 638 638 638 638 638 
R² (within)   0.25   0.12 
Max/Min of:       
FD (deposits) strict. neg. not signif. strict. pos. not signif. not signif. strict. pos. 
GDP (USD) 1,726 1,726 1,377 854 854 843 
***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
1 Both terms of FD (bank deposits) in the quadratic form are insignificant, but FD is significant in its linear form. 
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Table A4.5 
Income inequality and financial development by country 
Only country-year observations with information on income inequality (Gini), financial development (credit) and 
GDP per capita are included in the table, as other information were not used for the basic estimation. 
  Gini (gross)   Financial development (credit) 
Country N Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max 
High income  1285 42.84 25.01 64.37  74.57 7.04 269.76 
Australia 44 39.76 31.29 43.96  50.24 19.31 121.43 
Austria 33 42.85 33.08 51.81  80.59 38.14 111.58 
Bahamas, The 32 54.05 48.20 61.43  50.96 31.85 69.94 
Barbados 28 45.56 40.46 52.16  40.93 31.01 49.94 
Belgium 36 34.01 25.01 51.29  45.82 11.23 93.70 
Canada 46 39.46 35.82 43.82  78.13 17.73 183.83 
Croatia 14 34.87 32.40 38.21  42.67 24.98 67.32 
Cyprus 19 42.59 37.00 47.44  140.18 91.21 200.80 
Czech Republic 15 35.50 33.58 36.81  48.72 29.21 69.25 
Denmark 47 48.70 45.43 54.55  54.76 22.02 209.82 
Estonia 16 48.79 43.93 51.56  41.50 9.47 99.25 
Finland 44 42.96 36.38 64.37  55.73 37.18 93.26 
France 35 42.22 31.28 54.70  73.82 22.36 106.75 
Germany 37 46.36 31.43 55.95  91.10 63.09 116.93 
Greece 41 44.67 38.55 55.23  37.04 13.48 91.66 
Hong Kong 16 54.37 47.17 59.54  146.53 124.36 176.76 
Hungary 26 41.00 28.16 48.28  33.78 16.18 64.21 
Iceland 4 41.65 40.31 43.01  181.12 116.44 269.76 
Ireland 44 44.45 38.87 47.43  70.71 30.42 205.77 
Israel 30 41.29 30.67 45.08  57.34 31.66 88.39 
Italy 42 45.23 38.18 51.12  64.67 47.56 103.33 
Japan 45 37.87 34.26 41.70  126.38 51.27 200.61 
Korea, Rep. 38 39.69 35.16 45.97  84.09 36.41 144.59 
Latvia 15 47.19 42.15 53.20  34.42 7.04 94.72 
Luxembourg 31 36.39 27.55 43.96  102.30 56.07 211.42 
Malta 8 45.75 43.65 48.62  106.02 101.81 112.37 
Netherlands 43 41.48 37.54 53.74  101.34 41.61 192.60 
New Zealand 45 40.03 33.07 47.00  60.55 23.76 140.14 
Norway 42 42.32 37.74 48.13  85.28 58.16 113.89 
Poland 19 41.13 34.01 47.97  23.70 14.87 40.55 
Portugal 32 53.44 46.42 61.05  90.08 47.99 171.69 
Singapore 44 46.98 42.30 53.13  87.45 35.03 135.74 
Slovak Republic 15 33.98 29.75 36.83  40.90 29.60 52.87 
Slovenia 17 33.55 29.20 35.35  38.03 19.45 80.95 
Spain 35 38.81 32.93 46.65  87.25 63.67 188.49 
Sweden 49 44.60 36.94 51.09  89.64 51.37 134.88 
Switzerland 26 42.29 39.17 56.64  146.44 100.84 162.99 
Trinidad a. Tobago 34 44.69 37.83 64.06  39.84 12.28 62.16 
United Kingdom 49 43.30 37.30 48.78  70.33 16.05 189.56 
United States 49 43.50 39.33 47.93  116.43 70.53 210.73 
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  Gini (gross)   Financial development (credit) 
Country N Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max 
Upper middle income 739 49.49 27.52 77.28  32.31 2.80 155.25 
Albania 10 32.27 30.62 35.13  5.46 2.80 11.81 
Algeria 23 37.71 35.28 40.75  26.11 4.14 68.29 
Argentina 22 46.20 43.04 50.38  16.17 9.77 25.18 
Botswana 24 55.86 52.60 59.64  12.68 6.54 19.65 
Brazil 17 56.45 52.66 58.53  35.26 27.03 54.49 
Bulgaria 17 32.62 27.52 38.39  34.22 8.94 68.19 
Chile 30 52.76 50.91 54.45  52.84 11.08 74.34 
Colombia 41 58.53 48.86 67.50  25.34 16.83 35.65 
Costa Rica 38 48.55 43.30 60.89  22.45 10.47 51.96 
Dominica 1 41.41 41.41 41.41  63.30 63.30 63.30 
Dominican Republic 22 48.86 45.91 50.44  22.20 14.80 30.75 
Fiji 17 52.46 50.30 54.29  26.51 18.04 38.25 
Gabon 8 57.68 42.74 70.66  12.82 7.89 16.37 
Grenada 1 53.19 53.19 53.19  67.08 67.08 67.08 
Iran 35 47.26 42.95 53.25  28.16 18.64 43.62 
Jamaica 37 59.57 47.56 77.28   22.95 13.15 30.66 
Kazakhstan 13 37.11 34.01 41.94  14.72 4.97 36.83 
Lithuania 15 47.83 47.07 48.71  23.30 10.22 61.23 
Macedonia, FYR 14 32.88 29.72 38.94  23.66 17.38 37.01 
Malaysia 38 51.85 40.32 67.17  75.53 7.10 155.25 
Mauritius 31 47.98 39.73 56.62  38.34 20.63 72.35 
Mexico 42 51.49 46.72 68.75  20.36 8.69 37.10 
Panama 44 52.22 47.97 57.37  51.24 10.51 97.32 
Peru 20 47.65 44.34 51.01  16.94 3.16 27.89 
Romania 12 43.19 40.46 49.79  14.45 6.43 36.87 
Russian Federation 16 47.48 43.48 51.34  18.78 6.78 48.54 
Serbia 6 41.13 40.29 41.77  22.01 16.31 27.98 
Seychelles 1 57.59 57.59 57.59  22.45 22.45 22.45 
South Africa 38 65.45 61.70 70.24  80.68 43.44 132.56 
St. Lucia 2 49.75 40.25 59.26  67.72 58.26 77.19 
St. Vincent and the Gren. 1 66.41 66.41 66.41  43.94 43.94 43.94 
Suriname 7 50.28 50.05 50.51  14.33 7.27 21.88 
Turkey 25 45.36 41.75 50.84  14.67 10.91 18.79 
Uruguay 28 41.39 40.10 43.00  33.56 19.99 67.05 
Venezuela, RB 43 43.98 41.28 58.27  28.83 8.13 66.17 
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  Gini (gross)   Financial development (credit) 
Country N Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max 
Lower middle income 765 46.64 30.43 77.36  27.48 1.14 165.96 
Angola 6 60.34 60.06 60.61  3.12 1.14 4.45 
Armenia 15 45.68 39.59 54.42  7.86 3.09 23.42 
Belize 7 55.57 50.58 59.07  41.33 37.26 46.80 
Bhutan 3 48.17 48.07 48.27  14.60 11.48 18.08 
Bolivia 22 53.61 44.10 58.26  38.22 4.47 63.04 
Cameroon 19 47.69 43.96 49.51  16.93 6.66 28.14 
Cape Verde 17 50.06 42.35 55.89  24.15 3.02 41.13 
Cote d'Ivoire 32 48.89 38.20 59.84  28.93 14.91 41.22 
Ecuador 28 50.59 42.81 61.64  21.63 12.91 40.67 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 41 36.32 32.71 51.35  25.89 11.43 53.38 
El Salvador 42 51.16 47.46 63.71  28.01 16.82 43.53 
Georgia 10 45.44 43.14 47.55  6.45 3.31 11.31 
Guatemala 29 54.27 42.14 57.89  17.43 11.25 29.04 
Guyana 5 44.62 43.94 45.60  41.49 23.17 54.89 
Honduras 24 55.94 52.46 72.79  31.34 13.84 46.60 
India 46 35.35 31.99 44.51  19.46 7.84 36.37 
Indonesia 29 34.98 32.19 38.59  28.29 9.04 53.53 
Jordan 30 39.88 35.08 48.67  63.62 32.15 83.50 
Lesotho 18 59.67 51.95 64.54  13.78 5.60 20.05 
Moldova 13 41.22 37.24 44.46  14.78 4.45 29.68 
Mongolia 11 35.69 34.15 38.72  13.49 6.25 32.63 
Morocco 38 47.48 37.71 69.06  31.34 11.74 60.91 
Nigeria 35 50.80 43.40 65.16  11.20 3.33 18.93 
Pakistan 43 39.05 30.43 44.15  21.92 12.83 27.57 
Papua New Guinea 11 49.05 40.62 52.56  15.07 12.37 17.95 
Paraguay 19 50.98 37.51 55.35  22.09 13.18 29.03 
Philippines 45 55.42 45.83 61.30  30.64 16.94 54.06 
Senegal 17 44.93 39.50 58.56  18.13 14.51 26.10 
Sri Lanka 27 45.33 32.52 57.22  18.55 7.74 28.71 
Swaziland 13 55.25 49.07 77.36  14.14 10.92 18.83 
Thailand 36 50.18 43.98 60.27  68.38 15.07 165.96 
Tunisia 18 41.01 39.03 42.02  60.64 48.67 66.60 
Vietnam 11 37.60 36.34 38.64  36.33 17.23 64.37 
Yemen, Rep. 5 36.51 32.24 39.03  5.64 4.67 6.47 
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  Gini (gross)   Financial development (credit) 
Country N Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max 
Low income 439 46.91 29.70 75.08  12.23 1.10 41.41 
Bangladesh 10 34.08 33.16 35.75  24.41 15.12 31.14 
Benin 4 37.43 36.89 37.97  13.59 12.05 15.11 
Burkina Faso 10 50.79 44.77 54.31  9.40 5.73 12.84 
Burundi 15 37.40 34.17 41.02  19.81 14.25 27.95 
Cambodia 10 44.64 43.77 45.73  5.52 3.14 7.64 
Central African Rep. 2 61.41 60.96 61.86  5.14 4.50 5.78 
Chad 4 40.85 40.75 40.92  3.35 2.77 3.96 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 44.70 44.52 44.88  1.88 1.58 2.19 
Ethiopia 25 37.64 30.39 44.22  18.45 9.90 30.20 
Gambia, The 12 52.54 48.15 59.91  13.55 8.88 26.07 
Ghana 25 38.69 35.59 42.79  6.98 1.40 15.52 
Guinea-Bissau 15 43.72 36.30 54.61  4.08 1.49 7.62 
Haiti 11 54.06 53.61 56.05   12.74 10.26 13.99 
Kenya 39 61.34 49.80 75.08  25.82 12.19 34.96 
Kyrgyz Republic 12 42.60 39.00 47.30  5.97 3.74 11.29 
Lao PDR 11 34.88 31.10 37.16  7.14 3.63 9.19 
Madagascar 30 45.24 40.00 46.88  13.86 7.88 21.24 
Malawi 25 58.57 39.45 72.33  11.14 4.95 20.12 
Mali 18 44.17 37.51 53.00  13.48 8.13 17.11 
Mauritania 14 43.66 38.79 47.50  25.61 16.53 41.41 
Mozambique 10 42.82 40.15 46.01  11.27 8.31 15.39 
Nepal 29 42.59 29.70 63.98  14.55 3.72 28.31 
Niger 14 45.95 40.58 50.51  6.06 3.54 11.79 
Rwanda 6 46.96 45.85 48.08  10.60 10.16 11.04 
Sierra Leone 32 58.14 45.31 67.51  3.98 1.89 7.78 
Tanzania 12 39.55 36.06 44.50  7.97 3.08 15.09 
Togo 2 35.13 35.13 35.14  16.52 16.48 16.57 
Uganda 20 41.82 37.01 46.09  3.94 1.10 5.87 
Zambia 20 53.90 46.48 57.71  6.35 3.69 8.69 
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Figure A4.1 
Gross income inequality around the world 
Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of gross income. Data is based on averages from 2000 to 
2004. 
 
 
Figure A4.2  
Net income inequality around the world 
Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of net income. Data is based on averages from 2000 to 2004. 
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Figure A4.3 
Financial development around the world 
Financial development is measured by the average volume of private credit over GDP from 2000 to 2004. 
 
 
Figure A4.4 
Financial development, economic development and income inequality 
3D-graph for the relationship between Gini, economic and financial development with all country-year 
observations. 
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